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Writing a Ph.D. thesis is a rite of passage to becoming a member of a (new) academic 
community, which defines itself through its “discipline”. One must study so much more 
than written arguments; for it is a journey to understand which arguments count, and 
which do not; and the best way to do this is to immerse oneself – almost like an 
ethnographer – and to listen to participants within that academic community. Listening to 
the “LSE Political Theory” group in the early phases of this thesis was therefore a 
rewarding adventure, and I am grateful to the various convenors of that group and 
especially: Chandran Kukathas, Christian List, Anne Phillips, Kai Spiekermann and Lea Ypi. 
My special thanks are reserved to Katrin Flikschuh, whose philosophical guardianship and 
“Kantian” brilliance have been essential to my unlocking of the treasures of the discipline. 
For all their love, support and serenity, I would equally like to thank Roberta Bassi as well 
as Isolde and Dieter Schütze. Last but not least, let me salute Miran Norderland – a follow 
LSE traveller and good friend –  for his sharp humour and excellent company on this 
academic journey to an unknown destination.  
Much doctoral work has often not yet entirely matured to be published; and this thesis is – 
unfortunately – no exception to that rule. I am acutely aware of its literary gaps and 
argumentative weaknesses; and complementary chapters on the “French” nineteenth 
century and the “settled” – positivist – twentieth century are envisaged in the future (as 
well as time and distance from what has already been written here) before a final version 
may ultimately appear. I therefore deplore the LSE’s – illiberal – philosophy of forcing 
everyone to publish, albeit with some delay, his or her Ph.D. thesis online. In my view, this 
is an attitude that further contributes to the fast-publishing mode of our times and the 
ever-greater presence of not-yet-ripe arguments in the academic sphere. It seems that the 
publishing motto of the nineteenth century prince of another discipline – pauca sed matura – 
is irretrievably lost in an university context that values short-term quantity far more than 
long-term quality. Can this trend be reverted? I sincerely hope so; but, in the meantime, I 















Having lost the theological certainties of the past, all modern scholars of international law 
battle to establish normative foundations for the new “law of nations”. What is the 
relationship between “natural law” and the “positive” international law? By the eighteenth 
century, the quantity of positive international law and its legal quality had become a major 
philosophical problem. For if positive international law existed, what was its relation to 
natural law and what was the “reason” behind its (presumed) status as “law”? How could 
international norms be “laws” if there was no “government” above the States? These 
questions continued, during the eighteenth century, to be generally answered in favour of 
natural law; while the relationship between “natural law” and the “law of nations” remained 
open. But ever since the French and the Kantian revolution, “rationalistic” natural law 
conceptions were increasingly challenged. What did step into their place to justify the 
binding nature of international norms during the nineteenth century?  
The thesis traces the various theoretical and practical responses to this question. It argues 
that the nineteenth century develops its own conception of “natural law”. This however is 
a natural law that is neither universal nor rationalist but is instead “national” and 
“historicist”. The nineteenth century should therefore not be characterised as a “positivist” 
century in which international norms lacked a metaphysical normativity. While an 
“apologetic” turn towards state sovereignty ultimately takes place by the end of that 
century, it is only after the First World War that a new “positivistic” era of international law 
triumphs. In order to demonstrate this, the thesis explores the German and British 
philosophical and jurisprudential discourses in the long nineteenth century (1789-1914); 
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With the decline of the ideas of “empire” and “res publica christiana” in the early 
modern period,1 the belief in a “universal” law is gradually replaced by legal pluralism. 
The apostles of State sovereignty come to deny the very existence of any supranational 
authority above the State and introduce a distinction that still structures our political 
imagination: the distinction between national and international law.2 The former is the 
sphere of subordination within a sovereign State; the latter becomes the sphere of 
coordination between sovereign States. International law is henceforth no longer the 
(cosmopolitan) ius gentium of mankind;3 it becomes the ius inter gentes that regulates the 
formal interactions between sovereign states.4 From the perspective of this “modern” 
international law, a “civil law” between sovereigns leads to a contradiction. For if 
sovereignty is the defining characteristic of the modern State, there could be no higher 
“civil” authority binding states.  
For Hobbes (and, following him, Pufendorf), the ius gentium therefore cannot be 
“positive law”; it can only be “natural law” whose intrinsic authority derives from 
divine nature.5 International law is nothing but the law of nature applied to nations: 
“the law of nations properly so called … is nothing else, but the law of nature itself, 
 
1 On this point: J. N. Figgis, Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius: 1414–1625 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
2 In the following pages, I will predominantly refer to “international law” and treat this concept as 
interchangeable with the older “law of nations”.  
3 In antiquity, the idea of “international law” begins inside the history of the “ius gentium”. It is 
associated with “natural law”, that is: the law that is universally valid because it applies to all human 
beings. Roman legal theory conceptually contrasts it to the “civil law”. The latter applies within 
particular civil societies, whereas the “ius gentium” applies to all societies as ius commune (Gaius, The 
Institutes (Translated by: W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson) (Duckworth, 1988). Unlike our modern 
understanding, the ius gentium is consequently not the law between civil societies (or states). The ius gentium 
is the common law of all mankind; that nonetheless steps into the background whenever a society has 
chosen “its” domestic law. This conception of ius gentium identifies the latter with private international 
law; it is the law that applies to relations with foreign individuals (cf. P. Vinogradoff, Historical Types of 
International Law (Brill, 1923), 25). 
4 Richard Zouche is often credited – albeit not by Bentham – to be one of the first modern authors to 
use the term “jus inter gentes”, that is: the “Law between Nations”. See: R. Zouche, An Exposition of 
Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law between Nations, and Questions concerning the Same (originally published: 
1650; Brierly Translation, Carnegie, 1911). Vitoria had however already used the term a century earlier 
(W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (De Gruyter, 2000), 25).  
5 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (edited: R. Tuck, CUP 1996), 244: “Concerning the Offices of one Sovereign to 
another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not 
say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing… 
And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and 
what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the 
Consciences of Sovereign Princes and Sovereign Assemblies; there being no Court of Natural Justice, 
but in the conscience only, where not Man, but God reigneth[.]” 
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not applied to men considered simply as such but to nations.”6 This especially means 
that neither international treaties nor international custom are proper sources of 
international law. All “proper” international law derives from the (divine) nature of 
things, which must be deciphered by human reason – a task that elevates philosophical 
jurists into the legal conscience of the world.7  
What are the normative qualities of this natural law? First and foremost, its verity and 
authority are guaranteed by God or Nature;8 and it is unquestionably binding “law”. 
This law is, secondly, “necessary” and “eternal”; and, as such, it is – thirdly – also 
universal: it binds “all Mankind”.9 For Wolff, international law thus applies to all the 
nations at all “civilisational” stages and to all the religions of the world.10 And the 
European enlightenment scholars were not simply “universalists”: by insisting on the 
sovereign equality of each and every nation, they were decidedly anti-imperialist too.11 
(Classic natural law indeed insists that, whilst a more “civilised” nation is obliged to 
help a less civilised one to progress and perfect itself,12 it cannot force such progress 
and civilisation onto another.13) A utopian conception of universal solidarity can thus 
be found in the most popular textbook of the eighteenth century: Emer de Vattel’s 
 
6 J.-J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law (originally published: 1747; Liberty Fund, 2006), 
174. 
7 For an eighteenth-century example of this view, see C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (translation: 
J. H. Drake, Clarendon Press, 1934). The work was originally published in 1749.  
8 See, most famously: H. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace – Book 1 (editor: R. Tuck; Liberty 
Fund,2005), 89. 
9 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (supra n.5), 244. 
10 With regard to religion and the validity of international treaties, see for example, C. Wolff, Jus Gentium 
Methodo Scientifica (supra n.7), §429: “[I]n making treaties no consideration is to be given to the religion 
to which the nations are devoted. (…) So nothing prevents a nation devoted to the sacred rites of the 
Christians from entering into a treaty with a nation Mohammedan in religion, as, for example, with 
Turks or Persions.” 
11 S. Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton University Press, 2003), 1. For an excellent and 
nuanced analysis of the relationship between (European) international law and colonialism see the 
magisterial J. Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht (Steiner, 1984); as well as G. Cavallar, 
Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European Colonialism and Exploitation 
or True Cosmopolitans?, (2008) 10 Journal of the History of International Law 181.  
12 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.7), §168. 
13 Ibid., § 169: ““[I]f any nation wishes to promote the perfection of another, it cannot compel it to 
allow that to be done; if some barbarous and uncultivated nation is unwilling to accept aid offered to it 
by another in removing its barbarism and rendering its manners more cultivated, it cannot be compelled 
to accept such aid, consequently it cannot be compelled by force to develop its mind by the training 
which destroys barbarism and without which cultivated manners cannot exist. Barbarism and 
uncultivated manners give you no right against a nation.” 
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“Law of Nations” (1758).14 Vattel here defends the idea of a cosmopolitan society of 
mankind in the following words: 
“The universal society of the human race being an institution of nature herself, that is 
to say, a necessary consequence of the nature of man, — all men, in whatever stations 
they are placed, are bound to cultivate it, and to discharge its duties. They cannot 
liberate themselves from the obligation by any convention, by any private association. 
When, therefore, the unit in civil society for the purpose of forming a separate state 
or nation, they may indeed enter into particular engagements towards those with 
whom they associate themselves; but they remain still bound to the performance of 
their duties towards the rest of mankind.”15 
 
The object of this cosmopolitan “natural society established between all mankind” is 
to lend each other “mutual assistance” so as to help each state to attain perfection;16 
and the highest duty therefore is “that every individual nation is bound to contribute every thing 
in her power to the happiness and perfection of all others”.17 This utopian solidarity is however 
quickly qualified. For the highest natural right of nations is the “liberty and 
independence” of each state.18 While states are to help each other in the perfection of 
mankind, they cannot be forced to help; nor can they be forced to accept any 
civilisational assistance: 
“[T]hough a nation be obliged to promote, as far as lies in its power, the perfection of 
others, it is not entitled forcibly to obtrude these good offices on them. Such an 
attempt would be a violation of their natural liberty. In order to compel any one to 
receive a kindness, we must have an authority over him; but nations are absolutely 
free and independent. Those ambitious Europeans who attacked the American 
nations, and subjected them to their greedy dominion, in order, as they pretended, to 
civilize them, and cause them to be instructed in the true religion, — those usurpers, 
I say, grounded themselves on a pretext equally unjust and ridiculous. It is strange to 
hear the learned and judicious Grotius assert that a sovereign may justly take up arms 
to chastise nations which are guilty of enormous transgressions of the law of nature, 
which treat their parents with inhumanity like the Sogdians… Could it escape Grotius, 
that, notwithstanding all the precautions added by him in the following paragraphs, 
his opinion opens a door to all the ravages of enthusiasm and fanaticism, and furnishes 
ambition with numberless pretexts?”19  
 
 
14 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations (translator: J Chitty; Johnson & Co, 1883). The book was originally 
published in 1758. The subtitle of Vattel’s book importantly is: “Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied 
to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. 
15 Ibid., Preliminaries, §11. 
16 Ibid., Preliminaries, §12. 
17 Ibid., Preliminaries, §13. 
18 Ibid., Preliminaries, §15. 
19 Ibid., Book II, §7. 
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Could there be a clearer plea in favour of universal equality and against civilisational 
imperialism? And yet: one hundred-fifty years later, the “universality” and “anti-
imperialism” defended by the classic “enlightenment tradition” had given way to its 
very opposite. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the dominant ideology within 
international law had come to conceive of a “European family of nations” that was 
entitled to exclude all non-civilised members from its scope. The older universalist 
conception of international law thus appears to contract during the nineteenth 
century;20 and once some original members of the “natural” society of mankind are 
expelled, they become lawless “barbarous” nations that can be civilised and colonized 
according to a (Western) European standard of civilisation.  
How did this transformation from a universal and inclusive to a regional and exclusive 
conception of international society come about? What were the underlying conceptual 
changes behind this transformation? For Charles H. Alexandrowicz – the famous 
proponent of the “contraction thesis” – the dramatic change in the structure of 
international law was caused by the rise of a “positivist” philosophy in the nineteenth 
century: 
“In this connection it would be relevant to refer to the significant doctrinal changes 
at the end of the eighteenth century when the law of nations (based on the natural law 
ideology) was to give way to positivist tendencies which gathered momentum in the 
early nineteenth-century. Whatever the ideological content of natural law as the basis 
of the law of nations, be it natural law in the interpretation given to it by the writers 
of the Spanish school, by Grotius or by the lawyers of the period of enlightenment 
(Vattel), it had certain functional qualities which remain part and parcel of its 
operation in practice throughout all the changing faces of the classic period. One of 
them was the concept of universality of the law of nations, the other the absence of 
constitutivism in so far as a recognition of States or Sovereigns was concerned.  (…) 
How constitutivism came to be established in the early nineteenth century has been 
tentatively discussed elsewhere. Suffice it to say that its appearance coincides with the 
replacement of the natural law ideology by positivism, particularly that of the Hegelian 
brand.”21 
 
But is this really an adequate portrayal of the underlying conceptual causes triggering 
the transformation of international law from a universal and utopian to a European 
 
20 There has been a lively debate with regard to the “contraction thesis” in the past fifty years. Its 
principal proponent is C.H. Alexandrowicz, whose major contributions here are: “Doctrinal Aspects of 
the Universality of the Law of Nations”, (1961) 37 British Yearbook of International Law 506; as well 
as “An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies” (Clarendon Press, 1967).  
21 Ibid., 9. The reference to the author’s earlier work is to “The Theory of Recognition in Fieri” (1958) 
34 British Yearbook of International Law 176. 
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and apologetic international law? What does “positivism” here mean, and can Hegel 
really be identified with the new “positivist” philosophy?  
Doubts about the “Alexandrowicz thesis” emerged early on. Building on the work of 
Carl Schmitt,22 the most radical critique here endorses the very antithesis to the 
contraction theory. Wilhelm Grewe thus writes: within the nineteenth century 
“primarily under British influence, international law increased in scope to become universal”.23 
And doubting that the jurists of the nineteenth century were “‘positivists’ in any clear 
sense”;24 the  argument has – rightly – been made that the presence or absence of 
international treaties between European and non-European states simply cannot 
provide evidence for or against the contraction thesis.25 A causal relation between 
positivism and the decline of a universal international law has therefore been 
questioned, because no specifically European “positive” international law “ever 
existed”.26  Instead of “positivism”, it has recently been counter-argued, it was the 
“ideology of colonialism” that formatively shaped the dominant conception of 
international law in the nineteenth century.27 A variant of this “colonialist thesis” has 
finally combined colonialism and positivism into joint sinners: 
“The existence of a distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized was so 
vehemently presupposed by positivist jurists, that the state of nature – and therefore 
naturalism – becomes epistemologically incoherent because lacking this central 
distinction. Positivist jurisprudence was so insistent on this distinction that any system 
of law that failed to acknowledge it was unacceptable. In crude terms, in the naturalist 
world, law was given; in the positivist world, law was created by human societies and 
institutions. Once the connection between “law” and “institutions” had been 
 
22 C. Schmitt, Strukturwandel des internationalen Rechts, in: C. Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus? Arbeiten 
zum Völkerrecht und zur internationalen Politik, 1924-1978 (Duncker & Humblot, 2005); and, more 
generally, see Schmitt’s „Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum“ (Duncker 
& Humblot, 1997). 
23 W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 429. For an extended discussion 
of the “expansion thesis” and its direct confrontation with the “contraction thesis”, see Grewe’s “Vom 
europäischen zum universellen Völkerrecht” (1982) 29 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht 
und Völkerrecht 449. For a brilliant critique of the Schmitt/Grewe thesis, see however: J. Fisch, Die 
europäische Expansion (supra n.11), eps. 475-499.  
24 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 131. 
25 J. Pitts, Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire (Harvard University Press, 2018), 21: “The fact 
that European states signed treaties with so many non-Christian powers in the course of their global 
expansion does not show, pace Alexandrowicz, that they saw these treaties as foundational to the law 
of nations in the way that treaties within Europe were thought to be.” 
26 A. Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law, (2006) 17 European Journal of International 
Law 315 at 333. For a quantitative analysis to buttress this point for the nineteenth century, see: E. 
Keene, The Treaty-Making Revolution of the Nineteenth Century, (2012) 34 The International History 
Review, 475. 
27 Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law (supra n.26), 325. 
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established, it followed from this premise that jurists could focus on the character of 
institutions, a shift that facilitated the racialization by delimiting the notion of law to 
very specific institutions. (…) In summary, the distinction between civilised and 
uncivilised was a fundamental tenet of positivist epistemology and thus profoundly 
shaped the concepts constituting the positivist framework.”28 
 
 
What are we to make of these alternative explanations of the nineteenth-century 
transformation of international law? Should the nineteenth-century be characterised as 
a “positivist” century; and if so, what is the relationship between “positivism” and 
“colonialism”? This thesis will argue that a contraction from a universal to a regional 
international law really does take place, at the conceptual level, within nineteenth-
century Europe;29 but that this contraction was not caused by a “positivist” philosophy. 
The rise of a “European” conception of international law is primarily the result of an 
“idealist” philosophy that, while rejecting utopian rationalism, nonetheless continues 
to build on the idea of a “natural” society that has its own “organic” law. The most 
sophisticated and successful version of this communitarian vision of international law 
is developed by the (German) “Historical Law School”.30 It is its “historicist” and 
“organicist” vision that captures the imagination of German and British international 
law scholars for the better part of the nineteenth century. All law, including 
international law, originates from the consciousness of people(s) – not state 
institutions – and in that sense the long nineteenth century is decidedly not positivist.31 
States simply cannot dispose of international law as they wish, because international 
law is generally conceived of as binding law above the states. 
What is the relationship between the “Historical School” and colonialism? The thesis 
argues that there is no direct – conceptual – relationship between the “historicist” 
contraction to a European international law and the colonialization of non-European 
societies at the end of the nineteenth century. The Historical School, while not as 
explicitly anti-imperialist as the eighteenth-century enlightenment tradition, 
nevertheless developed no intrinsic hierarchical or imperialist understanding of 
European international law. The hierarchical “superiority” that European international 
 
28 A. Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law, (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1 at 24-25.  
29 In this sense also: J. Fisch, Die europäische Expansion (supra n.11), 288.  
30 For a discussion of the School, see Chapter 2 – Section 3. The rest of the thesis will refer to the 
“Historische Rechtsschule” simply as “Historical School”. 
31 For an elaboration of this point, see below as well as “Conclusion: Apologetic Endings”.  
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law ultimately claims, at the end of the nineteenth century, was added – from the 
outside – by British imperial thought; and, it is only this marriage between German 
organicist “idealism” and British utilitarian “imperialism” that produces the European 
neo-colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century. Yet this however also does not 
mean that any “utilitarian” philosophy is implicitly colonialist. For earlier forms of 
British utilitarianism – espoused, for example, by Jeremy Bentham – expressly contain 
an anti-imperialist commitment.32  
How, then, can we best explain the intellectual causes behind the changing structure 
of international law during the long nineteenth century (1789-1914)? In order to 
answer this question, the thesis proceeds in five steps. Chapter 1 starts out with an 
overview of the “unsettled” eighteenth century. Three competing conceptions of 
international normativity will be introduced. Shadowing August Comte’s three-stages 
classification,33 a “theological” conception, a “metaphysical” conception and a 
“positivist” conception will be contrasted; yet importantly, all three conceptions 
remain rooted, as we shall see below, in a universal – and, albeit to a different degree: 
natural law – project. The main body of the thesis will then be split into two halves – 
one half looking at the German, the other half exploring the British evolution(s) in the 
theory and practice of international law in the nineteenth century.34  
This division is itself a reflection of a radical “philosophical” split that takes place 
around 1789. For with Kant and Bentham, German “idealism” and British 
“empiricism” fully part company;35 and this philosophical division makes it advisable 
 
32 On Bentham and his conception of international law, see Chapter 4 – Section 1. 
33 A. Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte – Volume 1&2 (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
34 For reasons of space, the thesis will consequently not explore nineteenth-century French philosophy 
and practice. On the relatively “underdeveloped” nature of the French legal discourse here, see: M. 
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (supra n.24), 30: “[U]ntil late in the second half of the century, 
international law received no general academic treatment in France that would have been separate from 
a discussion of natural law. (…) French diplomats and courts were satisfied by general treaties written 
by foreigners – particularly those by von Martens and Klüber and the American diplomat Henry 
Wheaton (1785-1848) – either directly in French or translated for the French audience.” 
35 To quote J. W. Salmond, Law of Nature, (1895) 11 Law Quarterly Review 121 here (ibid., 137): “To 
the influence of Bentham and his followers is chiefly due the almost complete discredit into which in 
England the doctrine of natural law has fallen. Till the days of Kant on the Continent and of Bentham 
in England, there was no very striking discordance between English and Continental jurisprudence. It 
is not possible to draw any sharp line of distinction between the teaching of Hobbes, Locke, 
Cumberland and Blackstone on one side of the Channel, and that of Grotius, Puffendorf, Spinoza, 
Thomasius and Wolff on the other. All were the inheritors of the same traditions. The acceptance, 
however, of Kant's metaphysical theory on the one hand, and of Bentham's sceptical theory on the 
other, established between English and Continental juridical and ethical thought a wall of separation 
that has not yet been broken down.” 
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to explore the two emerging “national” conceptions of international law separately. 
Chapter 2 will consequently explore the three main German “idealist” projects and 
their understanding of international law; while Chapter 3, subsequently, analyses the 
“juristic” textbooks and practice on the European continent. Moving to the other side 
of the channel, Chapter 4 investigates the three main formations of British 
utilitarianism, with Chapter 5 exploring whether (or not) their philosophical work 
sediments into the textbooks of the main Anglo-Saxon jurists of the nineteenth 
century.  
A Conclusion will, finally, try to bring the various strands of the four substantive chapters 
together; and it hopes to solve many of the questions raised in this Introduction. Apart 
from a historical and philosophical analysis of the intellectual causes that transform 
international law from a “utopian” into an “apologetic” project, the thesis thereby also 
wishes to test and challenge three standard views found in today’s academic literature: 
─ First, it will be argued that it is deeply misleading to characterise the nineteenth century 
as a “positivist” century – especially if “positivism” is used in the “contemporary” 
sense of that word.36 For if legal positivism, minimalistically, means the rejection of 
an ontological link between law and morality, then much of the nineteenth century 
was decidedly non-positivist.37 Indeed: not only can we find a strong undercurrent of 
(theocratic) natural law thinking in (British) international law, the (German) Historical 
School’s conception of law is fully based on a metaphysical conception of “law” that 
dismisses State positivism as an irregular interference into the organic texture of the 
moral-legal continuum.  
─ Second, the belief that there was a “radical” break in the field of international law, 
which splits the long nineteenth century into an (unimportant) first half and an 
important “short” nineteenth century (starting around 1870) is questionable.38 Indeed, 
the view that there was a major discontinuity – among international law scholars – 
 
36 The problem with the concept of “positivity” is its indeterminate and historically contingent nature. 
For in the past, it has stood in to refer to such diverse matters as a “positive” divine law (Hobbes), the 
rationalist concept of a “voluntary law” (Vattel), the historicist idea of a customary law (Savigny); and 
finally, to the idea of a law issued by a human sovereign (Austin). Only the latter meaning formally 
disconnects law from morality; and it is in this contemporary sense that we today think of “positivism”. 
Positivism here coincides with “formalism” or “institutionalism”: a norm constitutes a legal norm if it 
is adopted according to a particular formal procedure regardless of its – god or bad – content. 
37 From this contemporary perspective, it is decidedly wrong to call the nineteenth-century a “positivist” 
century, contra S. Neff, Justice Among Nations (Harvard University Press, 2015), Part III. 
38 Contra, M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (supra n.24), 3: “radical character of the break 
that took place in the field between the first half of the nineteenth century and the emergence of a new 
professional self-awareness and enthusiasm between 1869 and 1885”.  
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must be qualified at best and disqualified at worst. True, a new “professional” spirit 
comes to dominate fin-de-siècle Europe, but we shall see below that “the men of 
1873” and their emphasis on a law deriving from moral consciousness, had a long 
tradition that started around 1815 and that finds its principal root in the German 
Historical School.   
─ Third, the view that the nineteenth century constitutes the “British age” in which 
Bentham’s conception of “international law” prevails and in which the older 
European public law is finally “universalised” is wrong on all fronts.39 Yes, the term 
“international law” becomes dominant in the course of the nineteenth century in the 
English, French and Italian literature,40 yet this is – crucially – not because of 
Bentham. For the nineteenth century sees, pace Bentham, the phenomenal rise of a 
new form of private international law; and it is that phenomenon that stands behind 
the semantic widening of the older “Law of Nations” into the younger “International 
Law”. Only the latter offered a suitable linguistic umbrella to contain both the public 
relations between states as well as the private relations between individual persons – 
something that the Benthamite concept of international law was unequivocally and 
decidedly not to do.   
 
Last but not least, three closing thoughts about the form and method of the thesis. 
Each of the five chapters has adopted a “tripartite” structure. This stylistic – not 
philosophical – device was meant to inject balance and symmetry into the overall 
argument.41 Methodologically, the thesis has also tried to find a proper equilibrium 
between the “philosophical” and the “historical” approach to the study of international 
 
39 There is in my view an unresolved tension in Grewe’s “Epochs of International Law” periodization 
in that he attributes his names according to which country hegemonically dominated a certain period in 
the history of international law. But is that domination a factual domination, expressed in military or 
economic might; or is it an intellectual domination? For example, even if the Roman Empire dominates 
late antiquity; is its international law Roman or Greek in spirit? And if the nineteenth-century is 
considered the “British Age”, does that mean that British conceptions of international law dominate? 
We shall see below that this is decidedly not the case for the better part of the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, if Grewe were to follow the “spirit” of a period, then, international law within the nineteenth 
century is the “German Age” (albeit not in the Hegelian sense!). For an excellent recent discussion of 
“periodisations” in the history international law, see: O. Diggelmann, The Periodization of the History 
of International Law, in: B. Fassbender & A. Peters (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the History of International 
Law (OUP, 2012), 997. 
40 The German language, by contrast, has remained loyal to the older idea of a “law of nations” in its 
idea of a “Völkerrecht”.   
41 That trichotomies will, of course, not “make” philosophy, see G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right (editor: A. W. Wood; Cambridge University Press, 1991), §3 – where Hegel ridicules “Herr 
Hugo” (the author of a famous German textbook on Roman law) for believing that the extensive use 
of “trichotomies” turns jurists into philosophers. 
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law. This syncretism is inspired by the “Cambridge School” of intellectual history; yet 
my emphasis on the long-term evolution of the philosophical concept “international 
law”, brings it probably closer to the German Begriffsgeschichte tradition.42 I have 
therefore attempted to let the various authors “speak for themselves”; and the thesis 
is consequently rich on primary sources (with the secondary literature often relegated 
to the footnotes). Silently towering over the thesis, one book from the rich secondary 
literature must nevertheless be singled out: Martti Koskenniemi’s “From Apology to 
Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument”,43 which – from an early 
academic age – has greatly inspired my thinking about international law. The title of 
this thesis pays homage to his mesmerising synthesis of philosophy, history and 




42 For an overview of the various strands within the history of ideas and “Begriffsgeschichte”, see only: 
E. Müller & F. Schmieder, Begriffsgeschichte und historische Semantik: Ein kritisches Kompendium (Surkamp, 
2016). The most well-known representative of the “Cambridge School” is Quentin Skinner (cf. “Visions 
of Politics – Volume 1: Regarding Method” (Cambridge University Press, 2002)); whereas the more 
“philosophical” tradition is best represented in the work of Reinhart Koselleck (cf. 
“Begriffsgeschichten: Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache“ 
(Suhrkamp, 2011)).  











The “Unsettled” Eighteenth Century 





Having lost the theological certainties of the past, all early modern scholars of 
international law battle to identify the normative foundations of the “law of nations”.1 
What is the relationship between natural law and “positive” international law? Grotius 
had famously allowed for both a “natural” and a “positive” (“voluntary”) international 
law,2 yet Hobbes (and Pufendorf) had come to deny the very existence of any 
“positive” international law: all international law was natural law.3 But by the 
eighteenth century, this view had become a major philosophical problem. Enormous 
social and political changes had taken place within that century, and the question 
therefore arose whether the relations and rules between states could also be subject to 
change. Yet if they could change, as they seemed to do, what normative authority 
would be able to validate such modifications? The undeniable existence and sheer mass 
of international treaties and customs had come to push “positive” law into the 
foreground; alas, what was its relation to “natural law” and what was the “reason” 
behind its (presumed) status as “law” if there was no “government” above the States?  
The eighteenth-century offers – unlike its predecessor – no dominant answer. It 
represents a “Sattelzeit”: a time of semantic reformation.4 Within that century, we thus 
find both older and newer conceptions of the normative foundations of international 
law co-existing with each other. This parallel existence of old and new ideas will be 
discussed in this preliminary chapter. It explores the unsettled foundations of 
international law through three distinct schools of thought, which we shall – in line 
with a famous nineteenth century classification – called the “theological”, the 
 
1 H. Steiger, “Völkerrecht”, in: O. Brunner et al. (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zut 
politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland – Volume 7 (Klett-Cotta 2004), 97 at 110: “Das Verhältnis von ‚ius 
naturae’ und ‚ius gentium’ bleibt begrifflich-theoretisch letzten Endes offen. Weder den Spaniern noch 
Grotius gelingt eine endgültige Klärung.“  
2 For the ambivalent position of Grotius in particular, see: P. Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la 
guerre juste (Presses Universitaires de France, 1983). 
3 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Editor: R. Tuck) (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 244: “[T]he Law of 
Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing… [a]nd the same Law, that dictateth to men that 
have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoid in regard to one another, dictateth 
the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign 
Assemblies; there being no Court of Natural Justice, but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but 
God raigneth”. 
4 On the importance of the eighteenth century as a “Sattelzeit”, see: R. Kosselleck, Einleitung, in: O. 
Brunner et al. (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe – Volume 1 (Klett, 2004), XV.  
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“metaphysical” and the “positive” school.5 The first continues to equate the law of 
nations with the law of nature and ultimately derives the “verity” and “authority” of 
that law from a divine source: God. The second school accepts the validity of positive 
international law; but in order to explain how the latter can “authorize” modifications 
in the natural law, it hypothesises a “voluntary” law of nations adopted by a 
metaphysical world republic. The third conception, finally, marginalises natural law 
thinking altogether and prioritises the “consensual” positive law created by States. 
These three – very different – answers reverberate throughout the eighteenth-century. 
Section 1 starts with the oldest of the three school: the theological conception of 
international law. For there indeed remained strong advocates of the divine origins of 
the law of nations in the first half of the eighteenth century. Section 2 discusses the 
most elaborate “metaphysical” conception of international law in that century: 
Christian Wolff’s civitas maxima. This metaphor is meant to “triumphantly 
rehabilitate[]” positive law;6 yet loyal to the older (Hobbesian) idea of laws as 
commands, it is forced to construct a fictitious superior entitled to adopt “civil” laws. 
This conceptual link between a “superior” state and positive law is subsequently 
weakened by Vattel, whose work would be the gate through which positivism emerged 
strengthened in the second half of the eighteenth-century. This third “positivist” 
school plants the seed for much that was to come in the nineteenth century – the main 




1. The Theological School: A “Divine” Law of Nations 
 
The early years of the eighteenth-century still stand under the controlling shadow of 
natural law thinking; and the towering figure here is not Hobbes but Pufendorf. 
Having been translated into French and English early on, Pufendorf’s naturalist system 
 
5 The terminology is based on A. Comte’s three stages-theory of societal evolution, see “The Positive 
Philosophy of Auguste Comte – Volume 1&2” (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
6 E. Reibstein, Die Dialektik der souveränen Gleichheit bei Vattel, (1958) 19 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 607 at 608: „Ablehnung des Begriffs ius gentium 
positivum bei Pufendorf und seine triumphale Rehabilitierung bei Christian Wolff“. 
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indeed penetrates deep into the new century;7 and with it revives, even if reluctantly, a 
“theological” conception of international law that ultimately traces its validity to a 
divine command.8 We find a classic restatement of this natural law conception in 
Chapter 3 of the Second Book of Pufendorf’s “Of the Law of Nature and Nations”. 
Not only is a denial of the existence of a “natural” (as opposed to a “civil”) law seen 
as “foolish”;9 the ultimate origin of this natural law is anchored in God himself.10 The 
rules of natural law, while deducible by human reason, are always backed up by divine 
commands: 
“[I]f these dictates of reason are to have the force of laws, it is necessary to presuppose 
the existence of God and His providence, whereby all things are governed, and 
primarily mankind. For we cannot agree with Grotius, when he says in his 
Prolegomena that natural laws 'will have some place, even if we should grant-what can 
only be done with the greatest impiety-that there is no God, or that He does not 
concern Himself with the affairs of men'. For if some man should devise such an 
impious and idiotic theory, and imagine that mankind; had sprung from itself, then 
the dictates of reason could in no possible way have the force of law, since law 
necessarily supposes a superior.”11 
 
The divine origin of the law of nations is seen as fundamental, because “the mere 
authority of men does not seem able to endow these dictates with the power of 
obligation”.12 Human law is merely “positive” law; and it must therefore “under all 
circumstances be maintained that the obligation of natural law is of God, the creator and final 
governor of mankind, who by His authority has bound men.13 This divine natural law is, 
importantly, the sole and exclusive law that governs nations. And following Hobbes, 
 
7 Jean Barbeyrac translates Pufendorf into French in 1706; and Pufendorf’s “Law of Nations” is 
translated into English in 1707 by Basil Kennet. For the purposes of this section, I have been using the 
1734 Barbeyrac edition. On the influence of the French translation on the dissemination of natural law 
thinking to a cosmopolitan audience, see: S. Bisset, Jean Barbeyrac’s Theory of Permissive Natural Law 
and the Foundation of Property Rights, (2015) 76 Journal of the History of Ideas 541 at 542.  
8 The original Latin edition of Pufendorf’s “De Jure Naturae et Gentium” (1672) had been less 
“theological”; yet due to the criticism by Catholic and Protestant “neo-scholastics” alike, the second 
edition of the book re-theologizes the argument in 1684. This is chiefly done by integrating extensive 
references to Richard Cumberland. On this point, see: D. Saunders, The Natural Jurisprudence of Jean 
Barbeyrac: Translation as an Art of Political Adjustment, (2003) 36 Eighteenth-Century Studies 473 at 
483. It is this second “Pufendorf” that is translated by Barbeyrac and thereby brought to a broader 
audience. On Barbeyrac’s own natural law thinking, see: R. Hochstrasser, Conscience and Reason: The 
Natural Law Theory of Jean Barbeyrac, (1993) 36 The Historical Journal 289.  
9 S. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books (translation: Oldfather, Clarendon Press, 
1934), 199. 
10 Ibid., 202 (with express reference to Cumberland’s “De Legibus Naturae”). 
11 Ibid., 215. 
12 Ibid., 217. 
13 Ibid., 217 (emphasis added). 
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Pufendorf indeed denies that “there is any other voluntary or positive law of nations which has 
the force of a law, properly so called, such as binds nations as if it proceeded from superior”.14 
International treaties and customs are thus not international law “proper” since they 
merely depend on the consent of States who do not recognize a (civil) superior above 
them.15 
Other major eighteenth-century jurists equally place the normativity of the law of 
nations into the hands of God.16 A “British” version of this theological conception can 
– for example – be found in William Blackstone’s “Commentaries on the Laws of 
England”. Grounded in natural law thinking (and especially Pufendorf),17 the law of 
nations is here seen to emerge from the fact that men wish to live in societies but a 
single human society for all humankind has proved too big: 
“[A]s it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great society, 
they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, commonwealths, 
and nations; entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to mutual intercourse. 
Hence arises a [new] kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, call “the law of 
nations”; which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superior in the other, 
cannot be dictated by either; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or 
upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several 
communities[.]”18 
 
While, seemingly, admitting treaties and customs as potential sources of international 
law, the law of nations is nonetheless identified as “a system of rules deductible by 
natural reason”.19 For since no state “will allow a superiority in the other, therefore 
 
14 Ibid., 226 (emphasis added).  
15 Ibid., 228. This last point would receive a famous critique in the form of Leibniz’s “Opinion on the 
Principles of Pufendorf” (1706), in which Leibniz – justly – contends that by this denial of all positive 
law, Pufendorf and his followers actually contradict themselves: “On the basis of this principle several 
learned followers of our author do not allow any voluntary law of nations whatever, for the reason, 
among others, that peoples cannot bring about a law by reciprocal pacts, not having the obligation 
rendered valid by any superior. With this argument too much is proved, namely that men cannot set up 
any superior for themselves by consent and agreement:  which is contrary to what [even] Hobbes 
admits.” See: G.W. Leibniz, Political Writings (edited: P. Riley, Cambridge University Press, 1988), 64 at 
70. For Leibniz, the voluntary law of nations derives its authority, just like the natural law, from God. 
16 For example: J.-J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law (Liberty Fund, 2006), 176: “[A]ll 
nations are with regard to one another in a natural independence and equality. If there be therefore any 
common law between them, it must proceed from God their common sovereign.” Divine providence 
equally appears to lie at the origin of G. Vico’s conception of international law; yet due to its lack of 
influence in the eighteenth century, it will not be dealt with here.  
17 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England – Volume I (Clarendon Press, 1765), 43 (with 
reference to Pufendorf). 
18 Ibid., 43. 
19 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England – Volume IV (Clarendon Press, 1769), 66. 
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neither can dictate or prescribe the rules of this law to the rest; but such rules must 
necessarily result from those principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of every 
nation agree”.20 This natural law of nations is “co-eval with mankind and dictated by 
God himself”; and, thanks to this universality and divinity, “[i]t is binding over all the globe, 
in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of 
them as are valid derive their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this 
original”. 21 For Blackstone, like for many other eighteenth century jurists and 
philosophers, there consequently also exist certain “criminal” offences against the law 
of nations;22 and the idea that each state enjoys “basic rights” equally emanates from 




2. The Metaphysical School: A “Civil” Law of Nations 
 
Can the law of nations change; or have the rules of nature and reason remained the 
same throughout history? A second school within the eighteenth century accepts that 
some changes in the rules of international law can occur; and the most famous 
eighteenth century attempt to offer a normative foundation for a “positive” 
international law is made by Christian Wolff.24 Devoid of the Leibniz’s theological 
commitment,25 the Wolffian system nonetheless continues to be firmly based on the 
idea of an “eternal and unchangeable law, which nature herself has established” and 
 
20 Ibid., 66-67 (emphasis added).  
21 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England – Volume I (supra n.17), 41 (emphasis added). 
22 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England – Volume IV (supra n.19), 68: “The principal 
offences against the law of nations, animadverted on as such by the municipal laws of England, are of 
three kinds; 1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and, 3. Piracy.” 
Pirates, in particular, are seen as “enemies of mankind” in that “every community hath a right by the 
rule of self-defense, to inflict that punishment upon him, which every individual would in a state of 
nature have been otherwise entitled to do” (ibid., 71). 
23 M. Vec, Grundrechte der Staaten: Die Tradierung des Natur- und Völkerrechts der Aufklärung, (2011) 
18 Rechtsgeschichte 66. 
24 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (translation: J. H. Drake, Clarendon Press, 1934). The work 
was originally published in 1749.  
25 On the interesting relationship between Wolff and Leibniz, see: F. Cheneval, Philosophie in 
weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung: Über die Entstehung und die Philosophischen Grundlagen des supranationalen und 
kosmopolitischen Denkens der Moderne (Schwabe, 2002), esp. 196: „Die wolffsche Lehre des Völkerstaats 
muss als grundsätzliche Transformation der leibnizschen Gottesstaatslehre verstanden werden.“ 
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that controls “all acts of individual men as well as those of nations”.26 The law of 
nations is thus “undoubtedly a part of the law of nature”;27 and it is consequently “a 
law common to all nations”.28 And yet, eager to integrate some modifications, Wolff 
also comes to affirm a form of “civil” or “voluntary” law into his system; and in order 
to explain its normative status as binding law, he famously reverts to the idea of the 
“civitas maxima” (a). This metaphysical tradition is partly continued and partly 
abandoned by Vattel, who – rejecting the hypothesised great republic – comes to 
“relativize” international law (b). 
 
 
a. Between “Natural” and “Civil” Law: Wolff and the World Republic  
 
Wolff defines international law as “the science of that law which nations or peoples 
use in their relations with each other and of the obligations corresponding thereto”.29 
This is a universal law that makes no distinctions between “barbarous” and “civilised” 
or between “Christian” and non-Christian religions;30 and it is a law that takes nations 
as they are.31 The core principle behind this universal law is the view that regards 
nations as moral persons, that is: “multitude[s] of men united into a state”. Nations 
are “individual free persons” that live in a “state of nature”;32 and, originally, they “used 
 
26 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.24), 3 (Preface). 
27 Wolff nevertheless admits that while the principles of the law of nature with regard to individuals and 
nations are the same, the application of these principles differs “in so far as the nature of a nation is not 
the same as human nature” (ibid., §3).  
28 Ibid., 5 (Preface).  
29 Ibid., §1. 
30 This “universalism” is never given up. Thus even if Wolff distinguishes between “barbarous” nations 
(ibid., §52) and “civilized” nations (ibid., §53), this is mainly to explain that the latter have a duty of 
solidarity to assist the former (ibid., §168); and he makes it absolutely clear that “if some barbarous und 
uncultivated nation is unwilling to accept aid offered to it by another”, “it cannot be compelled to accept 
such aid, consequently it cannot be compelled by force to develop”. Indeed: “[b]arbarism and 
uncultivated manners give you no right against a nation” and “a war is unjust which is begun on this 
pretext”. (ibid., §169). With regard to differences in religion in particular, we read (ibid., §263) that “[o]n 
account of difference of religion no nation can deny another the duties of humanity which nations owe 
to each other”, because “the duties which nations owe to nations do not assume identity of religion”.   
31 Ibid., §283: “No nation has the right to extend the limits of sovereignty. For the nation which extends 
the limits of sovereignty, extends the sovereignty beyond its boundaries into the territories of a 
neighbouring nation”. 
32 On this point, see especially § 269 entitled “Of the Right not to allow any nation to interfere in the 
government of another” and which states: “A perfect right belongs to every nation not to allow any 
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none other than natural law; therefore the law of nations is originally nothing except 
the law of nature applied to nations”.33 This natural law is defined as the “necessary 
law of nations” that – while eternal and immutable – however only “binds nations in 
conscience”.34  
But just as individual men cannot live simply by the abstract laws of nature and have 
hence developed a positive law within the nation, “so likewise the condition of nations 
is such that one cannot completely satisfy in all details the natural rigour of the law of 
nations” and the need for a positive law therefore arises. That positive law Wolff calls 
– following Grotius – the “voluntary law of nations”; yet there is a fundamental change 
of meaning: 
“But far be it from you to imagine that this voluntary law of nations is developed from 
the will of nations in such a way that their will is free to establish it and that freewill 
alone takes the place of reason, without any regard to natural law… [T]he law of nature 
itself prescribes the method by which the civil law is to be fashioned out of natural 
law, so that there can be nothing which can be criticized in it; so also the voluntary 
law of nations does not depend upon the free will of nations, but natural law itself 
prescribes the method by which the voluntary law is to be made out of natural law, so 
that only that may be admitted which necessity demands. Since nature herself has united 
nations into a supreme state in the same manner as individuals have united into particular states, the 
manner also in which the voluntary law of nations ought to be fashioned out of natural law, is exactly 
the same as that by which civil laws in a state ought to be fashioned out of natural laws.”35     
 
The “voluntary” law of nations is thus defined as an extension and specification of 
“abstract” natural law. It is vital to “concretise” and “externalise” universal natural 
law;36 but this positive law can only be adopted by a commanding “will”.37 For 
categorically rejecting treaties and customs as ever affecting natural law,38 only a 
(hypostasised) world state can create a civil law of a universal character. But whence 
 
other nation to interfere in any way in its government”; as well as § 271 – “Of the right to obtain one’s 
right by force”: “The right belongs to every nation to obtain its right against another nation by force, 
of the other is unwilling to allow that right.”  
33 Ibid., §3. 
34 Ibid., §4. 
35 Ibid. 6 (Preface, emphasis added). 
36 For the complex relationship between the necessary (natural) law and the positive (voluntary) law, see 
ibid., §22: “The voluntary law of nations is, therefore equivalent to the civil law, consequently it is 
derived in the same manner from the necessary law of nations, as we have shown that the civil law must 
be derived from the natural law in the fifth chapter of the eighth part of 'The Law of Nature'.”  
37 F. Cheneval, Philolosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung (supra n.25), 209: “Wolffs Theorie folgt logisch 
aus Pufendorfs Feststellung und überhaupt aus der positivistischen Rechtsauffassung, dass ein nicht 
von einer Obrigkeit garantiertes Völkerrecht nicht als positives Recht betrachtet werden kann.“ 
38 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.24), 7 (Preface).  
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does this world state and its civil law come from? In a famous passage, Wolff claims it 
is based on the great society that exists among nations: 
“Nature herself has established society among all nations and binds them to preserve 
society. For nature herself has established society among men and binds them to 
preserve it. Therefore, since this obligation, as coming from the law of nature, is 
necessary and immutable, it cannot be changed for the reason that nations have united 
into a state. Therefore society, which nature has established among individuals, still 
exists among nations and consequently, after states have been established in 
accordance with the law of nature and nations have arisen thereby, nature herself also 
must be said to have established society among all nations and bound them to preserve 
society. If we should consider that great society, which nature herself has established among men, to 
be done away with by the particular societies, which men enter, when they unite into a state, states 
would be established contrary to the law of nature, in as much as the universal obligation of all toward 
all would be terminated; which assuredly is absurd.”39 
 
Wolff here postulates the existence of a world-republic as guarantor for the validity of 
“positive” international law; and since the purpose of that civil society must be the 
same as that for individuals,40 it follows that “nature herself has combined nations into 
a state”.41 This “supreme state” or civitas maxima is not a “universal monarchy” 
governing all human beings directly; it is conceived as a universal federation “whose 
separate members are separate nations” – not individuals.42 The “supreme state” is “a 
kind of democratic government”;43 and the world state is therefore entitled to adopt 
“civil laws”. These civil laws are approved by a (fictitious) majority of States,44 and they 
are enforced by a (fictitious) supreme commander.45 From here it follows:  
 
39 Ibid., §7 (emphasis added). 
40 For Wolff, states – even the biggest states – are like individuals in that they cannot “perfect” 
themselves alone (ibid., §8). 
41 Ibid., §9. 
42 In the words of N. Greenwood Onuf, Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism, 
(1994) 88 American Journal of International Law 280 at 296: “Only by locating the civitas maxima at the 
apex of an ascending series of associations prescribed by the theory of corporations can we make sense 
of this proposition… Wolff’s model is the respublica composita.” 
43 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.24), §10 and §19. The latter paragraph continues: “The 
supreme state is a kind of democratic form of government. For the supreme state is made up of the 
nations as a whole, which as individual nations are free and equal to each other. Therefore, since no 
nation by nature is subject to another nation, and since it is evident of itself that nations by common 
consent have not bestowed the sovereignty which belongs to the whole as against the individual nations, 
upon one or more particular nations, nay, that it cannot even be conceived under human conditions 
how this may happen, that sovereignty is understood to have been reserved for nations as a whole. 
Therefore, since the government is democratic, if the sovereignty rests with the whole, which in the 
present instance is the entire human race divided up into peoples or nations, the supreme state is a kind 
of democratic form of government.” 
44 Ibid., §20. 
45 Ibid., §21. This second fiction is needed as all law must be issued by a superior.  
 21 
 “In the supreme state the nations as a whole have a right to coerce the individual 
nations, if they should be unwilling to perform their obligation, or should show 
themselves negligent in it. For in a state the right belongs to the whole of coercing the 
individuals to perform their obligation, if they should either be unwilling to perform 
it or should show themselves negligent in it. Therefore since all nations are understood 
to have combined into a state, of which the individual nations are members, and 
inasmuch as they are understood to have combined in the supreme state, the individual 
members of this are understood to have bound themselves to the whole, because they 
wish to promote the common good, since moreover from the passive obligation of 
one party the right of the other arises; therefore the right belongs to the nations as a 
whole in the supreme state also of coercing the individual nations, if they are unwilling 
to perform their obligation or show themselves negligent in it.”46 
 
But if the civitas maxima can adopt supreme civil laws,47 who is sovereign? Wolff 
answers this question by means of the revolutionary idea of divided sovereignty: “Some 
sovereignty over individual nations belongs to nations as a whole. For a certain sovereignty over 
individuals belongs to the whole in a state.”48 This conception of a divided sovereignty is not 
seen to undermine the freedom and independence of each nation. For in a move that 
parallels Rousseau’s thinking a decade later, Wolff claims that the “democratic” 
government of his world state ultimately preserves the “sovereignty” of each nation 
“since no nation by nature is subject to another nation, and since it is evident of itself 
that nations by common consent have not bestowed the sovereignty which belongs to 
the whole as against the individual nations, upon one or more particular nations”.49 
The “force” and “authority” of the civil law of nations is thus in harmony with the 
freedom and independence of each state.  
Does Wolff accept any other sources of international law apart from the natural law 
and the voluntary law of nations?  His “universal” international law is complemented 
by the “stipulative” law, which arises from international treaties;50 and he also refers to 
 
46 Ibid., §13. Within the Wolffian system of divided sovereignty, it is thus possible to envisage an 
international criminal law because States are entitled to “punish” others (ibid., §272): “The right belongs 
to every nation to punish another nation which has injured it.” And within his natural law system, there 
also cannot be a “just war” on either side (§633): “War cannot be just on each side. For there is no just 
cause of war save a wrong done or likely to be done.” He nevertheless draws some boundaries around 
the idea of a “punitive war” (ibid., §636-639). 
47 F. Cheneval, Philolosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung (supra n.25), 134: „Primat des Völkerrechts“. 
48 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.24), §15 (emphasis added).  
49 Ibid., §19. However, believing it impossible that all nations (as moral persons) could assemble 
together, Wolff agrees to the substitute of “right reason”, which “must be taken to be the will of all 
nations” (ibid., §20); and it follows that there can be a single “ruler” of the supreme state that “defines 
by the right use of reason what nations ought to consider as law among themselves” (ibid., §21).  
50 Ibid., §23. 
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customary law, based on the tacit consent of States.51 Yet importantly: neither of these 
two sources do constitute “real” sources of international law. For not only are 
stipulations “not universal but particular”; both agreements and custom simply 
“cannot be considered as the law of nations” “just as the private law for citizens … is 
considered as having no value at all as civil law for a certain particular state”.52 The 
“private” sources of international law are consequently not producing “real” law. For 
the “law” within the law of treaties is only the binding norm(s) that force States to 
obey their promises, and these rules form part of the natural or civil law of nations. 
An overview of the Wolffian system of legal sources can be found in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1. Wolff’s Sources of International Law 
 
 
b.  “Relativizing” International Law: Vattel and the Voluntary Law  
 
Vattel stands to Wolff like an apprentice to his master. Shadowing his successful 
predecessor, Vattel’s modest ambition was originally to simply “translate” the 
philosophical Wolff into practical language. Yet Vattel not only “de-scholasticises” 
Wolff’s work;53 he famously adopts a number of very different conclusions.54  
 
51 Ibid., §24. 
52 Ibid., §23. 
53 For an excellent analysis of the methodological shift that takes place between Wolff and Vattel , see: 
E. Tourme-Jouannet, L'Emergence doctrinale du droit international classique : Emer de Vattel et l'Ecole de droit de 
la nature et des gens (Pedone, 1998), 105 et seq.  
54 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations (translator: J Chitty; Johnson & Co, 1883). The book was originally 
published in 1758. 
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What, then, are the similarities and differences between Wolff and Vattel? Vattel 
accepts a natural law of nations,55 which he calls (following Wolff) the “necessary law 
of nations”.56 He also acknowledges a positive “voluntary law of nations”;57 yet unlike 
Wolff, this voluntary law is no longer seen as a “civil law” adopted by a supreme 
republic. The famous rejection of the Wolffian civitas maxima is announced at the very 
beginning in Vattel’s “Law of Nations” (1758): 
“In the very outset of my work, it will be found that I differ entirely from Monsieur 
Wolf[f] in the manner of establishing the foundations of that species of law of nations 
which we call voluntary. Monsieur Wolf[f] deduces it from the idea of a great republic 
(civitatis maximæ) instituted by nature herself, and of which all nations of the world are 
members. According to him, the voluntary law of nations is, as it were, the civil law 
of that great republic. This idea does not satisfy me; nor do I think the fiction of such 
a republic either admissible in itself, or capable of affording sufficiently solid grounds 
on which to build the rules of the universal law of nations.”58 
 
Vattel here forsakes the “civil” foundation of positive international law: the 
(hypostasized) World State. While admitting the existence of a “universal society of 
the human race”,59 the latter neither implies nor demands a universal state. For even if 
there exists a mutual dependence between nations, nature “has not imposed on them 
any particular obligation to unite in civil society”.60 The reasons for this rejection of a 
civil organisation among states are given as follows:  
“Individuals are so constituted, and are capable of doing so little by themselves, that 
they can scarcely subsist without the aid and the laws of civil society. But, as soon as 
a considerable number of them have united under this same government, they become 
able to supply most of their wants; and the assistance of other political societies is not 
so necessary to them as that of individuals is to an individual. (…) States conduct 
themselves in a different manner from individuals. It is not usually the caprice or blind 
impetuosity of a single person that forms the resolutions and determines the measures 
of the public: they are carried on with more deliberation and circumspection; and, on 
difficult or important occasions, arrangements are made and regulations established 
by means of treaties.” 61 
 
55 Ibid., Preface – vii: “There certainly exists a natural law of nations, since the obligations of the law of 
nature are no less binding on states, on men united in political society, than on individuals… [T]he 
natural law of nations is a particular science, consisting in a just and rational application of the law of 
nature to the affairs and conduct of nations or sovereigns.” 
56 Ibid., Preliminaries - §7. 
57 Ibid., Preliminaries - §21. 
58 Ibid., Preface – xiii. 
59 Ibid, Preliminaries – §11. 
60 Ibid., Preface – xiii. 
61 Ibid., Preface – xiv. See here also Book II, §3: “Social bodies or sovereign states are much more 
capable of supplying all their wants than individual men are; and mutual assistance is not so necessary 
among them, nor so frequently required.”  
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Put differently: thanks to their greater strength and more rational character, states are 
less in need (when compared to human beings) to combine into and form a world state; 
and in the absence of such a world state, there cannot be a civil international law.62  
How will Vattel then define the relationship between the – unchanging – natural law 
and the – changing – positive international law? His answer, while not always clear, 
seems to be that “all these alterations are deducible from the natural liberty of 
nations”;63 and for Vattel, all “positive” international law – including the voluntary law 
– is thus consensual law.64 Yet the voluntary law is also considered to be “established 
by nature”;65 and the states consent is here simply “presumed”. This “presumed” 
consent however no longer derives from an “objective” and “unified” conception of 
natural law (set by the civitas maxima). The central plank of Vattel’s voluntary law is 
the sovereignty of each state;66 and the “presumed consent” idea here assumes a 
fundamentally different meaning when compared to the older Wolffian system. For 
instead of justifying a (rational) decision presumed to have been taken by the majority 
of states because it is in the best interest of mankind, the consent requirement here limits – 
from the very start – what states could have consented to: only those rules to which 
states could be presumed to have consented to can be part of the voluntary law of nations!   
This Vattelian move completely disempowers the voluntary law of nations. The 
principle of sovereignty now demands that “no other nation can compel her to act in 
such or such a particular manner: for any attempt at such compulsion would be an 
infringement on the liberty of nations”.67 The use of force to legitimately compel any 
 
62 For an excellent discussion of the relation between Vattel and Wolff here, see: P. Haggenmacher, Le 
Modèle de Vattel et la Discipline Du Droit International, in: P. Haggenmacher, Vattel's International Law 
from a XXIst Century Perspective (Nijhoff, 2012), 3 esp.38-46. 
63 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations (supra n.54), Preface – xiv. 
64 Ibid., Preliminaries - §27: “These three kinds of law of nations, the Voluntary, the Conventional, and 
the Customary, together constitute the Positive Law of Nations. For they all proceed from the will of 
Nations; the Voluntary from their presumed consent, the Conventional from an express consent, and 
the Customary from tacit consent; and as there can be no other mode of deducing any law from the will 
of nations, there are only these three kinds of Positive Law of Nations.” 
65 Ibid., Preface - xv: “The necessary and the voluntary laws of nations are therefore both established 
by nature, but each in a different manner[.]” 
66 Ibid., Preface – xvi. 
67 Ibid., Preliminaries - §15 and §16. 
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nation is neutralised;68 and once all nations are seen as equal in relation to each other,69 
a plurality of views on what global justice requires is unconditionally accepted – 
including for the voluntary law of nations.70 This normative pluralism means, in 
particular, that there cannot be any “just” war: “nations cannot, in their dealings with 
each other, insist on this rigid justice”, because “every regular war is on both sides 
accounted just”.71 Here, as well as in other crucial areas,72 the voluntary law can hence 
no longer be seen as the externalised “necessary” part of the law of nations. No nation 
is allowed to enforce the “objectively” just natural law for the benefit of all of mankind 
– because there is no absolute Archimedean standpoint from which “global” justice can be judged.73 
All “positive” international law, including voluntary law, is here “relativized”. The 
voluntary law of nations no longer stems from a (hypothesized) superior. It is reduced 
to that “rational” law that could have been consented to by sovereign states; and, it 
must therefore respect their sovereign independence. Built upon the core principle of 
state sovereignty, the voluntary law will, consequently, soon be reduced to a simple 





68 For Vattel, all rights against other nations are thus “imperfect” rights (ibid., Preliminaries – §17).  
69 Ibid., Preliminaries – §18. Like Wolff, Vattel rejects the idea that states that are “less civilised” or 
which have a different religion are not equal.  
70 Ibid., Preliminaries – §21. 
71 Ibid., Book III – §195. 
72 For a good discussion of some of these areas, see: F. Ruddy, International law in the Enlightenment: The 
Background of Emmerich de Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens (Oceana, 1975), 110-123.  
73 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II - §7: “It is strange to hear the learned and judicious Grotius 
assert, that a sovereign may justly take up arms to chastise nations which are guilty of enormous 
transgressions of the law of nature, which treat their parents with inhumanity like the Sogdians, which eat human 
flesh as the ancient Gauls, &c. What led him into this error, was his attributing to every independent man, 
and of course to every sovereign, an odd kind of right to punish faults which involve an enormous 
violation of the laws of nature, though they do not affect either his rights or his safety. But we have 
shewn (Book I. §169) that men derive the right of punishment solely from their right to provide for 
their own safety; and consequently they cannot claim it except against those by whom they have been 
injured. Could it escape Grotius, that, notwithstanding all the precautions added by him in the following 
paragraphs, his opinion opens a door to all the ravages of enthusiasm and fanaticism, and furnishes 
ambition with numberless pretexts? Mahomet and his successors have desolated and subdued Asia, to 
avenge the indignity done to the unity of the Godhead; all whom they termed associators or idolaters 
fell victims to their devout fury.” 
74 F.S. Ruddy, International Law in the Enlightenment (supra n.72), 313  
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c. Excursus: The “Natural” Law of Nations and Foreign Citizens  
The Law of Nations is, within the eighteenth century, primarily seen as a law between 
sovereign states; and yet, the older “ius gentium” tradition also still allows for rules 
that apply to private individuals. Leaving the offences called “crimes against humanity” 
aside,75 these rules – applicable to private persons – generally relate to the rights of 
foreigners living within a state other than their own.  
What is the nature of these “private” international rights? For the naturalists, the law 
of nations forms part of natural law; and – as both Wolff and Vattel would hold – the 
creation of particular civil societies between some men did therefore not affect the 
existence of a universal society among all men. Both however accept each state’s legal 
sovereignty over its territory; and the general principle vis-à-vis foreigners is therefore 
as follows: “The ruler of a territory is not understood to allow foreigners to dwell in 
his territory nor stay there, except under this condition, that their actions are subject 
to the laws of the place.”76 Where foreigners commit an offence, “they are to be 
punished in accordance with the laws of the place”;77 and with regard to the settling of 
disputes, the same rule applies.78 And yet: both Wolff and Vattel accept some limits to 
this rule. A private testament, made in foreign territory, for example, must be made in 
accordance with a foreigner’s own law, because such private acts “have no relation to 
 
75 For the existence of these offences, see the discussion on Blackstone (supra n.75) above. The 
following section will not concentrate on Blackstone but he, like most natural lawyers, followed a broad 
conception of international law that covered the relations between nations “and the individuals 
belonging to each” (W. Blackstone, Commentaries – Book IV (supra n.19), 66). This “private” 
international law included “mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like”; and the 
resulting “law-merchant” was considered “a branch of the law of nations” (ibid., 67). 
76 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.24), §299. He continues: “There is no reason why you 
should urge that civil laws bind only members of that state in which they are promulgated; for that 
holds, as long as any one is outside of the territory subject to his nation, where no right over him belongs 
to the ruler of the territory. But entrance into alien territory produces a certain right over him which 
elsewhere belonged to his ruler.” For the same point, see E. de Vattel, Law of Nations (supra n.54), 
Book II – §101: “The sovereignty is the right to command in the whole country; and the laws are not 
simply confined to regulating the conduct of the citizens towards each other, but also determine what 
is to be observed by all orders of people throughout the whole extent of the state.” 
77 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.24), §301; and for the same conclusion, see: E. Vattel, 
Law of Nations (supra n.54), Book II – §102.  
78 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.24), § 302. He explains: “Nor does it make any 
difference that their native civil laws differ from those laws; for there is no place for their laws in the 
territory in which they are dwelling, since the ruler of the territory is not bound to consider their laws, 
but in promulgating laws in his own territory he is certainly independent of any other nation or of the 
ruler of any other state, as is quite plain from arguments given above and from universal public law.” 
For Vattel, see: “Law of Nations” (supra n.54), Book II – §103. 
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the alien territory” and are thus “subject to the laws of his own country”.79 The reason 
for this acceptance of “foreign law” here lies in natural law: “we must hold that the 
power of making a will is a right belonging to man by nature, which it is understood 
cannot be taken from him, for the reason that he dwells for some time in the territory 
of some foreign nation or stays there.”80  
This natural law conception comprises and supports a phenomenon that comes to be 
known, in the nineteenth century as “private” international law.81 For the law of nature 
dictates a division of legislative and judicial competences between two competing 
sovereignty claims. Vattel can therefore happily integrate the older “statutes” theory 
that had traditionally distinguished between “local” laws and “personal” laws:  
“[A]s to movable goods, specie, and other effects which he possesses elsewhere, which 
he has with him, or which follow his person, we ought to distinguish between the local 
laws whose effect cannot extend beyond the territory, and those laws which peculiarly 
affect the character of citizen. The foreigner remaining a citizen of his own country, 
is still bound by those last-mentioned laws, wherever he happens to be, and is obliged 
to conform to them in the disposal of his personal property, and all his movables 
whatsoever. The laws of this kind made in the country where he resides at the time, 
but of which he is not a citizen, are not obligatory with respect to him. (…) The case 
is quite otherwise with respect to local laws: they regulate what may be done in the 
territory, and do not extend beyond it. (…) The foreigner is obliged to observe those 
laws in the country where he makes his will, with respect to the goods he possesses 
there.”82  
 
These ideas, ultimately rooted in the older “naturalist” conception of international law, 
would not be accepted by the “positivist” scholars, 83 to whom we must now turn. 
 
79 C. Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica (supra n.24), §326. 
80 Ibid., §327. For the same solution, see E. de Vattel, Law of Nations (supra n.54), Book II – §110.  
81 Consider the, admittedly, obscure but Savigny-like passage in §332 of Wolff “Jus Gentium”: “[I]f a 
contract of purchase and sale or a hypothec needs to be confirmed by judicial authority to be good, the 
confirmation can be obtained only from one who has jurisdiction over the place where the thing is 
situated, not can an action against a captious debtor, who has made a contract of a hypothec with 
another, be brought elsewhere than in the forum where the thing is situated, even if he has a domicile 
elsewhere.” 
82 E. de Vattel, Law of Nations (supra n.54), Book II  - § 111. 
83 For J.J Moser, Erste Grundlehren des jezigen Europäischen Völker-Rechts, in Friedens- und Kriegs-Zeiten (Raspe, 
1778), the principle of state sovereignty simply means that foreigners are fully and completely subject 
to the alien state in which they reside (ibid., 160); and this, correspondingly means that his “native” 
jurisdiction is temporarily suspended (ibid., 161). And as regards judicial acts by one sovereign, they will 
not have any force within the territory of another (ibid., 162). For the same denial of any“private” 
international law, see also: D.H.L. von Ompteda, Litteratur des gesammten sowohl natürlichen als positive 
Völkerrechts – Erster Teil (Montags, 1785), 7: “Zwar kommen im Völkerrechte auch Regeln vor, wie ein 
Staat sich in Anlehnung einzelner Mitglieder eines andern Staates z.B. der Emigranten, der Desserteurs 
etc zu verhalten habe. Allein immer wird den Bestimmungen dieser Regeln nur allein Rücksicht [comity] 
auf die Rechte und Verbindlichkeiten genommen, welche man dem Staate, dem diese Personen 
angehören, oder angehöret hatten, nicht diesen Personen selbst, schuldig ist.”   
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3. The Positivist School: A “European” Law of Nations 
 
With the spectacular rise of “empiricism” in the natural sciences, the “rationalist” 
understanding of international law, as a special branch of the law of nature, is gradually 
being challenged from two sides. One the one hand, a class of “professional” scholars, 
encouraged by Leibniz, begins to collect and systematise existing state practices; while 
on the other hand, a number of philosophers – most famously Kant – attack the 
underlying “humanist” premises of the classic law of nature and nations. The first 
result of this dual challenge is a mixture that accepts – empirical – differences between 
national laws, yet still insists on a – subsidiary – universal law that governs all peoples 
of the world.  
A good illustration of this “mixed” solution can be found in Montesquieu. For apart 
from the national differences the “Spirit of the Laws” famously identifies, the law of 
nations – built upon the laws of nature – is considered to be universal in that it 
“concerns all societies”.84 And, again, while Montesquieu admits that the positive 
international law may differ significantly (his extreme “relativist” illustration is a 
reference to the laws of the Iroquois – a savage tribe in North America);85 the law of 
nations is meant to be based on human reason governing all societies and peoples of 
the earth. This ambivalence between a “universal” natural international law and a 
variety of different – positive – international laws can also be found in others;86 and, 
as this third section will show, none of the “positivist” challengers discussed indeed 
denies the existence of a “natural” law of nations as such.  
 
84 C. de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (translator: A. Cohler et al.; Cambridge University Press 
1989), 8. This universal natural law is founded on only two principles, namely: that “the various nations 
should do to one another in times of peace the most good possible, and in times of war, the least ill 
possible” (ibid., 7). 
85 Ibid., 8: “All nations have a right of nations; and even the Iroquois, who eat their prisoners, have one. 
They send and receive embassies; they know rights of war and peace: the trouble is that their right of 
nations is not founded on true principles.” 
86 J.-J.Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law (translator: T. Nugent; Liberty Fund, 2006), 
177: “There is certainly an universal, necessary, and self-obligatory law of nations, which differs in 
nothing from the law of nature, and is consequently immutable, insomuch that the people or sovereigns 
cannot dispense with it, even by common consent, without transgressing their duty. There is, besides, 
another law of nations, which we may call arbitrary and free, as founded only on an express or tacit 
convention; the effect of which is not of itself universal; being obligatory only in regard to those who 
voluntarily submitted thereto, and only so long as they please, because they are always at liberty to 




a. The Decline of the Voluntary Law and the Rise of State Practice  
 
An early example of the new “positivism” can be found in J. Moser’s “First Principles 
of Today’s European Law of Nations” (1778).87 Its main premise is to present the 
“real” law, as opposed to the “ideal” law that can be found in “Grotius, von Wolff and 
Vattel”.88 This does however not mean that Moser completely rejects the idea of 
natural law. For there “really” exists “one natural and general” international law,89 which 
forms part of the law of nature “which God implanted into human nature” and which 
governs all human relations in its sphere.90 However, for Moser, there also exist “many 
positive or particular” international laws;91 and due to his empiricist project – as well as 
the self-confessed limits of his own knowledge – his textbook is confined to the “real” 
law as practiced in Europe.  
What are the principal sources of this positive European international law? First and 
foremost, the latter must be found in “treaties”; and while none bind all the States of 
Europe, numerous treaties exist between a great many European states.92 A second – 
and even more important source – of the positive law of nations is seen in custom.93 
For while such custom should, in theory, only bind those states that created it, many 
customs have become generally binding as European law: 
“One can however prove for all and each of the European powers that they, within 
their official publications, recognize a customary law between various European 
states, especially what has been custom for some time; and that they regard it as 
 
87 J.J. Moser, Erste Grundlehren (supra n.83). Moser considers himself to be the first to have created the 
idea of a “European” international law. On Moser’s empirical programme generally, see: A. Verdross, 
J.J. Mosers Programm einer Völkerrechtswissenschaft der Erfahrung”, (1922) 3 Zeitschrift des 
öffentlichen Rechts 96.   
88 J.J. Moser, Erste Grundlehren (supra n.83), Vorrede - §§1-2. 
89 Ibid., Chapter 1 – §3 (emphasis added). 
90 Ibid., §5. The three spheres are: „das allgemeine privat-Naturrecht“, „das natürliche allgemeine 
Staatsrecht“ and „das natürliche allgemeine Völkerrecht“.  
91 Ibid., §15. 
92 Ibid., §22. The subsequent paragraphs then list the best treaty-collections in which these can be found; 
for example: Mably’s “Droit public de l’Europe” (1758). 
93 Ibid., § 27. 
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international law with a force and binding nature and to which they voluntarily subject 
themselves in new cases and therefore also, in turn, against themselves.”94 
 
The binding nature of European international law is here firmly located in “custom”;95 
and it is through custom that Europe constitutes an “autonomous” entity that, while 
composed of sovereign states, has its own customary laws regulating “its” international 
relations. These European (positive) principles thereby stand next to a general (natural) 
international law; and “in thesi” will never contradict it.96  
This “positivist” project is subsequently taken up by von Martens,97 whose textbook 
on the “Law of Nations” (1785) will become an international bestseller.98 Like Moser, 
Martens does not deny the existence of a universal and necessary international law: 
“Each national being considered as a moral being living in a state of nature, the 
obligations of one nation towards another, are no more than those of individuals, 
modified and applied to nations; and this is what is called the natural law of nations. It is 
universal and necessary, because all nations are governed by it, even against their will. 
This law, according to the distinction between perfect and imperfect, is perfect and 
external (the law of nations strictly speaking), or else imperfect and internal, by which 
last is understood the morality of nations.”99    
 
The universal natural law of nations however remains too abstract; and the common 
interests of nations therefore obliges them “to render it more determinate, and to 
depart from that perfect equality of rights”.100 Such modifications are effected by 
treaties or custom; and the resulting law is called the “positive, particular, or arbitrary, 
 
94 Ibid., §28 (my translation). 
95 In this sense also, A. Verdross, J.J. Mosers Programm einer Völkerrechtswissenschaft der Erfahrung (supra 
n.87), 97. 
96 J.J. Moser, Erste Grundlehren (supra n.83), Chapter 1 – §21: “Die Grundsätze des allgemeinen und des 
europäischen Völkerrechts können wohl neben einander stehen, sollten es auch; und in thesi 
wiederspricht man es nicht: Wenn es aber zu einzelnen Fällen kommt, collidierten sie oft gar sehr mit 
einander.“ 
97 On Martens, see: M. Koskenniemi, Into Positivism: Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756-1821) and 
Modern International Law, (2008) 15 Constellations 189. 
98 After a first Latin edition in 1785, a French edition (1789) and a German edition (1796) are followed 
by an English edition in 1802. According to A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations 
(Macmillan, 1954), 184 there were five subsequent French editions (1801, 1821, 1835, 1858 and 1864) 
– which would make Martens one of the most famous authors of the nineteenth (!) century; and yet 
Nussbaum rightly argues (ibid., 179) that, conceptually and historically, “von Martens belongs to the 
pre-Napoleonic period, during which his literary opus was virtually completed.” The following section 
is based in the first English edition. 
99 G.F. von Martens, A Compendium of the Law of Nations Founded on the Treaties and Customs of the Modern 
Nations of Europe (translator: Cobbett, Cobbett, 1802), 2. 
100 Ibid. 
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in opposition to the natural, universal, and necessary law”.101 The existence of such a 
positive international law cannot be doubted; but in the absence of an international 
code applicable to all nations, it must be found and founded through the abstraction 
of general principles from concrete rules:  
“[I]t is clear, that what is become a law between two or three, or even the majority, of 
the powers of Europe, either by treaty or from custom, can produce neither rights nor 
obligations among others. However, by comparing the treaties that the powers of 
Europe have made with one another, we discover certain principles that have been 
almost universally adopted by all the powers that have made treaties on the same 
subject. It is the same with respect to custom: a custom received among the majority 
of the powers of Europe, particularly among the great powers (when it is not founded 
upon their particular constitutions), is easily adopted by other powers, as far as it can 
apply to them; and, in general, all nations give a certain degree of attention to the 
customs admitted by others, although it cannot be proved, that they have ever been 
admitted by themselves.”102    
 
These general principles make up the (positive) law of Europe.103 They are rooted in 
“the resemblance of manners and religion, the intercourse of commerce, the frequency 
of treaties of all sorts, and the ties of blood between sovereigns”.104 These social ties 
have created – as Vattel (and Moser) already asserted – a “society of nations and states” 
that, while falling short of a “state” or “republic”,105 do form the moral framework 
within which a positive law can be found.106 For some early positivist writers, this moral 
framework even comes to be identified as a form of “societal” natural law. Günther, 
consequently, distinguishes between an “original” (universal) and a “societal” 
(particular) natural law – with the latter based on the “nature of the society” that 
 
101 Ibid., 3.  
102 Ibid., 3-4. Von Martens expressly rejects the idea of a “voluntary” law of nations that is independent 
of the (universal) natural law of nations and the (particular) customary law (ibid., 5 – footnote): “The 
law of nations which Baron Wolf[f] has called voluntary, and which some other writers have called 
modified, does not appear to form a particular branch of the law of nations; the principles that these 
writers deduce from it, may be, in part at least, deduced from the external or internal universal law of 
nations; and the rest depend merely on custom and are simply the effect of what a nation owes to itself.”   
103 Von Martens expressly points out that this term is meant to include some states “out of Europe”, 
such as the United States, which have adopted the same general principles; yet he finds the term “law 
of civilized nations” “too vague” (ibid.).  
104 Ibid., 27.  
105 Ibid., 27 – footnote: “We may compare this society of European powers to a people before they 
form themselves into a state; that is to say, before they acknowledge any sovereign power over them. 
The states of Europe need then make but one step, to advance from the natural to the civil state, and 
to form themselves into an universal monarchy or republic; but this step they will never make.”  
106 Von Martens also mentions religion but this is not the decisive criterion to exclude – for example –
the Turks from the European (Christian) law of Europe; rather, he considers that “the Turks have, in 
many respects, rejected the positive law of nations of which I here treat” (ibid., 5 – footnote).  
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various states have entered into..107 This “natural” law is independent of the will of the 
states that compose it;108 and due to the fact that a universal social and moral 
framework does not (yet) exist, this natural law “cannot bind all states of the globe, 
but only bind those which really coexist in a social community”.109 
What, then, is the relationship between the positive “European” law and other forms 
of “particular” international systems, especially when viewed against the background 
of a universal natural law? The scholarly position continues, in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, to follow the tolerant enlightenment tradition. Von Ompteda thus 
unconditionally accepts that “the merely natural law of nations will exercise its 
jurisdiction over all and every people on the Earth, whether civilised or uncivilised”; while 
ominously claiming – using Vattel’s idea of a voluntary law – that the “modified natural 
law of nations” can, by contrast, “only be considered as the basic law of all civilised 
nations”.110 But this restriction is, it seems, not meant to exclude “uncivilized” nations 
from the advantages of a modified natural law as such. On the contrary, it appears to 
allow non-European states to build their own “regional” international law.111  
A remarkable post-1789 version of this “regional” relativism can be found in the work 
of Robert Ward, which stands in between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. 
Ward accepts the “Law of Nature as forming a part of the foundation of the Law of 
Nations”;112 yet in line with the early positivists, he also thinks that a special and 
positive part is required to make that abstract law more concrete and, like them, he 
also thinks that for this positive part to be binding, it needs a “binding principle” 
validating it. That binding principle is found in “religion, and the moral system 
engrafted upon it”.113 Yet importantly, there is not just one such moral system but 
 
107 K. G. Günther, Europäisches Völkerrecht in Friedenszeiten – Erster Theil (Richterschen Buchhandlung, 
1787), 14. 
108 Ibid., 10: „Die Verbindlichkeit des freiwilligen Völkerrechts liegt in der natur der Gesellschaft, und 
hängt nicht weiter von dem Willen der Völker ab, sobald sie einmal freiwillig in die Gesellschaft getreten 
sind.“ 
109 Ibid., 11. 
110 D.H.L. von Ompteda, Litteratur des gesammten sowohl natürlichen als positive Völkerrechts – Erster Teil (supra 
n.83), 18.  
111 Ibid., where von Omteda equally clarifies that “Europe” means not the geographical but the 
normative concept and it therefore includes those states that have – voluntarily – adopted a European 
culture, like the United States. 
112 R. Ward, An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe – Volume I 
(Butterworth, 1795), xxxi. 
113 Ibid., xxxv. 
 33 
various moral systems. And while these regional systems may be divided into “savage” 
and “civilised”,114 each is ultimately deemed as equal, for what matters is that the 
“binding principle” is accepted by the people that it governs. Next to a “Christian” 
Law of Nations, there thus co- exists a “Mahometan” Law of Nations and so forth.115   
Unlike Montesquieu’s “national” relativism,116 Ward here offered a first “regional” 
relativism – a conception of positive international law that divides the world into 
“classes” of nations.117 In his own words: “[I]n fine, that what is commonly called the 
Law of Nations; falls far short of universality; and that, therefore, the Law is not the 
Law of all nations, but only of particular classes of them; and thus there may be a 
different Law of Nations for different parts of the globe.” 118 
 
 
b. Founding “Positive” Law: Rousseau’s “Utopian” Federalism  
 
A second “positivist” theme within eighteenth century discussions concerns European 
federalism. This strand also denies that there “naturally” exists a civil government 
above the State; yet, unlike the ordinary “positivists”, it urges States to positively 
“found” such a civil law through a federal compact between them. The most celebrated 
eighteenth-century project propagating such a federal compact is offered by Saint-
Pierre.119 Published around the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), his “Perpetual Peace” 
originally advocated a universal federation between “all the Kingdoms of the World”; 
 
114 Ibid., 101. 
115 Ibid., 102: “Now according to the whole tenor of the foregoing arguments, we say it is fair to suppose 
that uncivilized, as well as civilized nations believe the religious notions which inspire them, to be the 
dictates of their nature; and although civilized reason should demonstrate, ever so much to its own 
satisfaction, that uncivilized minds are wrong in their ideas, yet unless the latter agree that they are 
wrong, nothing satisfactory can be determined.” 
116 Ibid., 156. 
117 Ward lists his “classes of nations” (ibid., 139): “Thus then, distinct Classes of Nations have 
distinguishing Sets of customs. The North American Indians have one; The Indians of the South Sea 
another; The Negroes a third; the Gentoos a fourth; The Tartar Nations a fifth; The Mahometans a 
sixth; The Christians a sevenths, and so on.” 
118 Ibid., xiv. 
119 C.-I. Castel de Saint-Pierre, Projet Pour Rendre la paix Pérpetuelle en Europe (Utrecht, 1713). Saint-Pierre 
had published an early version in 1711, which he had subsequently extended into this three-volume 
treatise. In 1729, a shorter version was published as « Abrégé du Projet de Paix perpétuelle ». The three-
volume project can be found online here: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k86492n. 
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but fearing this to be too utopian, the project in the end settled on Europe in the hope 
that “most of the Sovereigns of Asia and Africa” would in the future “desire to be 
received into the Union”.120  
These ideas are subsequently taken up by Rousseau, whose formally modest aim it is 
to make the Abbé’s work more “readable”;121 yet the Rousseauian “restatement” has 
been said to have treated its predecessor with “utmost freedom”.122 The central 
difficulty nevertheless remains the same: how to reconcile the internal welfare within 
states with the existence of external warfare between them? Following Saint-Pierre’s 
original project, Rousseau also confines himself to Europe; and the central question 
for him therefore becomes: considering that “the Powers of Europe stand to each 
other strictly in a state of war, and that all the separate treaties between them are in the 
nature rather of a temporary truce than a real peace”, how can a “public Law of 
Europe” be guaranteed?123 The answer Rousseau gives is this:  
“If there is any way of reconciling these dangerous contradictions, it is to be found 
only in such a form of federal Government as shall unite nations by bonds similar to 
those which already unite their individual members, and place the one no less than the 
other under the authority of the Law. Even apart from this, such a form of 
Government seems to carry the day over all others; because it combines the 
advantages of the small and the large State, because it is powerful enough to hold its 
neighbours in awe, because it upholds the supremacy of the Law, because it is the only 
force capable of holding the subject, the ruler, the foreigner equally in check.”124 
 
Rousseau here resumes a way of thinking that had, a decade earlier, been popularised 
by Montesquieu;125 yet the author of the “Social Contract” takes this idea – unlike what 
others have suggested – radically further.126 For instead of simply advising small 
republics to combine into a federal union so as to counterbalance the external force of 
 
120 Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe: Volume I (supra n. 119), xix-xx. 
121 J.-J. Rousseau, A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe and the State of War (Translator: C.E. 
Vaughan; Constable, 1917). The suggestion to turn the “unreadable” three volumes into a small and 
readable book had, originally come from Mably.  
122 This was the opinion of C.E. Vaughan (ibid., 7): “Rousseau has treated his original with the utmost 
freedom.” 
123 Ibid., 47. 
124 Ibid., 38-39. 
125 On the influence of Montesquieu on Rousseau, see: C. E. Vaughan, The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau – Volume I (Cambridge University Press, 1915), 71 et seq.  
126 For the opposite view, see: S. Hoffmann, Rousseau on War and Peace, (1963) 57 American Political 
Science Review 317 at esp. 327-8. 
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their (dangerous) monarchic neighbours,127 the very idea of a supranational federation 
is proposed as a fundamental remedy to prevent all wars. And because such a 
federation does not “naturally” exist, it must be “positively” founded. An “authentic 
federation” is here defined as “a genuine Body politic” that has “a Legislative Body, 
with powers to pass laws and ordinances binding upon its members”, and executive 
power “capable of compelling every State to obey its common resolves”; and, finally, 
“it must be strong and firm enough to make it impossible for any member to withdraw 
at his own pleasure the moment he conceives his private interest to clash with that of 
the whole body”.128 What is here proposed is therefore nothing short of a 
“Constitution of the Federation of Europe”, whose five articles of confederation are:  
“By the first, the contracting sovereigns shall enter into a perpetual and irrevocable 
alliance, and shall appoint plenipotentiaries to hold, in a specified place, a permanent 
Diet or Congress, at which all questions at issue between the contracting parties shall 
be settled and terminated by way of arbitration or judicial pronouncement. By the 
second shall be specified the number of the sovereigns whose plenipotentiaries shall 
have a vote in the Diet; those who shall be invited to accede to the Treaty; the order, 
date and method by which the presidency shall pass, at equal intervals, from one to 
another; finally the quota of their respective contributions and the method of raising 
them for the defrayal of the common expenses.  By the third, the Federation shall 
guarantee to each of its members the possession and government of all the dominions 
which he holds at the moment of the Treaty, as well as the manner of succession to 
them, elective or hereditary, as established by the fundamental laws of each Province. 
(…) By the fourth shall be specified the conditions under which any Confederate who 
may break this Treaty shall be put to the ban of Europe and proscribed as a public 
enemy (…) Finally, by the fifth Article, the plenipotentiaries of the Federation of 
Europe shall receive standing powers to frame – provisionally by a bare majority, 
definitively (after an interval of five years) by a majority of three-quarters – those 
measures which, on the instruction of their Courts, they shall consider expedient with 
a view to the greatest possible advantage of the Commonwealth of Europe and of its 
members, all and single.”129  
 
Rousseau’s constitutional scheme thus envisages “civil” laws within the European 
federation that are adopted by a (qualified) majority of “plenipotentiaries” acting on 
behalf of their States. These laws ought to be enforced by executive and judicial means; 
and to illustrate this point further, Rousseau concentrates on Article 3 of the European 
Constitution – a provision that could have inspired the “Concert of Europe” half a 
century later. Here, he states: 
“As for the dependence of all upon the Tribunal of Europe, it is abundantly clear by 
the same Article that the rights of sovereignty, so far from being weakened, will, on 
the contrary, be strengthened and confirmed. For that Article guarantees to each 
 
127 C. de Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws (supra n.84), 131-132. 
128 J.-J. Rousseau, A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe (supra n.121). 59-60.  
129 Ibid., 61-64. 
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Sovereign not only that his dominions shall be protected against foreign invasion, but 
also that his authority shall be upheld against the rebellion of his subjects. The prince 
accordingly will be none the less absolute, and his crown will be more fully assured. 
By submitting to the decision of the Diet in all disputes with his equals, and by 
surrendering the perilous right of seizing other men's possessions, he is, in fact, doing 
nothing more than securing his real rights and renouncing those which are purely 
fictitious.”130 
 
Such a federal scheme has never been adopted in Europe. Why? For Rousseau, the 
reason is not that it is not good enough but rather that “it was too good to be 
adopted”.131 Due to the “excessive self-love” of kings,132 “[n]o Federation could ever 
be established except by revolution”;133 and this pessimistic conclusion undermines, 
according to Rousseau, the very desirability of the federal project. For if the only way 
to establish a “peaceful” federal Europe is by a war-like revolution, it is questionable 
“whether the League of Europe is a thing more to be desired or feared”, as “[i]t would 
perhaps do more harm in a moment than it would guard against for ages”.134 And yet: 
from a normative viewpoint, the creation of a European federation, and by extension: 
a world federation, forms an essential and integral – if lost – part of Rousseau’s 
philosophical project.135 The centrality of a federal treaty for his entire political 
philosophy indeed cannot be exaggerated,136 because only it can solve the dilemma of 
a Hobbesian world characterised by plurality of egoistic states. And this problem of 
 
130 Ibid., 80. 
131 Ibid., 111. 
132 Ibid., 94-95. 
133 Ibid., 112. 
134 Ibid., 112.  
135 The famous footnote in Book III – Chapter 15 of his “Social Contract”, Rousseau had promised a 
deeper analysis of foreign relations and the political philosophy of “confederation” in a later work – yet 
he never did. For a summary of his international law writings, see however: S. Hoffmann & D. P. Fidler, 
Rousseau on International Relations (Clarendon Press, 1991). Rousseau had apparently written a length 
fragment on international federations – apparently some sixteen chapters (C. E. Vaughan, The Political 
Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau – Volume I  (supra n.125), 95) that were however lost during the 
French Revolution; and we therefore are “left with a single sentence of the Contrat social – that in which 
we are told that Federation would have been one of the subjects treated in the Institutions politiques” 
(ibid.). For the story of the lost manuscript, see M. Windenberger, La République conféderative des Petits 
Ètats (Picard, 1899). 
136 On how central the idea and ideal of a federation was to Rousseau, see Vaughan (supra n.125, 100): 
“From all this it is manifest that the doctrine of Federation, so far from being a mere offshoot, springs 
from the very root of Rousseau’s political ideal; that the international Contract is necessary to complete 
the demands of that which gives birth to each nation taken singly[.]” This view has been contested by 
P. Riley, Rousseau as a theorist of national and international federalism (1973) 3 Publius 5; yet for an 
excellent rebuttal see: D. Cullen, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Case against (and for) Federalism, in: 
A. Ward & L. Ward, The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism (Ashgate, 2009),137. 
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the incomplete – civil – contract is already discussed in the (second) “Discourse on 
Inequality”: 
“It is easy to see how the establishment of a single Society made the establishment of 
all others indispensable, and how, in order to stand up to united forces, it became 
necessary to unite in turn. Societies, multiplying and expanding rapidly, soon covered 
the entire face of the earth…   Civil right having thus become the common rule among 
the Citizens, the Law of Nature no longer obtained except between different Societies 
where, under the name of Right of nations, it was tempered by a few tacit conventions 
in order to make commerce possible and to replace natural commiseration which, 
losing in the relations between one Society and another almost all the force it had in 
the relations between one man and another, lives on only in a few great Cosmopolitan 
Souls who cross the imaginary boundaries that separate Peoples and, following the 
example of the sovereign being that created them, embrace the whole of Mankind in 
their benevolence. The Bodies Politic thus remaining in the state of Nature among 
themselves soon experienced the inconveniences that had forced individuals to leave 
it, and this state became even more fatal among these great Bodies than it had 
previously been among the individuals who made them up. From it arose the National 
Wars, Battles, murders, reprisals that make Nature tremble and that shock reason, and 
all those horrible prejudices that rank among the virtues the honour of spilling human 
blood.”137  
 
The historical foundation of the first “civil society” among human beings was thus a 
mixed blessing. For it now leads other groups of men to form rival societies; and the 
creation of a plurality of civil societies will indeed not eradicate the state of nature – 
which continues to exist between states. The modern world order of civil societies is 
thus a “hybrid” order; and the pessimistic conclusion behind Rousseau’s international 
law writing is that this hybrid order is, in fact, a worse state of affairs than the original 
“state of nature”. Because through the creation of a plurality of states “more misery 
and loss of life than if men had preserved their original freedom”.138 By establishing a 
“hybrid order” in which law and peace exist within a state but anarchy and war between 
states, mankind ironically “succeeded in putting [itself] in the worst position that it was 
 
137 J.-J. Rousseau, The Discourses and other early political writings (editor: V. Gourevitch; Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 173-4.  
138 The relevant passage from Rousseau’s “Émile or on Education (Penguin, 1991), 446 states: “Having 
thus considered every kind of civil society in itself, we shall compare them, so as to note their relations 
one with another; great and small, strong and weak, attacking one another, insulting one another, 
destroying one another; and in this perpetual action and reaction causing more misery and loss of life 
than if men had preserved their original freedom. We shall inquire whether too much or too little has 
not been accomplished in the matter of social institutions; whether individuals who are subject to law 
and to men, while societies preserve the independence of nature, are not exposed to the ills of both 
conditions without the advantages of either, and whether it would not be better to have no civil society 
in the world rather than to have many such societies. Is it not that mixed condition which partakes of 
both and secures neither?  “Per quem neutrum licet, nec tanquam in bello paratum esse, nec tanquam in pace 
securum.”—Seneca De Trang: Animi, cap. I. Is it not this partial and imperfect association which gives rise 
to tyranny and war? And are not tyranny and war the worst scourges of humanity?” 
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possible to discover” – “worse than if such distinctions were unknown”.139 This ultra-
pessimist position interprets the creation of separate states as the original sin of all 
political organisation. 
Can Rousseau’s theory of federalism solve this normative dilemma? The internal peace 
within a society and the external peace between different societies can, in his view, 
only be achieved by a second – supranational or international – social contract.140 This 
federal contract can positively create a supranational civil society; but importantly, any 
supranational contract can only work if certain social conditions are in place. These 
social preconditions may already be found in Europe,141 yet the absence of a “general 
society of mankind” will prevent an extension of the federal contract to the world.142 
All talk about a world society or even a world republic is considered “utopian” thinking 
that turns the historical evolution of mankind on its head.143 The traditional perception 
that Rousseau categorically rejects a world federation must nevertheless be qualified.144 
For while the historical conditions for its practical implementation are not in place, it 
 
139 J.J. Rousseau, A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and the State of War (supra n.121), 127-8. 
140 On this point, see: Windenberger, La République conféderative des Petits Ètats (supra n.135), 237: « Au 
Contrat social s’ajoute le Contrat international; à l’organisation des hommes au sein des sociétés civiles 
se superpose le République confédérative des petits États. »   
141 “Thus the Powers of Europe constitute a kind of whole, united by identity of religion, of moral 
standard, of international law; by letters, by commerce, and finally by a species of balance[.]”By contrast, 
“[t]he nations of other continents are too scattered for mutual intercourse; and they lack any other point 
of union such as Europe has enjoyed”. See Rousseau, A Lasting Peace (supra n.121), 40 and 44. 
142 In Chapter 2 of the Geneva Manuscript of his “Social Contract” – mysteriously dropped from the 
final version, we thus have Rousseau tell us that the word “mankind” is only a “purely collective idea, 
which does not assume any real unity among the individuals who constitute it” because it is not a “moral 
person” endowed with a “sentiment of common existence” generated through language, mutual 
communication or commerce. See: J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings 
(translator: V. Gourevitch; Cambridge University Press, 1997), 155.    
143 This is, in my view, the meaning of the following famous passage from Chapter 2 of the Geneva 
manuscript (ibid., 158): “We conceive of the general society in terms of our particular societies, the 
establishment of small Republics leads us to think of the larger one, and we do not properly begin to 
become men until after having been Citizens. Which shows what one should think about these supposed 
Cosmopolitans who, justifying their love of fatherland by their love of mankind, boast of loving 
everyone so that they might have the right to love no one.”  
144 In this sense: G. Cavallar, `La sociéte générale du genre humain': Rousseau on cosmopolitanism, 
international relations, and republican patriotism, in: P. Kitromilides (ed.), From Republican Polity to 
National Community, (2003) Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Voltaire Foundation, 
2003), 89 at 97: “The favourable interpretation clams that Rousseau endorsed an evolutionary approach, 
and a bottom-up procedure. Civic patriotism is the first and indispensable step in the evolution of a 
genuine love of humanity. (…) A global general will might be created by continuous republican 
practice.” In this sense also, F. Cheneval, Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung (supra n.25), 382: 
“Erst auf der Stufe supranationaler Integration wäre also die Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie wirklich 
abgeschlossen[.]“ 
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does represent the ideal solution to Rousseau’s political paradox. His “positivist” semi-





The eighteenth century is a – fascinating – battleground of old and new ideas. It is the 
century in which the older “utopian” ideas of a world republic finally die, and the 
modern international law of sovereign states is fully born.145 The normative 
foundations of this modern international law remain, however, unsettled throughout 
that century; and this first – preliminary – chapter has tried to identify three distinct 
approaches or “schools” to the question of the nature of international law.  
The “theological” approach here constitutes the oldest school of thought. It explains 
the validity of international law by reference to the “authority” and “goodness” of 
God. All law, whether natural or positive, ultimately derives its legal character and 
moral goodness from a divine commander that stands at the apex of the natural order 
of things. This theocratic conception of the law of nature is complemented by a secular 
conception that attempts to better justify legal change and the rise of positive law 
within the eighteenth century.  This “metaphysical” school accepts the validity of 
positive law but, in order to explain how the latter can “authorize” modifications of 
the natural law, it is forced to root the “voluntary” law of nations in a fictitious “world 
republic” that can adopt legislative “civil” laws. The third school, finally, marginalises 
natural law thinking altogether and prioritises the “consensual” positive law created by 
States. All positive international law here derives its “normativity” from the consent 
 
145 The modern phrase « Westphalian state order », so often found in international relations and 
(American) legal scholarship is thus deeply misleading. No-one has better said it then P. Haggenmacher, 
Le Modèle de Vattel et la Discipline Du Droit International (supra n.62), 48: “Il ne s’agit nullement de nier 
l’immense importance politique de la paix de Westphalie qui (avec celle des Pyrénées) marque une césure 
dans l’histoire européenne en faisant échec aux visées hégémonique de la maison d’Autriche et en 
instaurant une manière de stabilité confessionnelle. Au demeurant l’objet du congés de paix n’était pas 
de créer de toutes pièces un nouvel ordre juridique internationale ; tout au plus rééquilibrait-on la 
constitution du Saint-Empire, de manière à affaiblir la position de l’empereur … S’il est vrai qu’avec eux 
s’ouvrit une nouvelle époque du système des Etats européens qui vit éclore les droit international 
comme discipline juridique propre, ce n’est pas pout autant à ces traités qu’on le doit. A vrai dire, ceux-
ci forment bien le point de départ de ce qu’on appellera au temps de Vattel, à la suite de l’abbé de Mably, 
‘le droit public de l’Europe fondé sue les traites’ ; mais ceci est toute autre chose que le prétendu 
‘Westphalian Order’… Allant plus loin, il est même permis de se demander si l’on n’a pas indument 
projeté le modèle de Vattel un siècle en arrière."   
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of the States; and, while a lingering connection with natural law theories is retained, 
natural law is ultimately reduced to positing the basic “postulates” of practical reason 
(such as the binding nature of international treaties). 
All three of these eighteenth-century views resurface, as the next chapter will show, in 
the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant originally believes, with Wolff, in the idea of a world 
state as the ultimate normative fountain of all international law; yet, in light of the 
empirical and normative plurality of States, Kant comes to replace the (unrealizable) 
ideal of a world republic with the (realizable) idea of a voluntary federation of States. 
This federation is not “naturally” given but must – following Rousseau – be 
“positively” founded. However, because States are “sovereign”, any federal union is 
confined to the “negative” task of maintaining peace between States and it ought not 
“positively” interfere into the “internal” sphere reserved to “state” law. The free 
federation of States would thus not have a “government”; the collectivity of States is 
only tasked to govern “as if” subject to a civil constitution.  
But let us tread slowly. For whereas Kant rescues the metaphysical position into the 
nineteenth century, there are many eighteen-century “certainties” that will be lost. 
First, all classic scholars, discussed above, had remained, at least to some extent, 
attached to some “natural law” thinking.146 This “naturalist” conception was – 
secondly – a universal conception. (For even if a “positive” international law was 
confined to a particular society of states, there existed a universal natural law that 
applied to all peoples and cultures.) Non-European states did, in theory, enjoy the 
same normative status as European states under natural law; and the enlightenment 
spirit thus rejected a colonial project that would have justified the subjection of non-
European societies on the ground that a higher civilisation could bring benefits to a 
lower civilisation. Finally, the eighteenth century still entertained a broad “ius gentium” 
conception of international law that included states as well as individuals. This could 
be seen in the normative affirmation of “crimes” against humanity, but there also 
existed an unarticulated theory of what would, a century later, be called “private 
international law”.  
 
146 For the controversy whether Rouesseau is a “pure” positivist or nor, see: R. Wokler, “Natural Law 
and the Meaning of Rousseau’s Political Thought: A correction to two Misrenderings of his Doctrine”, 
in G. Barber and C.P. Courtney, Enlightenment Essays in Memory of Robert Shackleton (Voltaire Foundation, 
1988), 319. For the classic argument placing Rousseau into the natural law tradition, see: R. Derathé, 











The “German” Nineteenth Century I 





With the French Revolution, the eighteenth century comes to an early end; and with 
it, the long nineteenth century stormily begins. Inside the German Enlightenment 
circles, the Revolution is, at first, greeted with enthusiasm and hope. The ancient feudal 
world seemed to have come to an end, and a new rational one appeared to have 
emerged. Among the intellectual supporters of the Revolution we find Immanuel 
Kant, whose rationalist project – centred on human freedom – naturally aligned itself 
to the revolutionary principles (even if Kant categorically rejected the “right” to revolt). 
But a “reactionary” response soon objected to the French rationalist challenge; and 
the traditional sources of “authority” and “legitimacy” were actively “revived”.1 This 
revival of tradition would find its most profound legal expression in the so-called 
Historical School.2 Viewing law as the organic expression of a natural order, the 
Historical School stood – just like Burke in England – diametrically opposed to the 
idea of radical reform based on rational principles. Finally, and in between the two 
extremes of rational “revolution” and social “tradition” lay the legal philosophy of 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.3  
What did the French Revolution mean for international law? Would the “classic” 
“natural law” conception survive into the nineteenth century; and if not, what would 
take its place? This chapter explores three post-revolutionary “German” philosophical 
reactions, and especially their understanding of the nature of international law. For 
Kant, the origin of all law remains (universal) human reason; and, as Section 1 aims to 
show, he thus continues to construct his conception of international (and 
cosmopolitan) law on the basis of an a priori rationalist system. For Hegel, on the 
other hand, all law ultimately derives from the state as the highest “natural” order; and 
with the state “absolutized”, Hegel’s philosophy has often been decried as lacking any 
conception of international law. Section 2 hopes to show that this picture is too broad-
brushed, yet it will also confirm Hegel as the principal representative of the “un-sorry” 
deniers of an “objective” international law. Section 3 finally explores the philosophical 
 
1 F. B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution: 1814-1832 (Harper, 1963), Chapter 3. 
2 In Britain, this conservative “reaction” will be led by Edmund Burke; in France, it will come to be 
influenced by Joseph de Maistre.   
3 M. Riedel, Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy (Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), esp. Chapter 7.  
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premises of the Historical School. Steeped in German idealism, it considers each 
national “spirit” as the ultimate source of law; and yet its moral and ethical 
understanding of the nation can – surprisingly – also develop a conception of 
international law based on a “society” of nations.     
Each of the three post-revolutionary conceptions will come to a different conclusion 
as to the nature and scope of international law; yet all three remain, as will be shown 
below, firmly rooted in a metaphysical project. For Kant, the central metaphysical 
“object” thus remains the rational individual; whereas for Hegel and the Historical 
School, a new metaphysical object is embraced: the nation-state. In a process that had, 
within Germany, accelerated with Herder,4 the nineteenth-century will indeed come to 
identify the nation-state as the “natural” unit of political and philosophical life. Like 
any natural organism, the nation is thereby seen as evolving with time; and once this 
evolutionary perspective is applied, a philosophy of history emerges in which human 
progress will be chartered in “a chain of cultivation” in which one (or few) nations 
come to represent the “spirit of the age”.5 This evolutionary viewpoint is rooted in a 
“romantic” or “idealist” programme; and, indeed, all three philosophical approaches 
discussed in this chapter ultimately form part of German idealism that permeates the 
entire nineteenth century. 
 
 
1. Kant and the “Unsettled” Foundations of International Law 
 
What is Kant’s philosophical position towards the nature and foundation of 
international law? In the early post-critical period, Kant lays out three themes that are 
characteristic to his legal writings. First, he expressly links – following Rousseau – the 
establishment of a “national” constitution “to the problem of a law-governed external 
relationship with other states”; indeed: the former is “subordinate” to the latter “and 
cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved”.6 Second, and again with Rousseau, 
 
4 J.G. Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of The History of Man (translator: T. Churchill; Johnson, 1800), 249. 
5 Ibid., 450: “The human Race is defined to proceed through various Degrees of Civilization[.]”; and 
see also ibid., 453: “Thus through all the polished nations, that we have hitherto considered, or shall 
thereafter consider, a chain of cultivation may be drawn, flying off in extremely divergent curves.”  
6 I. Kant, Political Writings (editor: H. Reiss; Cambridge University Press, 1991), 47.  
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the solution suggested is “a federation of peoples”;7 and since that federation is not 
embedded in natural law, it must – thirdly – be positively “founded”.8 But what sort 
of federation Kant envisages changes over time. There are different and contradictory 
answers that the Konigsberg philosopher gives. One answer applies, by analogy, the 
solution found for civil society to international society and argues in favour of a 
“cosmopolitan constitution” establishing a “civil” federation above the individual 
states (a). But later on, this positive idea is replaced with a “negative” substitute:  an 
international federation of free states without the power to coerce (b).  
 
 
a. The “Cosmopolitan Constitution” and the World Republic 
 
For Kant, international peace can only be established in a “federation of peoples”. In 
“Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (1784), this is a federation “in 
which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive security and rights not 
from its own power or its own legal judgment, but solely from this great federation”.9 
The latter is “a united power”, whose united will adopts world laws.10 Expressly 
referring to the plans by Saint-Pierre and Rousseau, this world state solution is justified 
by the suffering States can inflict on each other. It is this suffering that “must force 
the states to make exactly the same decision (however difficult it may be for them) as 
that which man was forced to make, equally unwilling, in his savage state – the decision 
to renounce his brutish freedom and seek calm and security within a law-governed 
 
7 Kant here clearly follows Saint-Pierre and Rousseau, see: G. Cavalar, Pax Kantiana: Sytematisch-historische 
Untersuchung des Entwurfs “Zum Ewigen Frieden” (1795) von Immanuel Kant (Böhlau, 1992), 33.  
8 Like Hobbes, and unlike Wolff, the natural state is thus one of war, and peace therefore needs to be 
“positively” founded. However, it is in my view, wrong to argue that Kant’s international law philosophy 
is “an extremely Hobbesian account of the international state of nature” (R. Tuck, The Rights of War and 
Peace (Oxford University Press, 2001), 215). This seriously underestimates the intellectual debts to Wolff, 
Vattel and Rousseau, while it also downplays the originality of Kant’s own solution in founding the 
normativity of international law. For the relationship between Kant and Rousseau in the context of 
international law, see in particular: O. Asbach, Internationaler Naturzustand und Ewiger Friede: Die 
Begründung einer rechtlichen Ordnung zwischen Staaten bei Rousseau und Kant, in: D. Hüning & B. 
Tuschling (eds.), Recht, Staat und Völkerrecht bei Immanuel Kant (Dunscker & Humbot, 1998), 203. 
9 I. Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in: Kant, Political Writings (supra 
n.6), 41 at 47. 
10 Ibid. 
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constitution”.11 This cosmopolitan system is “like a civil commonwealth” with a “civil 
constitution”, because “nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind”.12  
Kant’s simple solution to creating “international” law and peace thus lies in projecting 
a “civic” solution into the international arena of States. States must exit the 
(international) state of nature and found a “cosmopolitan system” in which a “united 
power” legislates, executes and arbitrates over the individual “citizens”. This civitas 
maxima solution is subsequently taken up and (minimally) developed in “Theory and 
Practice” (1793): 
“On the one hand, universal violence and the distress it produces must eventually 
make a people decide to submit to coercion which reason itself prescribes (i.e. the 
coercion of public law), and to enter into a civil constitution. And on the other hand, 
the distress produced by the constant wars in which the states try to subjugate or 
engulf each other must finally lead them, even against their will, to enter into a 
cosmopolitan constitution. Or if such a state of universal peace is in turn even more 
dangerous to freedom, for it may lead to the most fearful despotism (as has indeed 
occurred more than once with states which have grown to large), distress must force 
men to form a state which is not a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single ruler, but 
a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right [law].”13 
 
The passage contains a number of key confirmations. First, Kant advocates the 
adoption of a “civil constitution” that is a “cosmopolitan constitution”. Second, this 
cosmopolitan constitution will involve “the coercion of public law”. Third, because 
the establishment of a world state is potentially dangerous for freedom if it is a state 
under a single ruler (universal monarchy), Kant prefers a “federation” that is: a 
republican commonwealth. The latter is not the “loose” federation of his late work, 
but “a state of international right, based upon enforceable public laws to which each 
state must submit (by analogy) with a state of civil or political right among individual 
men”. 14 And to reinforce his plea for public laws, Kant not only ridicules the idea of 
the invisible hand in discourses on the international balance of powers,15 he also holds 
– against Rousseau – that the theory of a federal world state is (still) possible in practice:  
 
11 Ibid., 48 (emphasis added). 
12 Ibid., 48-51. 
13 I. Kant, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’, 
in: Kant, Political Writings (supra n.6), 61 at 90. 
14 Ibid., 92. 
15 Ibid: “For a permanent universal peace by means of a so-called European balance of power is a pure 
illusion, like Swift’s story of the house which the builder had constructed in such perfect harmony with 
all the laws of equilibrium that it collapsed as soon as a sparrow alighted on it.” 
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“For my own part, I put my trust in the theory of what the relationships between men 
and states ought to be according to the principle of right. It recommends to us earthly 
gods that maxim that we should proceed in out disputes in such a way that a universal 
federal state may be inaugurated, so that we should therefore assume that it is possible 
(in praxi).”16 
 
In conclusion: Kant’s first solution combines the idea of a world state – presumed by 
Wolff to be naturally existing – with the Rousseauian idea that such a state needs to be 
positively founded; and this founded cosmopolitan state would have to be a 
“federation” – presumably along the lines that Rousseau had drafted, that is: a 
federation that acknowledges the continued political existence of individual states as 
moral persons; yet one that can enforce its laws through the right to be prosecuted 
through a “punitive” war. 
 
 
b. The Abandonment of the World Republic: Following Vattel? 
 
Only two years after “Theory and Practice”, Kant publishes his longest essay on the 
foundations of international law: “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795).17 
Written in the style of a peace treaty between States, the very form of the essay already 
signals a fundamental shift in his conception of the normative foundation of 
international law. No longer is international law founded on a cosmopolitan 
constitution, it now needs to be founded on the voluntary agreement between free 
states. 
Kant’s famous peace treaty has four components: the preliminary articles, the definite 
articles, the supplements, and the appendices. The preliminary articles are designed to 
establish the pre-conditions for peace.18 (They are “prohibitive laws”; yet, not all of 
 
16 Ibid., 92. 
17 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, in: Political Writings (supra n.6), 93. The essay is 
generally seen to be a personal response to the Peace Treaty of Basel (1795), concluded by Prussia and 
revolutionary France. The title is taken from Saint-Pierre; and the famous implicit “pun” is liberally 
taken from Leibniz, who had already written, commenting on Saint-Pierre, that “I am reminded of a 
device in a cemetery, with the words: Pax perpetua; for the dead do not fight any longer” (see: Leibniz, 
Political Writings (editor: P. Riley, Cambridge University Press, 1988), 183).  
18 What do they state? The first article clarifies that a temporary peace to prepare for war is not valid 
(“No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation of 
the material for a future war.”). The second article states that a State cannot acquire another one (“No 
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them are said to be prohibitive in a strict sense.19) By contrast, the “definitive articles” 
positively “institute[]” peace and end “the state of nature, which is rather a state of 
war”.20 In discussing these three articles, Kant returns to his central theme: all law is 
connected and forms part of a single – monistic – normative world order; but within 
this monistic order, there exist three constitutional levels:  
“[T]he postulate on which all the following articles are based is that all men who can 
at all influence one another must adhere to some kind of civil constitution. But any 
legal constitution, as far as the persons who live under it are concerned, will conform 
to one of the three following types: 
(1) [A] constitution based on the civil right of individuals within a nation (ius civitatis). 
(2) [A] constitution based on the international right of states in their relationships with 
one another (ius gentium). 
(3) [A] constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals and states, co-
existing in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as 
citizens of a universal state of mankind (ius cosmopoliticum).”21 
 
All public (positive) law must be based on these three “constitutions”;22 and the 
constitutional categories are here “not arbitrary, but necessary”: each of them on its 
 
independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by 
inheritance, exchange, purchase of gift.”), because States are moral persons. The third article stipulates 
that standing armies are to be gradually abolished, while the fourth article criticises the credit system for 
financing wars (“No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the 
state.”). The fifth article prohibits violent interferences into the internal affairs of other states (“No state 
shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.”), and the sixth preliminary 
article finally outlaws “dishonourable stratagems” (poisoning and treason) that would undermine the 
trust of the enemy that a future peace might be possible.    
19 This is, for example, the case for the second preliminary article. This is a prohibition to treat States as 
“objects” capable of possession; and yet, in light of existing state practice, this prohibition is not directly 
effective. Kant explains: “prohibitive” laws in a wider sense “are not exceptions to the rule of justice”, 
but “allow for some subjective latitude according to the circumstances in which they are applied”. Put 
differently: they “need not necessarily be executed at once, so long as their ultimate purpose (e.g. the 
restoration of freedom to certain states in accordance with the second article) is not lost sight of”. Delay 
in applying this prohibition is permitted “as a means of avoiding a premature implementation which 
might frustrate the whole purpose of the article” (I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 97). 
Kant here introduces the idea of the “permissive law”. 
20 Ibid., 98.  
21 Ibid., 98 - *footnote. 
22 On the concept of “constitution” here, see: O. Eberl & P. Niesen, Immanuel Kant: Zum Ewigen Frieden 
(Surkamp, 2011), 208-209: „Wenn Kant sich am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts in Friedensschrift und 
Rechtlehre für den Ausdruck ‚Verfassung’ entscheidet, um den Rechtszustand nicht nur diesseits, 
sondern auch jenseits der Staaten zu bezeichnen, greift er ein in jüngster Zeit mehrdeutig gewordenes 
Konzept auf. Im hergebrachten und unspezifischen Sinne bezeichnet ‚Verfassung’ einfach den 
Gesamtzustand des Gemeinwesens; im neuen, mit der Amerikanischen und der Französischen 
Revolution eingeführten terminologischen Sinn ist eine Verfassung dagegen ein positives Gesetz, das 
die Rechtsbeindung aller Machthabenden Institutionen festlegt. Während das alte Verständnis ein 
empirisches ist, ist das neue ein normatives. (...) Sein Verfassungsbegriff für die globale Ordnung ist 
rechtlich-normativ, aber nicht demokratisch.“ 
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own must be realised in order to create peace.23 The three “complementary 
constitutions” are indeed mutually interlocking; and each of the three definitive articles 
consequently deals with one constitution:  
Definite Article 1: “The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican.” 
Definite Article 2: “The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free 
States.” 
Definite Article 3: “Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal 
Hospitality.”  
 
Unlike the preliminary articles (which are prohibitive laws), the definite articles 
represent prescriptive laws. The first article thereby demands a link between the 
national and the international constitutions. For the requirement that state 
constitutions are “republican” means, inter alia, 24 that the consent of the citizens is 
required to declare war; and this is seen to guarantee that States will only go to war 
when absolutely necessary.25 The second article explains the need for an international 
constitution as follows: 
“Each nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to demand of the others 
that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil one, without 
which the rights of each could be secured. This would mean establishing a federation of 
peoples. But a federation of this sort would not be the same thing as an international 
state. For the idea of an international state is contradictory[.] (…) But peace can 
neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general agreement between the nations; 
thus a particular kind of league, which we might call a pacific federation (foedus pacificum), 
is required. (…) This federation does not aim to acquire any power lie that of a state, 
but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of 
the other confederated. Although this does not mean that they need to submit to 
public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of 
nature.”26  
 
23 Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 99: “This classification, with respect to the idea of a perpetual 
peace, is not arbitrary, but necessary.” See also: I. Kant, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine 
of Right (“Doctrine of Right”), in: Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (edited: M. Gregor) (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), §43: “So if the principle of outer freedom limited by law is lacking in any one 
of these three possible forms of rightful condition, the framework of all the others is unavoidably  
undetermined and must finally collapse.” It is therefore misleading to state that “Kant argues that a 
peaceful global order can be created only by a cosmopolitan law [Weltbürgerrecht] that enshrines the 
rights of world citizens and replaces classical law among nations [Völkerrecht]” (J. Bohmann & M. Lutz-
Bachmann, Introduction, in: Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (MIT Press, 1997), 1 at 2-
3. 
24 On the very complex concept of “republicanism”, see: G. Cavalar, Pax Kantiana (supra n.7), 142-156.  
25 This idea goes back to Montesquieu, who has already argued in “The Spirit of the Laws” (editor: A. 
Cohler and others; Cambridge University Press, 1989) 143): “It is also against the nature of the thing 
for a democratic republic to conquer towns that could not enter the sphere of the democracy. (…) If a 
democracy conquers a people in order to govern it as a subject, it will expose its own liberty, because it 
will entrust too much power to the magistrates whom it sends out to the conquered state.” 
26 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 102 and 104. 
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The passage appears to significantly depart from Kant’s earlier civitas maxima position 
in three important ways. First, he now denounces the very idea of an “international 
state” as a contradiction in terms. Inter-national law conceptually means a law between 
nations; and if there were only one international state, there would simply be no need 
for the second definite article. This leads to a second point. The federation of states 
cannot have a civil constitution that allows for laws that can be enforced by a superior 
authority;27 and there therefore cannot be any “punitive war”.28 Finally: the constitution 
must be based on the voluntary accession of States.29  
The third definitive article finally deals with the cosmopolitan constitution. 
Substantially, it cannot – by subtraction – deal with relations within one state (Article 
1), nor with relations between states (Article 2). Cosmopolitan law deals with the 
relationship between States and non-States. It is defined as “the right of a stranger not 
to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory”.30 This right 
to hospitality is not the “right of a guest to be entertained” (asylum), but only the right 
to present oneself so as to enter into contact.31 Importantly, this third article contains 
a prescriptive and a prohibitive element.32 For while the prescriptive “shall” indicates 
that there be a cosmopolitan right whose normative foundation appears to lie in the 
idea of a civitas maxima,33 that right is nevertheless limited to universal hospitality; and 
 
27 This is further spelled out in the “Doctrine of Right” (supra n.23), §54: “This alliance must, however, 
involve no sovereign authority (as in a civil constitution), but only an association (federation); it must be 
an alliance that can be renounced at any time and so must be renewed from time to time.”  
28 Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 96: “A war of punishment (bellum punitivum) between states is 
inconceivable, since there can be no relationship of superior to inferior among them.”  
29 States should gradually crystallise around a federal “focal point” – but no forceful or permanent 
adhesion is allowed (ibid., 104): “For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form 
a republic (which is by its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for 
federal association among the states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of 
each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further 
and further by a series of alliances of this kind.”  
30 Ibid., 105. 
31 This right of physical contact is often identified with a right of economic contract. For an extensive 
discussion of Kant and international trade, see: P. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical 
Ideal of World Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Chapter 5.  
32 This excellent point is made by O. Eberl & P. Niesen, Immanuel Kant: Zum Ewigen Frieden (supra n.22), 
248. 
33 G. Cavallar, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right (University of Wales Press, 1999), 59; 
and see also: K. Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
Chapter 5: “The general united will and cosmopolitan Right”. 
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by means of this restriction, Kant has been held to indirectly prohibit all forms of 
imperialism and colonialism between States and non-state “peoples”.34  
 
 
c. Rousseauian Troubles: The “Antinomies” of International Right  
 
There is a central antinomy at the heart of Kant’s conception of international law, 
which he describes in Perpetual Peace as follows:  
“There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states can emerge 
from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like individual men, they must 
renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, 
and this from an international state (civitas gentium), which would necessarily 
continue to grow until it embraced all the peoples of the earth. But since this is not 
the will of the nations, according to their present conception of international right (so 
that they reject in hypothesis what is true in thesi), the positive idea of a world republic 
cannot be realised. If all is not to be lost, this can at best find a negative substitute in 
the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war.”35  
And in the Doctrine of Right, we read:  
“Since a state of nature among nations, like a state of nature among individual human 
beings, is a condition that one ought to leave in order to enter a lawful condition, 
before this happens any rights of nations, and anything external that is mine or yours 
which states can acquire or retain by war, are merely provisional. Only in a universal 
association of states (analogous to that by which a people becomes a state) can rights 
come to hold conclusively and a true condition of peace come about. But such a state made 
up of nations were to extend too far over vast regions, governing it and so too 
protecting each of its members would finally have to become impossible, while several 
such corporations would again bring a state of war. So perpetual peace, the ultimate goal 
of the whole right of nations, in indeed an unachievable idea. Still, the political 
principles directed toward perpetual peace, of entering into such alliances of states, 
which serve for continual approximation to it, are not unachievable.” (…) Such an 
association of several states to preserve peace can be called a permanent congress of 
states, which each neighbouring state is at liberty to join.36  
 
What arguments did Kant employ to explain this antinomy between reason and reality, 
between theory and practice? Two aspects must here be distinguished. First, Kant 
employs a series of “empirical” arguments to explain why nature obstructs the creation 
 
34 G. Cavallar, Pax Kantiana (supra n.7), 227. On Kant and colonialism, see K. Flikschuh & L. Ypi (eds,), 
Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2014).  
35 Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 105. 
36 Kant, Doctrine of Right (supra n.23), §61. 
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of an international state (aa); and, secondly, there exist a number of “conceptual” or 
normative reasons why Kant thinks there cannot be an international state (bb).  
 
 
aa. Empirical Obstacles to a Universal State  
 
For Kant, the idea of international law springs from the empirical existence of a plurality 
of States. For there simply would be no need for such a concept if all human beings 
had, from the beginnings of history, united into one general will under one constitution 
creating one State.37 But this has not happened. There exists a multitude of peoples 
having constituted a multitude of States; and it is this empirical fact that gives rise to the 
law of nations, or better: the law between States (Staatenrecht).  
But does nature not wish there to be only one state in the end? While “Theory and 
Practice” postulated that nature unconditionally wants an international state governed 
by a civil constitution, the Kantian position has changed after 1795. Kant henceforth 
identifies the idea of an international state with a “universal monarchy”, whose 
“soulless despotism” would “finally lapse into anarchy” because “laws progressively 
lose their impact as the government increases in range”.38 Geography is here presented 
as an argument against the creation of (effective) law. But more importantly: nature 
itself has “wisely separate[d] the nations” and uses “two means to separate the nations 
and prevent them from intermingling – linguistic and religious differences”.39 And since 
the social preconditions for a universal state are not fulfilled, “unlike that universal 
despotism which saps all man’s energies and ends in the graveyard of freedom, 
[perpetual] peace is created and guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces and a most 
 
37 If the physically possible (!) interaction between all human beings on the spherical earth is the reason 
for the assumption of an original community, why is the physically actual (!) interaction limited to States? 
The – perhaps – best explanation of this paradox comes from B. Ludwig, Kants Rechtlehre (Felix Meiner, 
Verlag, 2005), 131-2: “Der empirische (mithin zufällige) Sachverhalt, daß der Erwerbende nicht zugleich 
mit allen Erdbewohnern „in ein Praktisches Verhältnis kommt“, sondern zunächst nur mit denen, die 
sich mit ihm aktual auf dieselben äußeren Sachen beziehen, führ dazu, daß, obgleich die Idee des 
allgemeinen Willens selbstverständlich alle praktischen Vernunftwesen einzubeziehen hat, der 
unmittelbar bewirkte Zustand der vereinigen Willkür nur einen Teil derselben umfaßt. Das – erst im 
öffentlichen Recht Thema werdende – Phänomen [!] des Einzelstaates hat folglich seinen systematischen 
Ursprung in den empirischen Bedingungen der Erwerbung äußerer Sachen, speziell des Bodens.“   
38 Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 113.  
39 Ibid., 113-4. 
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vigorous rivalry”.40 This rivalry is kept in check by nature, because “nature also unites 
nations” under the concept of cosmopolitan right “by means of their mutual self-
interest” through “the spirit of commerce”.41 In essence: the diversity within mankind 
demands only a degree of unity, and that unity-in-diversity is seen in a federation of 
states. Nature herself would see to this – mixed – result.42 
 
 
bb. Normative Obstacles playing against an International State  
 
Why would Kant nevertheless not normatively advocate the idea of a (international) 
State? In Perpetual Peace, Kant gives two reasons. Analytically, he considers the very idea 
of an “international state” as contradictory: “a number of nations forming one state 
would constitute a single nation”; “[a]nd this contradicts our initial assumption, as we 
are here considering the right of nations in relation to one another in so far as they are 
a group of separate states”.43 The force behind this argument has often been 
misjudged.44 For Kant’s “pure” theory of law, considers the idea of a people or 
“nation” in exclusively “positivist” terms: a State and its nation always coincide 
because a State “constitutes” the nation (and not the other way around).45 It analytically 
follows that there cannot be an “inter-national” state but only a cosmopolitan state.  
But why does Kant not allow for such a cosmopolitan state – a state in which all humanity 
is united into one nation? Why does he reject “the positive idea of a world republic” in 
favour of “the negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding 
 
40 Ibid., 114. 
41 Ibid. 
42 This is the essence of the “First Supplement: On the Guarantee of a Perpetual Peace”, where Kant 
famously writes (ibid., 108): “Perpetual peace is guaranteed by no less an authority than the great artist 
Nature herself (natura daedala rerum).” 
43 Ibid., 102. 
44 For an extensive discussion of this point, see: P. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical 
Ideal of World Citizenship (supra n.31), 59 et seq. 
45 According to this (Hobbesian) view, a multitude constitutes itself as a “people” or “nation” through 
the very act of creating a civil body, that is: a state. The notion of “Staatsvolk” is here a pleonasm 
because “Staat” and “Volk” always coincide. This contrasts with the “organic” (or in Kant’s 
terminology: anthropological) view that considers the “people” as an ethnic or cultural entity that pre-
exists the State.  
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federation”? Kant admits that states are under an obligation to leave the state of nature, 
which is “a non-rightful condition” that is “in itself still wrong in the highest degree”;46 
yet he accepts that the weight of that obligation on states is not the same as that 
imposed on individuals: 
“[W]hile natural right allows us to say of men living in a lawless condition that they 
ought to abandon it, the right of nations does not allow us to say the same of states. 
For as states, they already have a lawful internal constitution, and have thus outgrown 
the coercive right of others to subject them to a wider legal constitution in accordance 
with their conception of right.“47 
And again: 
“[The] difference between the state of nature of individual men and of families (in 
relation to one another) and that of nations is that in the right of nations we have to 
take into consideration not only the relation of one state towards another as a whole, 
but also the relations of individual persons of one state towards the individuals of 
another, as well as toward another state as a whole. But this difference from the rights 
of individuals in a state of nature makes it necessary to consider only such features as 
can be readily inferred from the concept of a state of nature.”48 
 
Unlike the extreme normative pluralism that exists when each private person judges 
right and wrong in the state of nature, once civil societies have been formed normative 
progress through “unification” has been made. In order to protect the degree of 
“public” order already reached, Kant thus considers that there exists a difference 
between the state of nature between individuals and the state of nature between states:  
“The refusal by one State to enter into a civil condition with a particular State in its 
neighbourhood is not the same as refusing a civil condition between States as such. 
When, within the state of nature, a random number of persons decide to form a state, 
they create something ontologically different, namely an internally rightful constituted 
group of persons – which, as such, simply did not exist beforehand. By contrast, 
whenever a random number of previously distinct States join a Union of States that is 
itself similar to a State, nothing ontologically new has been created when compared to 
what had existed before. For there still exists a plurality of dis-united States – with the 
only difference that one State has changed its size and internal structure.”49 
 
In order to protect the “internal” peace – and normative unification within a State –  
Kant thus not only prohibits all revolutions from within, he also prohibits any other 
 
46 Kant, Doctrine of Right (supra n.23), §54. 
47 Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 104. 
48 Kant, Doctrine of Right (supra n.23), §53. 
49 J. Ebbinghaus, Kants Lehre vom Ewigen Frieden und die Kriegsschuldfrage, in: “Gesammelte 
Aufsätze, Vorträge und Reden (Olms, 1968), 24 at 35 (my translation).  
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State from interfering into the internal affairs from without.50 But more than that: while 
states are under an obligation, like individuals, to leave the State of nature; the means 
to achieve that end are radically different. Whereas individuals are entitled to use force 
to positively “found” a civil constitution, States are not allowed to establish an 
international constitution by means of war.51 (For a war against war is still war – and 
can never be “just war”;52 and even within the state of nature, wars of extermination 
or subjugation, that is wars that forcefully merge one State with another are 
prohibited.) Kant’s legal philosophy thus accepts States as distinct normative 
phenomena, and consequently rejects the violent creation of a World State. 53 
Integration between States must be integration through law, not integration through 
war. 
What means of leaving the state of nature among states is, then, suggested? The 
exeundum obligation expresses itself in the idea of a “social contract” that creates a 
league of nations. Its single aim is the protection of peace under the territorial status 
quo.54 The creation of a “league” thus means no transfer of sovereign authority (as in 
 
50 The fifth “preliminary article” states: “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and 
government of another state.” 
51 Because international law is defined as a relation between States, that is: a relation between moral persons 
that are themselves no physical objects, it is clear that “the idea of the right of nations involves only the 
concept of an antagonism in accordance with principles of outer freedom by which each can preserve 
that belongs to it, but not a way of acquiring” (§57). And since States cannot “acquire” other States or 
their territory as “property”, the normative demand for States to enter into a cosmopolitan state is here 
much lower. For the same conclusion, A. Ripstein, Force and Freedom (Harvard University Press, 2009), 
228: “[A]s Kant understands states, they do not have external objects of choice. The state does not 
acquire its territory; its territory is just the spatial manifestation of the state. That is why Kant joins other 
eighteenth-century writers in supposing that the state’s territory is more like its body than like its 
property.” 
52 Kant’ Doctrine of Right distinguishes between three “rights” with regard to war: the right to go to 
war (§56), the right during war (§57) and the right after war (§58). But importantly: these rights are rights 
within the state of nature and Kant emphatically denies a (conclusive) “just war” as a contradiction in 
terms. It is thus wrong to claim that there is a Kantian theory of just war, and it is even unthinkable for 
Kant justify a humanitarian intervention, contra: F. Téson, A Philosophy Of International Law 
(Westview Press, 1998), 56: “The Kantian thesis includes a theory of just war; it is the war wages in 
defense of human rights.” 
53 W. Kersting, Kant über Recht (mentis, 2004), 151: “[E]s kann kein Erlaubnisgesetz der Vernunft zur 
Gewaltname zum Zwecke der Errichtung eines Weltstaates geben, und daher kann sich die Befriedung 
durch Einzelstaatlichkeit nicht als Befriedung durch Weltstaatlichkeit vervollständigen. Es gibt im 
Kantischen Vernunftrecht Raum für Staatsgründungsgewalt, aber nicht für 
Weltstaatsgründungsgewalt.”  
54 Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 97. With reference to the second preliminary article Kant writes 
(idid): “For in the case of the second article, the prohibition only relates to the mode of acquisition, which 
is to be forbidden hereforth, but not to the present state of political possessions. For although the present 
state is not backed up by the requisite legal authority, it was considered lawful in the public opinion of 
every state at the time of the putative acquisition.”  
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a civil constitution); and the league cannot interfere in the States’ internal affairs. The 
social contract between States is confined to “limit” States’ external sovereignty; and  
Kant identifies this idea with a congress of States: “Only by such a congress can the 
idea of a public right of nations be realized, one to be established for deciding their 
disputes in a civil way, as if by a lawsuit, rather then in a barbaric way (the way of savages), 
namely by war.”55  
What does this “as if” formula here mean? Negatively, it may mean that the federal 
Congress not only lacks legislative and executive powers but equally lacks judicial powers.56 
Yet behind the “as if” formula may also stand a reflection that finds a parallel in Kant’s 
treatment of “republicanism” under constitutional law. For Kant here famously 
accepts that, regardless of the constitutional arrangements within States,57 
republicanism can operate outside a “republic”. Wherever an (enlightened) monarch 
governs “as if” s/he directly represented the people, republicanism is at play; and, in a 
similar vein, the “as if” formula with regard to a supranational “civil law” may refer to 
the idea that even in the absence of a “world state”, a federation of states can act “in 
a civil way”. In this ideational sense, Kant unconditionally supports the idea (!) of the 
world state as a regulatory ideal.58 Not a world government but world governance here 
stands behind the “as if” formula.  
 
55 Kant, Doctrine of Right (supra n.23), § 61. 
56 For the opposite view, A. Ripstein, Force and Freedom (supra n.51), 229-30: “Because each nation has 
neither private purposes nor external objects of choice, the analogue of a rightful condition among 
states has a court but neither legislature not executive. Such a court can resolve disputes about 
boundaries peacefully, but its resolution of disputes is only “as if before a court”, because states can 
resolve their disputes peacefully by accepting the decision of a court as binding.” This interpretation 
reduces the “as if” as pointing to the lack of an executive force enforcing a judgement.  
57 With Aristotle, Kant distinguishes between three “forms of sovereignty” (autocracy (monarchy), 
aristocracy and democracy); while there exist also two forms of government: republican and despotic.  
58 Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 105: “There is only one rational way in which states coexisting 
with other states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like individual men, they 
must renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and this 
from an international state (civitas gentium), which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraced 
all the peoples of the earth.” Can the idea of the international state ever be realised? According to 
Cavallar, Pax Kantiana (supra n.7), 209 this is possible if States voluntary consent to subjecting 
themselves to compulsory laws; and importantly (ibid., 211): „Kant kititisert schließlich nie die freiwillige 
Stiftung einer kosmopolitischen Republik. Staaten könnten zusätzliche Schritte unternehmen, um über 
eine Föderation hinauszugehen, die bloß versucht, Kriege zu verhindern.“ Yet for Kant, the idea that 
States, as States, would be willing agents favouring a progress that would undermine their moral 
existence is unlikely, cf. Kant, Perpetual Peace (supra n.17), 105: “But since this [the world state based 
on voluntary association] is not the will of the nations, according to their present conception of 
international right (so that they reject in hypothesi what is true in thesi), the positive idea of a world republic 
cannot be realised. If all is not to be lost, this can at best find a negative substitute in the shape of an 
enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent law.” 
 56 
This “non-institutional” solution behind this philosophy lies in a voluntary league of 
nations. But what stabilises this voluntary league normatively? The best answer here 
returns to the normative connection between internal (constitutional) law and external 
(international law):  
“[A] state which claims immunity from international juridical coercion on the grounds 
of its juridical sovereignty domestically is for that reason juridically obliged to enter 
into rightful relations with other states: its very claim to sovereignty domestically 
obliges it internationally. The juridically sovereign state is a self-enforcer of its 
international obligations: given its juridical immunity it cannot be compelled by a 
higher authority but must compel itself. However, though not coercible, the obligation 
is not for that reason voluntarily incurred or even voluntarily discharged.”59 
 
A State that does not recognize the (external) sovereignty of other States undermines 
its own claim to (internal) sovereignty. This ingenious solution stands at the heart of 
Kant’s international law conception. It is a solution that dialectically synthesizes the 
sovereign equality of all States; and with it, the “rationalist” law tradition finds its 
purest form.   
 
 
2. “National” Natural Law I: Hegel and State Idealism  
 
With Hegel, the natural law tradition reaches a turning point. Dismissing the 
“empirical” school of the past (Hobbes) as “content without form”; while equally 
rejecting the “transcendental” school (Kant) as “form without content”,60 a new 
approach to natural law is advocated. This new – third – approach envisages a changing 
and concrete conception of natural law that, in Hegel’s mind, combines form with 
content.  
Why are all previous accounts of natural law mistaken? For Hegel, the “empirical” 
approach simply discovers its “natural” laws in the society that presently exists. Its “a 
priori” is a simple reflection of an “a posteriori”, and the empirical approach is thus 
charged to “lack[] any criterion whatsoever for drawing the boundary between the 
 
59 K. Flikschuh, Kant’s Sovereignty Dilemma: A Contemporary Analysis, (2010) 18 Journal of Political 
Philosophy 469 at 488. 
60 T. Burns, Hegel and Natural Law Theory, (1995) 15 Politics 27. 
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contingent and the necessary, between what must be retained and what must be left 
out in the chaos of the state of nature”.61 The “transcendental” approach, by contrast, 
is “completely lacking in any content of the [moral] law”. All that Kantian rationalism 
can produce, Hegel laments, are analytical propositions in which “the sublime capacity 
of pure practical reason to legislate autonomously consists in the production of 
tautologies”.62 For any “formalism” to ever produce a law “some material, some 
determinacy, should be posited to supply its content”;63 and this material can only be 
provided by what Hegel calls the “ethical”.64 Natural law is here ingeniously viewed as 
a synthesis of “form and content”; or better: “form through content”. And it 
necessarily follows that since the world, through its content, is changing, this natural 
law will also change!  
But if natural law only “exists” where embedded within the “ethical” life, where do we 
find the latter? Rejecting the rationalist individualism behind all social contract 
theories, Hegel identifies the “ethical” with the “communities” in which individuals 
live – from the “family” to “civil society” up to the “State”. The nation state is posited 
as the highest “existing” spiritual community that human beings have – in the early 
nineteenth century – created; and for Hegel’s “real philosophy” it is therefore 
presumed to be the “absolute ethical totality”.65 The State suddenly becomes the 
starting point of all law – including natural law.66 For the latter can only be “abstracted” 
and “understood” from within a concrete ethical community and especially the highest 
ethical community: the State. This Hegelian conception of a “national” natural law 
warrants a separate analysis (a), before we take a closer look at his conception of the 
state in world history (b); and, finally, the Hegelian conception of international law (c).  
 
 
61 G. W. F. Hegel, On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, in: “Political Writings” (translator: 
H.B. Nisbet; Cambridge University Press, 1999), 102 at 111.  
62 Ibid, 123. 
63 Ibid., 124. 
64 Ibid., 105. The entire passage reads: “[B]ecause natural law has immediate reference to the ethical [das 
Sittliche], the [prime] mover of all human things; and in so far as the science of the ethical has an existence 
[Dasein], natural law belongs to [the realm of] necessity. It must be at one with the ethical in its empirical 
shape, which is equally [grounded] in necessity, and, as a science, it must express this shape in the form 
of universality.” 
65 Ibid., 140. 
66 Nota bene: Hegel’s “Elements of the Philosophy of Right” has the alternative title “Natural Law and 
Political Science in Outline”.  
 58 
a. Hegel’s Conception of Law: Between “Nature” and “Positivity”  
 
Is Hegel a “naturalist” or a “positivist” when it comes to the normativity of law? While 
rejecting “a priori” individual rights, he nonetheless admits that solely within an ethical 
community can right and morality become “true”: “The sphere of right and that of 
morality cannot exist independently; they must have the ethical as their support and 
foundation.”67 Within this communitarian philosophy, individual “rights” and individual 
“morality” are seen as mere abstractions from the ethical totality that is the State.68 All 
law must have its ultimate foundation within the State; and yet it would be a serious 
mistake to qualify Hegel as a state “positivist”. For his conception of law is not 
“positive” or “voluntarist” but “communitarian” and “natural”: each (national) 
community will develop its own conception of what is “natural” to itself.69 Hegel’s 
conception of law is thereby a metaphysical one;70 and it is, as such, distinct from that 
offered by the “positive sciences of right”.71  
What, then, is the relationship between “natural” and “positive” law? Objecting to the 
rationalist premise according to which natural law is categorically  distinct from 
“positive” law, Hegel accepts their difference but argues that “it would be a grave 
 
67 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (editor: A. W. Wood; Cambridge University Press, 
1991), §141 (Addition). And see also: ibid., §33: “Morality and the earlier moment of formal right are 
both abstractions whose truth is attained only in ethical life.” 
68 Hegel puts here Kant on his head. For whereas Kant’s individualist morality is founded on the idea 
of a moral will that must “construct” a moral and legal community via the generalising categorical 
imperative, for Hegel, this relation between the individual and its community is the exact opposite: the 
morality of the community is here “real” and existing, whereas the personal morality of an individual is 
nothing but an “abstraction” that has been “constructed”.   
69 Hegel expresses this idea in his “Phenomenology” as follows “all reality is in its own self, conformable 
to law“ (“alle Wirklichkeit ist an ihr selbst gesetzmäßig“), see: “Phenomenology of Spirit” (translator: A.V. 
Miller; Oxford University Press, 1977), §150. This idea has recently been reformulated by my colleague 
Thom Brooks, who rightly claims Hegel to be a “natural law theorist” whose “natural” law standard is 
“internal”; yet it does – in my view – not necessarily follow that the “moral standards” arise “from 
within the law itself” (see: T. Brooks, Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in: D. Moyar (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Hegel (Oxford University Press, 2017), 453 at 458). For the “internalism” is, arguably, not 
in relation to the positive law itself – then Hegel would be a positivist – but in relation to “reality”; and 
since that reality is as an expression of objective spirit, it is always a “national” reality. It is for this reason 
that Hegel may be consider as a “national” natural lawyer.    
70 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §2: “The science of right is a part of 
philosophy.” 
71 Hegel’s criticism of “positive” legal science is fierce. In the essay on “Natural Law”, we thus read 
(supra n.61, 168): “Thus, in so far as a science of right is positive (in that it clings to opinions and 
insubstantial abstractions), its invocation of experience, or of its applicability, by definition, to actuality, 
or of sound common sense and universal attitudes, or even of philosophy, makes no sense whatsoever.” 
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misunderstanding to distort this difference into an opposition or antagonism”.72 
Natural and positive law are connected; and referring to Montesquieu, this connection 
can – for him – be found in the “philosophical viewpoint, that legislation in general 
and its particular determinations should not be considered in isolation and in the 
abstract, but rather as a dependent moment within one totality, in the context of all the 
other determinations which constitute the character of a nation and age”.73 But Hegel 
takes Montesquieu’s descriptive insight to a normative level: only those laws are 
“rational” and “right” that correspond to the national spirit (and the developmental 
stage in its overall evolution).  
“Legality” is consequently not identified with a positive legislator. For law is not 
formalistically what the state legislator adopts.74 The concept of law requires that “what 
is right in itself is posited in its objective existence”.75 Yet dialectically, “[o]nly when it 
becomes law does what is [natural] right take on both the form of its universality and 
its true determinacy”.76 The task of legislation is consequently to “codify” and 
“concretise” abstract natural rights; but again, for Hegel,  this process of codification 
is not purely “declaratory” since it has a “constitutive” element.77 For unlike unwritten 
custom, legislation allows for a better “cognition of the content in its determinate 
universality”.78 The principal task of state legislation is thus to engage in “new and 
further determination, and with those internal concerns of the state whose content is 
wholly universal”.79 This is also the reason why Hegel rejects a purely historical 
 
72 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §3. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid.: “[A legislative] determination of right may be shown to be entirely grounded in and consistent 
with the prevailing circumstances and existing legal institutions, yet it may be contrary to right 
[unrechtlich] and irrational in and for itself, like numerous determinations of Roman civil law 
[Privatrecht][.]” And in § 212, we read: “In this identity of being in itself and being posited, only what 
is law has binding force as right. Since being posited constitutes the aspect, of existence in which the 
contingency of self-will and of other particular factors may also intervene, what is law may differ in 
content from what is right in itself.” 
75 Ibid., §211. 
76 Ibid. 
77 All law should be “external” and thus “public”; and ideally it is as rational as possible so as to be easily 
cognizable. For if “[t]he language of the ethical spirit of society is law” (Hegel, Phenomenology (supra n.69), 
§653), that language needs to be understood! For an excellent discussion of this point, see: M. Franklin, 
Alienation and Hegel’s Justification for Codification, (1958-59) 33 Tulane Law Review 133.  
78 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §211. 
79 Ibid., §298. 
 60 
justification.80 Thus, as a living organism, each state must constantly adjust its laws to 
the evolutionary stage in which it is in. The concept of right is always in a process of 
“immanent progression and production”. (And the “moving principle” behind all 
concepts – including the concept of law – Hegel calls “dialectic”.81)  
The dialectic concept of (natural) law thereby means the following: “The Idea must 
continually determine itself further within itself, for it is initially no more than an 
abstract concept. But this initial abstract concept is never abandoned. On the contrary, 
it merely becomes continually richer in itself, so that the last determination is also the 
richest.”82 For example: the abstract “natural” right to property can only be understood 
within its specific ethical context (and indeed does not exist “concretely” without such 
a context);83 and we can only understand what is “rational” within this right once it has 
progressed to the next ethical context. Rationality must be found in what is “actual”, 
because these are the “active” and dynamic moments in the transition between past 
and present: “What is actual, the shape which the concept assumes, is therefore from 
our point of view only the subsequent and further stage, even if it should itself come 
first in actuality. The course we follow is that whereby the abstract forms reveal 
themselves not as existing for themselves, but as untrue.”84  
The Hegelian conception of a changing (natural) law here derives from his broader 
epistemology. For Hegel’s foundational postulate is the unity of the phenomenal and 
the noumenal world.85 And in criticising the “enlightenment” assumption of universal 
and eternal laws, Hegel finds that these “a priori” laws will only ever be idealised 
reflection of a “real existing” world; and since the principle behind this world is not 
stasis but change, all philosophy must be a metaphysics of change. Reconciling 
 
80 Ibid., §3: “When a historical justification confuses an origin in external factors with an origin in the 
concept, it unconsciously achieves the opposite of what it intends. If it can be shown that the origin of 
an institution was entirely expedient and necessary under the specific circumstances of the time, the 
requirements of the historical viewpoint are fulfilled. But if this is supposed to amount to a general 
justification of the thing itself, the result is precisely the opposite; for since the original circumstances 
are no longer present, the institution has thereby lost its meaning and its right [to exist].” 
81 Ibid., §31. 
82 Ibid., §32 – Addition. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid.. It is this thought that essentially stands behind the iconoclastic – and typically misunderstood 
proposition that “[w[hat is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational”. For a good discussion of the 
famous phrase, see: E. L. Fackenheim, On the Actuality of the Relational and the Rationality of the 
Actual, (1970) 23 Review of Metaphysics 690. 
85 That is the whole point of the “Phenomenology of Spirit”! 
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“rationalism” and “empiricism”, the task of Hegelian philosophy is to look for 
“reason” in social life, because philosophy itself is but an “exploration of the rational” 
which ought to lead to a “comprehension of the present and the actual”. Instead of 
constructing an “empty ideal” – as Kant’s Natural Law – the aim of legal philosophy 
must be to find correspondence between the (rational) idea that is “actual” in concrete 
reality.86 A “real philosophy” must try “to recognize in the semblance of the temporal 
and transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present”.87  
In conclusion: whatever is rational and universal must always be found in what is real 
and actual; yet not all that is “real” is actual because there can be elements within the 
positive law that are “dead” and past their time. Positive laws can become “untrue” 
laws where they do no longer correspond to the spirit of the time.88 And the famous 
illustration of such a “dead” positive law, Hegel offers, is none other than the 





86 In Hegel’s “Introduction to the Philosophy of History” (translator: L. Rauch; Hackett, 1988), we thus 
read (ibid., 38): “As was said, nothing is more common today than the complaint that the ideals raised 
by fantasy are not being realized, that these glorious dreams are being destroyed by cold actuality. On 
their life-voyage, these ideals smash up on the rock of hard reality. They can only be subjective, after 
all; they belong to that individuality of the solitary subject which takes itself for the highest and wisest. 
Ideals of that sort do not belong here – for, what the individual spins out for himself in his isolation 
cannot serve as law for the universal reality, just as the world’s law is not for the single individual alone 
(who may come off much the worse for it).” 
87 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), Preface. The resemblance with 
Baudelaire’s famous statement in “The Painter of Modern Life” is remarkable. 
88 On this point, see: ibid., §21 (Addition): “Truth in philosophy means that the concept corresponds 
to reality. A body, for example, is reality, and the soul is the concept. But soul and body ought to match 
one another; a dead body therefore still has an existence [Existenz], but no longer a true one, for it is a 
conceptless existence [Dasein]: that is why the dead body decomposes. The will in its truth is such that 
what it wills, i.e. its content, is identical with the will itself, so that freedom is willed by freedom.” 
89 In the famous opening words of “The German Constitution”, an essay also found in “Political 
Writings” (supra n.61), Hegel can thus state: “Germany is no longer a state” (ibid., 6). He explains (ibid., 
9): “The organisation of that body known as the German constitution took shape in [the context of] a 
life quite different from that which later invested it and does so now. (…) The structure in which that 
destiny resided is no longer supported by the destiny of the present generation, it stands without 
sympathy for the latter’s interests and is unnecessary to them, and its activity is isolated from the spirit 
of the world. If these laws have lost their former life, the vitality of the present age has not managed to 
express itself in laws. The vital interest of each has gone its own way and established itself separately, 
the whole has disintegrated, and the state no longer exists.” For Hegel, Germany thus only exists “in 
thought” as a “Gedankenstaat” that has no “actuality” (ibid., 41): “Germany is a state in [the realm of] 
thought but not in actuality, that formality and reality are separate, so that empty formality belongs to 
the state, whereas reality belongs to the non-existence of the state.” 
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b. The Spirit of War: States in World History  
 
For Hegel, each philosophy of (natural) law will always be a reflection of its time,90 and 
Hegel’s own time is a time of sovereign states. In this historical stage, there is no 
“ethical” community that would support a world law;91 and for Hegel, a “universal 
monarchy” or a cosmopolitan “world republic” are “empty words” – pure abstractions 
without (empirical) content.92 The highest – existing – ethical community lives in the 
state; and even if Hegel postulates the existence of a “world spirit”, that world spirit 
always governs through the states: “[t]he state is the world which the spirit has created 
for itself” and “[w]e should therefore venerate the state as an earthly divinity and 
reality”.93 Only through States can world history – as the development of the world 
spirit – take place. The world spirit indeed evolves through the medium of “National 
Spirits”;94 with each national spirit representing one stage in the evolution of the world 
 
90 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), Preface: “As far as the individual is 
concerned, each individual is in any case a child of his time; thus philosophy, too, is its own time 
comprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy can transcend its 
contemporary world as that an individual can overleap his own time[.]” 
91 There really cannot be any doubt in this point; and yet the argument that there is an international 
“Sittlichkeit” in Hegel has nonetheless been made, see: W.E. Conklin, Hegel’s Laws: The Legitimacy of a 
Modern World Order (Stanford Law Books, 2008), 283 et seq.  
92 G. W. F. Hegel, The German Constitution (supra n.89), 93: “The idea of a universal monarchy has 
always been an empty word. The fact that it was never implemented when the plan for it was first laid 
shows that it is impossible to do so, and that it is therefore an empty thought; but in any case, there can 
no longer be any question of it in more recent times.”. On this point, see equally Hegel’s “Natural Law” 
essay (supra n.61), 179: “[Philosophy] cannot discover this absolute shape by resorting to the 
shapelessness of cosmopolitanism, or to the vacuity of the rights of man or the equal vacuity of an 
international state or a world republic; for these abstractions and formal constructions [Formalitäten] 
contain the precise opposite of ethical vitality, and are essentially protestant and revolutionary in relation 
to individuality.” 
93 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §272 (Addition). See also § 258 in which 
E. Gans – not Hegel – adds the famous phrase that “[t]he state consist in the march of God in the 
world”.  
94 Ibid., §346: “Since history is the process whereby the spirit assumes the shape of events and of 
immediate natural actuality, the stages of its development are present as immediate natural principles; 
and since these are natural, they constitute a plurality of separate entities such that one of them is allotted 
to each nation [Volke] in its geographical and anthropological existence.” 
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spirit. 95 With Hegel the two opposing strands of “cosmopolitanism” and “nationalism” 
thus reach a new nineteenth century synthesis.96 
The principal agent for the evolution of the world spirit is “war”. For Hegel, war is 
both “necessary” and “ethical”, because old “particularities” are dissolved and a new 
ideal “attains its right and becomes actuality”.97 Solely through war can the dynamic 
progression of the world spirit be guaranteed – something that “perpetual peace” 
cannot do.98 From Hegel’s philosophical perspective, war thus forms an integral part 
of history, since the disorder that it generates is instrumental in permitting new 
normative orders to emerge.99 The dialectical unfolding of the world spirit is built on 
– and therefore requires – a plurality of States that compete in war. It is only through 
the competition between them that their “individuality” is guaranteed; and according 
to Hegel there will always be one national spirit representing the “self-development of 
the world-spirit’s self-consciousness”.100 This national spirit temporarily assumes an 
“epoch-making role” – as it dominates world history for a particular epoch.101  
In the history of the world, four principles and four epochs are identified: the Oriental 
world, the Greek world, the Roman world, and the Germanic world. Each of these 
“worlds” represents a cultural stage in the evolution and civilisation of mankind.102 
(Importantly it always comprises a plurality of states that share the “natural” principle 
of a cultural epoch.) The “Germanic” world here stands for the principle of universal 
 
95 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History (supra n.86), 89: “The principles of the various National Spirits, 
progressing in a necessary series of stages, are themselves only phases of the one universal Spirit: 
through them, that World Spirit elevates and completes itself in history, into a self-comprehending 
totality.” 
96 For this excellent point, see F. Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the Nation State (translator: R. B. Kimber; 
Princeton University Press, 1970), 201. 
97 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §324. 
98 G. W. F. Hegel, On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law (supra n.61), 141: “[W]ar preserves 
the ethical health of peoples in their indifference to determinate things; it prevents the latter from 
hardening, and the people from becoming habituated to them, just as the movement of the winds 
preserves the seas from that stagnation which a permanent calm would produce, and which a permanent 
(or indeed ‘perpetual’) peace would produce among peoples”.  
99 S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge University Press, 1974), 195: “[S]ince so much 
of what happened in history is the outcome of war and discord rather than of harmony and co-
operation, a theory which would just dismiss the means as utterly unworthy while welcoming the results, 
would be both a very poor theory on theoretical grounds, and hypocritical, if not outright immoral, on 
ethical ones.”  
100 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §347. 
101 The idea of “dominance” is here “cultural” and not “political” in nature (S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of 
the Modern State (supra n.99), 222).  
102 F. Dittmann, Der Begriff des Volksgeistes bei Hegel (Voigtländer, 1909). 
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freedom. It constitutes “history’s old age” and embraces all of Europe bound together 
by Christendom.103 Hegel’s own “Philosophy of Right” is thus a philosophy of the 
“Christian” world, that is: the European world;104 and it is through this lens that his 
conception of international law must be understood. 
 
 
c. The Hegelian State and “its” International Law  
 
From the “absolute” point of view of world history, there cannot be a universal 
international “law” standing above all states. For Hegel gives absolute priority to the 
“one” dominant national spirit, which means that “the spirits of other nations are 
without rights”.105 From the “relative” point of view of individual states, as 
“unconscious instruments and organs” of the world spirit,106 there nevertheless 
appears to be a form of international law. But because the highest “ethical” organism 
is the sovereign state, all law must be state law, and for Hegel international law is 
consequently nothing but “external state law”.107 “International” law is here reduced 
to the external or “negative” side of a state’s own individuality: while it “appears as the 
relation of another to another, as if the negative were something external… this negative relation 
is the state's own highest moment - its actual infinity as the ideality of everything finite 
within it.”108 A close reading of this passage locates all international law in each state’s 
 
103 Avineri is absolutely right to castigate Sibree’s translation of “Germanic world” with “German 
world” as having been responsible for misleading legions of British readers “creating the understandable 
but incorrect notion that Hegel was referring to German supremacy” (S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the 
Modern State (supra n.99), 228). The “Germanic” world here means the world of Christendom, and 
preferably: the Protestant religion because Hegel believes that “[t]he Catholic religion (although like 
Protestantism, it is a form of Christianity) does not ascribe to the state the inherent justice and ethical 
status that lie in the inward ness of the protestant principle” (Hegel, Philosophy of History (supra n.86), 
54).  
104 In the words of A. W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 30: “States 
are therefore the “material” of world history, the concrete agents of world-historical development.”  
105 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), § 347. 
106 Ibid., §344. In the beautiful phrase of F. Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State (Princeton 
University Press, 1970), 202: “The state and the historical world as a whole lead a double existence of 
apparent freedom in the realm of reality and of actual servitude in the realm of the spirit.”  
107 E.g. G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §259 and more generally 
“international law” = “äußeres Staatsrecht”.  
108 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §323. 
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own will; yet because that will is posited as an “individuality”, it also requires – logically 
– other wills that exist outside it.109  
What are the principles essential to Hegel’s conception of international law? If each 
State is sovereign and “the absolute power on earth”,110 are there any legal principles at 
all? For Hegel, there surprisingly are; yet consistent with his “national” natural law 
thinking, these principles derive from his “phenomenology” of the state. The state, as 
an individuality will, can only become independent if externally recognized by other 
states: “Without relations with other states, the state can no more be an actual 
individual than an individual can be an actual person without a relationship with other 
persons.”111 This principle of mutual recognition thus plays a quintessential role in 
Hegel’s construction of international law (and indeed in his entire phenomenology of 
being more generally).112 The “mutuality” of the recognition is thereby crucial; and this, 
in particular, means that non-states need not be recognised. In § 351, of the 
“Philosophy of Right”, we thus read:  
“The same determination entitles civilised nations to regard and treat as barbarians 
other nations which are less advanced than they are in the substantial moments of the 
state (as with pastoralists in relation to hunters, and agriculturalists in relation to both 
of these), in the consciousness that the rights of these other nations are not equal to 
theirs and that their independence is merely formal.”113   
 
 
109 In the words of A. von Trott zu Solz, Hegels Staatsphilosophie und das internationale Recht (Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1932), 75: „So ist es nicht eine geschichtsphilosophisch vorgefundenen Tatsache, daß es 
mehrere aus dieser zu individueller Wirklichkeit vollendeten Entwicklung des Freiheitsbegriffs 
bestehenden Staaten gibt, sondern sie folgt notwendig aus dem Wesen der in der Wirklichkeit 
erscheinenden Idee selbst.“ 
110 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §331. 
111 Ibid. The famous master-slave parable here comes to mind.  This idea will be repeated by E. Gans, 
Naturrecht und Universalrechtsgeschichte: Vorlesung nach G.W.F. Hegel (Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 234: „Genau wie 
der Mensch kann der Staat sein selbständiges Ich erst in Beziehung zu anderen Individuen vollends 
entfalten.“  
112 On Hegel’s theory of recognition more generally, see: R. B. Pippin, What is the Question for which 
Hegel’s Theory of Recognition is the Answer? (2000) 8 European Journal of Philosophy 155; as well as 
E. Sembou, Hegel’s Idea of a ‘Struggle for Recognition’: The Phenomenology of Spirit, (2003) 24 
History of Political Thought 262: “Recognition is the best-known theme, and certainly the core, of 
Hegel’s political philosophy.” 
113 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §351. For Hegel, the United States of 
America were then not (yet) a state; it is but a “civil society” that is not yet organised into a political 
state. For a general discussion of this point, see: G.A. Kelly, Hegel’s America, (1972) 2 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 3. 
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But what about “equal” states that belong to the same stage of history? For them, the 
principal instrument of external state law is the international treaty;114 and for that 
instrument to work, Hegel postulates one “universal” principle of international law: 
the principle that international treaties must be observed (pacta sunt servanda). However, 
even this principle is brought in line with the idea of state sovereignty. For since states 
have remained in “a state of nature in relation to one another”, their mutual obligations 
will only be actualised “in their own particular wills”; and this means that international 
treaties will always remain contingent on these particular wills and can never be 
enforced as a perfect right.115 In the absence of a supranational power above the states, 
all international law is thus “subjective”:  
“There is no praetor to adjudicate between states, but at most arbitrators and 
mediators, and even the presence of these will be contingent, i.e. determined by 
particular wills. Kant's idea of a perpetual peace guaranteed by a federation of states 
which would settle all disputes and which, as a power recognized by each individual 
state, would resolve all disagreements so as to make it impossible for these to be settled 
by war presupposes an agreement between states. But this agreement, whether based 
on moral, religious, or other grounds and considerations, would always be dependent 
on particular sovereign wills, and would therefore continue to be tainted with 
contingency.”116 
  
For Hegel, then, there cannot be “real” or “objective” international law. All law is state 
law; and while there exist a natural and a positive law within the state, neither exists on 
the international plane. All the latter can offer are external and particular expressions 
of state will(s) that always remain individually entitled to determine what is in their best 
individual interest. An international organisation – like the Holy Alliance – cannot 
change this predicament, because it itself is based on an international treaty and, as 
such, subject to and limited by the principle of state sovereignty.117 Due to the absence 
 
114 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (supra n.67), §332. Custom as a rule is not expressly 
mentioned; even if there is an allusion to custom in the Addition to §339 by E. Gans.  
115 Ibid, §336: “The relationship of states to one another is a relationship between independent entities 
and hence between particular wills, and it is on this that the very validity of treaties depends. But the 
particular will of the whole, as far as its content is concerned, is its own welfare in general. Consequently, 
this welfare is the supreme law for a state in its relations with others, especially since the Idea of the 
state is precisely that the opposition between right as abstract freedom and the particular content which 
fills it, i.e. the state's own welfare, should be superseded within it, and it is on this Idea as a concrete 
whole that the initial recognition of states is based.” 
116 Ibid., §333. 
117 Ibid., § 324, Addition (Gans): “Perpetual peace is often demanded as an ideal to which mankind 
should approximate. Thus, Kant proposed a league of sovereigns to settle disputes between states, and 
the Holy Alliance was meant to be an institution more or less of this kind! But the state is an individual, 
and negation is an essential component of individuality. Thus, even if a number of states join together 
as a family, this league, in its individuality, must generate opposition and create an enemy. Not only do 
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of an ethical community and international institutions, the Hegelian “system” of states 
consequently lacks the “normative” resources to create from within itself a “real” law 
that could stand above the particular wills of the states. That does not, however, 
necessarily mean that Hegel cannot envision a world republic; but this world republic 
is far beyond the present and cannot be “conceived” in terms of the “present” yet. 118 
 
 
3. “National” Natural Law II: Savigny and the Historical School  
 
Parallel to the development of the Hegelian system, a second intellectual movement 
emerges in the early decades of the nineteenth century.119 Equally criticising the 
abstract rationalism behind the French Revolution, the Historical School follows 
Montesquieu and regards law as an expression of concrete cultural and geographic 
conditions; but unlike Montesquieu, it comes to single out the national history of a 
people as its decisive criterion for determining the “spirit” of its law.  
The Historical School builds on two important eighteenth-century precursors;120 yet it 
is only formally born in 1815 with the foundation of the “Zeitschrift für die 
geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft”. Its spiritual father is Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 
who had started to find a synthesis between history and reason as early as 1802.121 
Inspired by Kant’s methodological programme,122 the task of the legal scholar is said 
 
peoples emerge from wars with added strength, but nations [Nationen] troubled by civil dissension gain 
internal peace as a result of wars with their external enemies.” 
118 In this sense: S. Avineri, Hegel‘s Theory of the Modern State (supra n.99), 207. Referring to Hegel’s 
formulations in his “Philosophy of History” (“The trend of the states is, therefore, towards 
uniformity”), Avineri claims that Hegel, in the end, “emerges with a vision of One World, united by 
culture and reason, progressing towards a system wherein sovereignty, though acknowledged, will wither 
away, and wards, though immanent, will gradually disappear”.  For a criticism of this view, see however: 
R. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition (University of California Press, 1997), 361-2.  
119 On the (un)easy relationships between Hegel (and the Hegelians) and the Historical School, see 
especially S. Brie, Der Volksgeist bei Hegel und in der historischen Rechtsschule, (1908/09) 2 Archive 
für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 1 (Part I) and 179 (Part II); as well as C. Mährlein, Volksgeist und 
Recht: Hegel’s Philosophie der Einheit und ihre Bedeutung in der Rechtswissenschaft (Königshausen & Neumann, 
2000), 116-129. 
120 Savigny himself identified Hugo and Möser – with the former being the bête noir of Hegel. 
121 See especially F. C. von Savigny, Vorlesungen über juristische Methodologie 1802-1842 (edited: A. 
Mazzacane; Klostermann, 2004).  
122 On the philosophical relation between Kant and Savigny, see: F. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der 
Neuzeit (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 370; as well as M. Franklin, The Kantian Foundations of the 
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to “synthesise” (empirical) history and (rational) philosophy. History – not abstract 
speculation – offers the material basis of all law; the law within history can however 
only be “conceived” in the rational categories of legal philosophy. Unlike classic 
naturalist thinking, the Historical School thus denies that the human mind can itself 
derive substantive conclusions about justice; yet like Kantian rationalist thinking, it 
nevertheless believes in formal – juristic – reason without which the historical reality 
must remain unlocked. To paraphrase Kant: juristic reason without history is empty, 
history without juristic reason is blind. On the basis of these premises, it develops – 
like Hegel - a “national” conception of law that is distinct from positive law (a); yet 




a. The Historical School: The Nation as a Metaphysical Construct  
 
What conception of law has the Historical School developed? Savigny’s pamphlet “Of 
the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence” notoriously dismisses the 
very attempt to positively “found” German law in the wake of the Vienna Congress.123 
One reason behind his anti-positivist stance is his dislike for the French Revolution 
(and its Napoleonic Code Civil). Yet Savigny’s criticism goes deeper. Drawing on the 
“romantic” approach best exemplified in Herder, he links “language” and “history” to 
the idea of the “nation”.124 Law, just as language, is seen as an integral part of the 
 
Historial School of Law of Savigny (1952) 22 Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 66. 
Kantian philosophy had also inspired Hugo, who primarily used Kant to undermine classic natural law 
thinking, see: E. Landsberg, Kant und Hugo, (1901) 28 Zeitschrift für das Privat- und öffentliche Recht 
der Gegenwart 670.   
123 F. C. von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Mohr, 1828), iv. Savigny’s 
opponent here was the Heidelberg University Professor Thibaut. The important point to keep in mind 
to understand this debate is that Savigny did not argue against a “German” national law as such. He 
only argued against codification since he believed that Germany already had an unwritten “common” 
law in the form of the received “Roman law” and that that common Roman law had not disappeared 
with the disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. For Savigny, it is thus not the “state” or 
“Empire” that stands behind the validity of law, see: F. C. von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts 
– Erster Band (Veit, 1840), §2: “Bey der Auflösung des Deutschen Reichs behaupten nun manche 
Schriftsteller, daß das gemeine Recht mit seiner Basis, der Reichsstaatsgewalt, auch seine Geltung 
verloren habe. Diese Meinung, entstanden aus einem Missverständnis über die Natur des positiven 
Rechts, ist indessen ganz ohne Einfluß auf den wirklichen Rechtszustand geblieben.“  
124 J. G. Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man (translated by T. Chruchill, Johnson, 1800), 
esp.237: “A philosophical comparison of languages would form the best essay on the history and 
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“spirit” of a “people”;125  and following Herder’s (negative) correlation between the 
vivacity of a language and codification, a living law must never be codified. The legal 
order is an “organism” whose natural growth is best reflected in “customary law”, 
which itself emanates from popular ethics (“Sitte”) and popular beliefs 
(“Volksglaube”).126  
But if all law emanates from the spirit of a people, why can the latter not be represented 
by the state legislator? In order to understand Savigny’s attack on legislative 
positivism,127 one must better understand his concept of the “nation”. This is not an 
empirical reality – say, the collection of persons living in a defined territory – but a 
metaphysical ideal created by history and culture.128 It is this “idealist” concept of the 
nation that gives a metaphysical texture to its law:  
“This, then, is the general question: what is the relationship between the past and the 
present, or between becoming and being? Some here hold that every age brings forth 
its own existence in which it freely and arbitrarily creates its world, good and happy, 
or bad and unhappy… According to the teaching of others, there is no such thing as 
a completely solitary and isolated human existence: rather, what can be regarded as 
single is, seen from another side, a part of a higher whole. (...) If we apply this general 
account of the distinction between the historical and unhistorical view to 
jurisprudence, it will not be difficult to determine the character of the two schools 
mentioned above. The historical school assumes that the material of law is given by 
the total past of the nation, but not by arbitrariness, so that it might happen to be this 
or another, but by the very essence of the nation itself and its history. The special 
activity of each age, however, must be directed towards inspecting, rejuvenating, and 
preserving this material given by inner necessity. The unhistorical school, on the other 
hand, assumes that the law is produced at every moment arbitrarily, by those who 
have legislative power, and thus quite independent of the law of the preceding period; 
 
diversified character of the human heart and understanding: for every language bears the stamp of the 
mind and character of a people... the genius of a people is nowhere more displayed than in the 
physiognomy of their language.” 
125 Von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit (supra n.123), 11: „[D]ieser organische Zusammenhang des Rechts 
mit dem Wesen und Charakter des Volkes bewährt sich auch im Fortgang der Zeiten, und auch hierin 
ist es der Sprache zu vergleichen. So wie für diese, gibt es auch für das Recht keinen Augenblick eines 
absolutes Stillstands, es ist derselben Bewegung und Entwicklung unterworfen, wie jede andere 
Richtung des Volkes[.]“ According to H. Kantorowicz, “Volksgeist und historische Rechtsschule”, 
(1912) 108 Historische Zeitschrift 295, the direct inspiration behind the comparison between “law” and 
“language” for Savigny is not Herder but J. Grimm, who indeed writes an important essay in the second 
volume of the “Zeitschrift für die geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft” entitled: “Von der Poesie im 
Recht”.  
126 Von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit (supra n.123), 14. 
127 It is this attack on codification that aroused Hegel’s fundamental disapproval in §211 of his 
“Elements of the Philosophy of Right” (supra n.67): “To deny a civilized nation, or the legal profession 
within it, the ability to draw up a legal code would be among the greatest insults one could offer to 
either; for this does not require that a system of laws with a new content should be created, but only 
that the present content of the laws should be recognized in its determinate universality - i.e. grasped 
by means of thought - and subsequently applied to particular cases.” 
128 F. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (supra n.122), 392-3.  
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only following their best conviction, as the present moment happens to bring with it.  
129 
 
These youthful thoughts, written in 1815, would receive a mature refinement after 
1840, when Savigny published his monumental “System of Modern Roman Law”.130 
Building on the work of his disciple Puchta, a new idea of what constitutes the 
“positive” law – as opposed to abstract natural law – is now defined as follows: 
“The positive right lives in the common consciousness of the people, and we therefore 
have to call it Volksrecht. (...) And by assuming an invisible origin of the positive right, 
we must consequently renounce any documentary proof of it ... In fact, we find it 
everywhere, where people live together and so far as history declares that they 
constitute a spiritual community that expresses itself through the use of a common 
language. In this natural unity lies the source of all law because in the common and 
all-penetrating spirit we find the strength to satisfy the need recognized above.... But 
if we consider the people as a natural unity, and in this respect as the bearer of all 
positive right, we must not only think of the individuals presently contained in it; 
rather, that unity goes through the generations that are historically succeeding one 
another, and through which the present is connected with the past and the future. 
This stable preservation of the law is effected by tradition, and the latter is not 
conditioned and founded upon a sudden but a gradual generational change.” 131  
 
The “nation”  is here seen as a “natural” legal unit that is itself based on a common 
ethnic and ethical community.132 It alone – not the State – is the “carrier” of all positive 
law.133 But because the nation is a historical community, the Volksrecht cannot be 
determined by the “present” people alone – especially not by a “representative” 
legislator. The nature of a nation lies in its transcendental totality; it is a fusion of the 
past and present in an evolving cultural community.134 Savigny’s conception of the 
 
129 F. C. von Savigny, Über den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift, (1815) 1 Zeitschrift für geschichtliche 
Rechtswissenschaft 1 (my translation). 
130 This eight-volume set is published between 1840 and 1849. 
131 F. C. von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts – Erster Band (supra n.123), §§7-8 (my 
translation).  
132 On this see also G. F. Puchta, Das Gewohnheitsrecht (Palmsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1828), 134: “Der 
Begriff des Volks hat die natürliche Grundlage der gemeinsamen Abstammung. Diese bringt nicht allein 
eine leibliche, sondern auch eine geistige Verwandtschaft hervor. Daraus, daß das Volk in diesem 
eigentlichen Sinne des Worts ein natürliches Ganzes ist, folgt, daß es nicht auf künstlichen Wege und 
nicht durch freien Entschluß und Willen entstehen kann.“  
133 For Savigny, the state is only “the physical embodiment of the spiritual community of the people” 
(Savigny, System des Römischen Rechts (supra n.123), §9); and according to his theory, wherever there is a 
people there will therefore also be a state (ibid.: “Vielmehr wird jedes Volk, sobald es als solches 
erscheint, zugleich als Staat erscheinen, wie auch dieser gestaltet sein möge.) However, and importantly, 
the state is not the origin of law (ibid., §10): „Das Recht hat sein Dasein in dem gemeinsamen Volksgeist, 
also in dem Gesamtwillen, der insofern auch der Wille jedes Einzelnen ist.“  
134 That this may even include the „future“ derives from Savigny, System des Römischen Rechts (supra n.123), 
§10: „daß das ideale Volk, wovon hier die Rede ist, auch die ganze Zukunft in sich schließt, also ein 
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nation is consequently a resolutely “metaphysical” construct; and his Volksrecht 
partakes in this metaphysical idealism. For unlike all empirical conceptions of 
“positive” law, the Volksrecht is produced “in an invisible manner, and therefore cannot 
be traced back to an external event or a particular point in time”.135 The Volksrecht is 
an unwritten and unconscious law and “emanates” from an idealist source: the 
Volksgeist.136 In the words of Puchta: 
"There exists a form of law creation, which can be called the immediate one, insofar 
as the law here really represents the national conviction about legal freedom without 
any artificial medium. This natural right, as one could therefore call it, asserts itself 
just as naturally, namely through the influence which popular conviction exerts on the 
actions of the individual members of the people. These acts, in so far as they are 
conditioned by this influence, are called custom; and that immediate natural right, that 
express itself first by this influence, we tend to call customary law".137  
 
For Puchta (and Savigny), customary law is a kind of “natural” law that stands in stark 
ontological contrast to the “artificial” law produced by state institutions.  The source 
of all customary law thereby lies in the common consciousness (opinio juris) of a 
nation.138 This Volksrecht must not be confused with any collection of positive 
legislation or judicial judgments.139 On the contrary, all “state laws” must always be 
judged against the evolving “spirit of the people”.140 But who is to “find” and 
“decipher” this spirit? While originally a task for the people itself, with the increasing 
 
unvergängliches Dasein hat“.  In the words of F. Wieacker, Privatrechsgeschichte der Neuzeit (supra n.122), 
393: „Volk ist also für Savigny gar nicht die politische und gesellschaftliche Realität der geschichtlichen 
Nation, sondern ein idealer Kulturbegriff: die durch gemeinsame Bildung verbundene geistige und 
kulturelle Gemeinschaft.“  
135 Savigny, System des Römischen Rechts (supra n.123), §12.  
136 The first use of this concept by the historical school is by G. F. Puchta, Das Gewohnheitsrecht (supra 
n. 132), 1; and according to S. Brie, Der Volksgeist bei Hegel und in der historischen Rechtsschule 
(supra n.119), the Historical School takes the concept directly from Hegel. For Kantorowicz (supra 
n.125), by contrast, it is not Hegel but Montesquieu that lies at the origin of this borrowing that would 
become so central for the Historical School. 
137 G. F. Puchta, Das Gewohnheitsrecht (supra n.132), 9-10 (my translation). 
138 Ibid. 169: “Die rechtliche Überzeugung ist es, welche die Sitte bestimmt und hervorbringt, nicht 
umgekehrt; denn gerade jene als Bestimmung des Willens ist es, die einer Handlung das Prädikat der 
Sitte verleiht.“ 
139 Ibid., 133 and especially 164. 
140 F. C. von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit (supra n.123), 127: „Unabhängig von Leibniz, aber in 
ähnlichen Sinne, schlägt Möser vor, durch planmäßige Sammlung wirklicher Rechtsfälle eines Landes 
neue Pandekten anzulegen. Beides sehr schön; nur ist eine notwendige Bedingung nicht mit in 
Rechnung gebracht, die Fähigkeit nämlich wahre Erfahrungen zu machen. Denn man muß das klare, 
lebendige Bewußtsein des Ganzen stets gegenwärtig haben, um von dem individuellen Fall wirklich 
lernen zu können, und es ist also wieder nur der theoretische, wissenschaftliche Sinn, wodurch auch die 
Praxis erst fruchtbar und lehrreich erscheint.“  
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complexity of the law, the task of identifying the national spirit ought to belong to the 
“jurists”. The “juristic estate” is to act as the “organ” of the people: it identifies the 
“living customary law” which guarantees the “right progress” of the nation.141 
“Volksrecht” here becomes – just as within classic natural law thinking – ultimately 
“Juristenrecht”.142 The jurist is tasked to trace the existing law “back to its roots in 
order to discover an organic principle” so as to discover those norms that are “still 
alive” within the consciousness of the people.143  
What, then, is the meaning of “positive” law within the Historical School? 
Fundamentally, and anti-positivistically, law is not identified with state legislation but 
rather with organic custom (“Sitte”); and while not denying the legal quality of 
legislation as such, the province of legislation is reduced to “pronouncing the existing 
law”.144 (Not the “state” but the “nation” is the creator of all law.145) Strictly speaking 
it is not even custom as such – as an empirical and external material – but the invisible 
consciousness or spirit of a nation that the Historical School sees as its sole legal source. The 
consciousness of the people determines their customary being, and not their other way 
around!146 And against this background, the Historical School cannot be classified as 
“positivist” because it participates, like Kant and Hegel, in an idealist project. The 
 
141 Ibid., 133. 
142 For a famous and polemical criticism of this development, see D. G. Beseler “Volksrecht und 
Juristenrecht” (Weidmann, 1843).  
143 F. C. von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit (supra n.123), 117-118. Scientific “jurisprudence”, as exercised 
by law professors, will thereby – in revealing the organic unity of the law – rejuvenate and even revive 
the Volksrecht; and it is for that reason that “jurists” can be described as “a new kind” of a legal source 
(F.C. von Savigny, System des Römischen Rechts (supra n.123), §14: “In dieser letzten Function erscheint 
die Wirksamkeit der Juristen zunächst als eine abhängige, ihren Stoff von außen empfangende. Indessen 
entsteht durch die dem Stoff gegebene wissenschaftliche Form, welche seine inwohnende Einheit zu 
enthüllen und zu vollenden strebt, ein neues organisches Leben, welches bildend auf den Stoff selbst 
zurück wirkt, so daß auch aus der Wissenschaft als solcher eine neue Art der Rechtserzeugung 
unaufhaltsam hervorgeht.“ 
144 G.F. Puchta, Das Gewohnheitsrecht (supra n.132), 146. 
145 G. F. Puchta, Cursus der Institutionen – Erster Band (Breitkopf und Härtel, 1841), 29: „Aus dem 
bisherigen ergibt sich auch das Verhältnis des Staats zu dem Recht. Das Recht entsteht nicht erst durch 
den Staat, dieser setzt vielmehr ein rechtliches Bewusstsein, ein Recht schon voraus, welches zu 
schützen seine Hauptaufgabe ist. (...) [D]er Ursprung des Rechts liegt außerhalb des Staats[.]“. The 
reasons for this have been described as follows by H.-P. Haferkamp, Die Historische Rechtsschule 
(Klostermann, 2018), 109: „Ein wichtiger Einschnitt für diese Entwicklung war das Jahr 1806. Den 
Untergang des Römischen Rechts als geltenden Rechts vor Augen musste man sich entscheiden, ab 
man das antike Recht weiterhin zum primären Lehrgegenstand machte... Mit Savignys Konzept wurde 
der Anspruch Heutiges Römisches Recht zu lehren auch ohne staatliche Absicherungen gerettet“.  
146 On the connections between Savigny and German idealism, generally, see: J. Rückert, Idealismus, 
Jurisprudenz und Politik bei Friedrich Carl von Savigny (Verlag Rolf Gremer, 1984), esp. Part III. For a more 
hesitant judgment here, see: F. Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford University Press, 2015), 
222, who places Savigny closer to the early “romantics”.  
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Historical School is founded on the belief in an historical-yet-natural law that governs 
each nation. 147 It stands half-way between history and nature because it accepts, in the 
words of Max Weber, a “natural law of historical existence”.148  
 
 
b. The International Law Conception of the Historical School 
 
If all law flows from a “national” community and not (universal) human reason, will 
this not mean that the Historical School must, by definition, deny the objective quality 
of international law? One strand of the Historical School indeed comes close to this 
conclusion. Because the spirit of a people – and law as its external manifestation – is 
most alive when its “particularity” and “individuality” are most pronounced, it follows 
that the more universal and abstract the law becomes, the more the nation loses its 
character as a people.149 And following this line of argument, a universal law for all 
mankind cannot exist because the more the law becomes “abstracted” from a specific 
Volksgeist, the more it loses its quality as a “living” law. For Puchta, there consequently 
cannot be any international law “properly so called” in the absence of a “natural” Volk. 
All that exists between States is at best international morality – but nothing more.150  
Yet, surprisingly, this rigorous view will not become the “official” view of the 
Historical School. For Savigny’s position is – famously – much more nuanced; and it 
is his conception that became dominant in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
 
147 Savigny, “Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit” (supra n.123), 6: „Das Recht wächst also mit dem Volke fort, 
bildet sich aus mit diesem, und stirbt endlich ab, so wie das Volk seine Eigentümlichkeit verliert.“  
148 M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Mohr, 1972), 497: „Naturrecht des historisch Gewordenen“. 
149 Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit (supra n.123), 116: “In der Geschichte aller bedeutenden Völker 
nämlich finden wir einen Übergang von beschränkter, aber frischer und lebensvoller, Individualität zu 
unbestimmter Allgemeinheit. Auf diesem Wege geht auch das bürgerliche Recht, und auch in ihm kann 
zuletzt das Bewusstsein der Volkseigentümlichkeit verloren gehen: so geschieht es, wenn bejahrte 
Völker darüber nachdenken, wie viele Eigenheiten ihres Rechts sich bereits abgeschliffen haben, daß 
sie leicht zu dem so eben dargestellten Irrtum kommen, indem sie ihr ganzes noch übriges Recht für 
ein jus quod naturalis ratio apud omnes homines constituit  halten.“ 
150 Puchta, Gewohnheitsrecht (supra n.132), 142: „Aber man sollte endlich einmal aufhören, wenigstens die 
Juristen sollten es tun, von denen zu vermuten steht, daß sie den Ausdruck Recht in seinem eigentlichen 
Sinne gebrauchen, - man sollte aufhören, das Recht dadurch zu entweihen, daß man Sätze mit seinem 
Namen belegt, für welche sich noch keine rechtliche Form der Geltendmachung gefunden hat, man 
sollte von einer Völker- oder Staatenmoral, aber nicht von einem Völkerrecht sprechen.“ This passage 
is extremely close to Austin – to be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Partly paralleling the Hegelian idea that the abstract “spirit of humanity” 
(Menschheitsgeist) must always act though (a) particular nation(s),151 Savigny nevertheless 
comes to affirm the possibility of a binding and objective international law: 
"If we look further at the relationship between several peoples and states existing side 
by side, the latter seems to us at first to be similar to the relationship of individual 
human beings who are brought together by chance and without being connected into 
a national community. (...) However, a similar community founded on a legal 
consciousness can also develop among different peoples and here creates positive law 
in the same way as is done within one people. The basis of this spiritual community 
will partly consist in tribal kinship, partly and predominantly in common religious 
convictions. International law, especially the international law of the Christian-
European states, is founded on this; but it can also be discovered among the ancient 
peoples, as it occurs, for example, in the Roman jus feciale. We should also regard this 
international law as positive law, but for two reasons only as an incomplete legal 
phenomenon: firstly, because of its incompletely defined content, and secondly 
because it lacks the real basis on which the law of individuals within the same people 
is given by the state power, and in particular the judiciary...”152 
 
This Savignian key passage would exercise an enormous spell over the majority of 
German (and British) scholars in the nineteenth century. Without recourse to the older 
natural law ideas, it promised a “positive” international law where the latter was rooted 
in a “common” legal consciousness of a group of nations. This common 
consciousness, created by ethnic bonds or ethical convictions,153 would forge an 
“international community” that could, in turn, become the medium for a positive 
international law. Admittedly, this positive law would be “imperfect”, due to its greater 
abstraction (when compared to national law); but law it was. Viewing a law-enforcing 
sovereign or legal sanctions as non-essential elements, law – as an organic 
phenomenon – naturally derives from within an existing society; and in Savigny’s 
 
151 Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts (supra n.123), §8: „Was in dem einzelnen Volk wirkt, ist 
nur der allgemeine Menschengeist, der sich in ihm auf individuelle Weise offenbart. Allein die 
Erzeugung des Rechts ist eine That, und eine gemeinschaftliche That. Diese ist nur denkbar für 
diejenigen, unter welchen eine Gemeinschaft des Denkens und Thuns nicht nur möglich, sondern auch 
wirklich ist. Da nun eine solche Gemeinschaft nur innerhalb der Grenzen des einzelnen Volkes 
vorhanden ist, so kann auch nur hier das wirkliche Recht hervorgebracht werden, obgleich in der 
Erzeugung desselben die Äußerung eines allgemein menschlichen Bildungstriebes wahrzunehmen ist, 
also nicht etwa die eigenthümliche Willkür mancher besonderen Völker, wovon in andern Völkern 
vielleicht keine Spur angetroffen werden könnte. Nur darin findet sich eine Verschiedenheit, daß dieses 
Erzeugniß des Volksgeistes bald dem einzelnen Volke ganz eigenthümlich, bald aber in mehreren 
Völkern gleichmäßig vorkommend ist. Wie die Römer diese allgemeinere Grundlage des Volksrechts 
als Jus gentium aufgefaßt haben, wird unten gezeigt werden.“ 
152 Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts (supra n.123), §11. 
153 F. C. von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts – Band 8 (Veit, 1849), §348: „Der Standpunkt, 
auf den wir durch diese Erwägung geführt werden, ist der einer völkerrechtlichen Gemeinschaft der mit 
einander verkehrenden Nationen, und dieser Standpunkt hat im Fortschritt der Zeit immer allgemeinere 
Anerkennung gefunden, unter dem Einfluß theils der gemeinsamen christlichen Gesittung, theils des 
wahren Vortheils, der daraus für alle Theile hervorgeht.“ 
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conception, this offered a foundational base for both public and private international 
law.154 Yet crucially: outside the cultural community of States – here: the Christian 
states of Europe155  – international “law” could only have a “purely moral character”. 
For the existence of a common “positive” law was contingent on a common ethical 
base; and that common ethical base was a regional – not a universal – phenomenon. 
Only where there was a common morality – and with it a common society – could 





This chapter has presented three “idealist” philosophies that developed in Germany 
after the French Revolution. The contribution of Kantian rationalism here mainly lied 
in the destruction of the “uncritical” scholastic conception of natural law;156 and after 
the Alleszermalmer had done his critical work, all that natural law could hope to do was 
to offer the rational categories through which historical reality could be understood 
from the point of view of (individual) human reason. Kant indeed accepts the historical 
reality of a plurality of states; and accepting the principle of state sovereignty, all his 
rationalist account could provide is a minimalist international law. However, for Kant, 
States remain under an obligation to leave the state of nature, which constitutes for 
him a “non-rightful condition” and a “wrong in the highest degree”;157 but the demand 
on states is lower, when compared to individual persons, as states already represent 
 
154 Savigny’s major contribution to international law lay especially in “private international law”; and he 
has rightly been celebrated as “probably the most influential private international law theorist of the 
19th century” (A. Mills, The Private History of International Law, (2008) 55 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 34). In the second half of the 19th century, the most influential 
proponent of the Historical School’s approach to (private) international law would be Mancini, whose 
work will be discussed in the next chapter. 
155 H.-P. Haferkamp, Die Historische Rechtsschule (supra n.145), 266-7: “Welche Neuausrichtung die Schule 
nun philosophisch nahm, wurde Ende der 1830er Jahre von Zeitgenossen sehr klar war genommen. 
Hatte das Christentum in den Schuldebatten lange keine Rolle gespielt, so erkannt man nun eine 
„theologisierende“ bzw. „historisch-christliche Schule“.“  
156 J. Schröder, Recht als Wissenschaft: Geschichte der juristischen Methodenlehre in der Neuzeit (1500-1933) (Beck, 
2012), 206: “Die entscheidende Veränderung in der Geschichte des Naturrechts nach 1800 liegt also 
nicht darin, daß es als Wissenschaftliche Disziplin erlischt, sondern darin, daß es nicht mehr als 
Rechtsquelle gilt.“ 
157  Kant, Doctrine of Right (supra n.23), §54. 
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legally constituted moral persons. There cannot, therefore, be a permissive law or 
postulate of practical reason to force states into founding a “World Republic”; and the 
normative solution that Kant therefore favours is to found “perpetual peace” on the 
basis of a voluntary (and regional) federation of states.  
The Hegelian philosophy comes, in many respects, to the oppose conclusion. Not 
peace but war appears as the “actual” centre of human history.158 Peace signifies 
stagnation; war means progress in which “national spirits” compete and the “world 
spirit” dialectically evolves. Hegel’s entire political philosophy is therefore a 
philosophy of the state; and the resulting “state idealism” cannot “objectively” 
conceive of an “international law”. International law is always subjective “state law”; 
and as external state law, the international treaty becomes the sole “authentic” source 
of such a law. But since the highest ethical substance is the state, treaties must always 
depend on the subjective wills of the states and can therefore always be – legitimately 
– broken. The idea of a federation of states (itself based on an international treaty), 
which could enforce this treaty against their will is seen as a chimerical abstract idea. 
Does this make Hegel a “positivist” philosopher? The answer should depend on his 
view vis-à-vis  natural law in general; and as we saw in Section 2 above, Hegel is best 
seen as continuing the “natural law” tradition but confines the latter to the ethical 
sphere of the nation state. There simply cannot be any law, properly speaking, above 
the nation – and this includes positive or natural international law.  
The Historical School converges and diverges, in a number of normative elements, 
with the Kantian and the Hegelian project (Figure 3). In line with the Hegelian 
programme, it attempts to abstract reason from  a concrete and collective reality; yet 
for the Historical School this “reality” is no longer found primarily in the “actual” 
present but lies in the historical past. (The left-Hegelian criticism that the School would 
famously encounter later on is that it “legitimises the infamy of today with the infamy 
of yesterday”.159) Like Kant and Hegel, the Historical School adopts an idealist 
 
158 F. Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State (supra n.96), 199: “[With Hegel], a major 
representative of German philosophy finally gave war an unqualified and definitive sanction, and war 
received its place in a world view that, more than any other before it, sought to grasp the rational order 
of the world.” 
159 K. Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (available: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm) : “One school of 
thought that legitimizes the infamy of today with the infamy of yesterday, a school that stigmatizes every 
cry of the serf against the knout as mere rebelliousness once the knout has aged a little and acquired a 
hereditary significance and a history, a school to which history shows nothing but its a posteriori, as did 
the God of Israel to his servant Moses, the historical school of law – this school would have invented 
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philosophy that ultimately insists that law is dependent on morality and reason. Its 
“naturalist” conception of law is however neither universal and individualist (Kant), 
nor national and statist (Hegel). Founded on the idea of a common legal consciousness, 
law primarily emerges historically within national communities; yet ethical or ethnic 
similarities among national communities are also capable of generating an (imperfect) 
international law. Unlike the Kantian idea of a (European) federation of states, 
international law here need not be positively “founded” by states; it comes to exist 
“naturally” and “organically” among (similar) peoples. The Historical School therefore 
ought to be seen as adopting a form of “concrete” and “collective” natural law 
thinking.  
 
Figure 2. Three Chains of Normativity  
 
In conclusion, all three legal philosophies, discussed in this chapter, remain embedded 
in a metaphysical project – that sometimes even incorporates theocratic elements.160 
However, unlike the eighteenth century, each abandons, in one way or another, the 
universalist cosmopolitanism of the earlier century. For Kant, the foundation of 
international law must practically start from a regional federation of states, and the 
 
German history were it not itself an invention of that history. A Shylock, but a cringing Shylock, that 
swears by its bond, its historical bond, its Christian-Germanic bond, for every pound of flesh cut from 
the heart of the people.” Marx therefore, despite his criticism, fully sided with Hegel as against the 
Historical School: “The criticism of the German philosophy of state and right, which attained its most 
consistent, richest, and last formulation through Hegel, is both a critical analysis of the modern state and 
of the reality connected with it, and the resolute negation of the whole manner of the German consciousness 
in politics and right as practiced hereto, the most distinguished, most universal expression of which, raised 
to the level of science, is the speculative philosophy of right itself.”  
160 For Hegel’s panentheism, see only his “History of Philosophy” (supra n.86), 39: “This good, this 
Reason – in its most concrete representation – is God. God governs the world; the content of His 
governance, the fulfilment of His plan, is world history.”   
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Historical School’s insistence on an ethical community underpinning all law practically 
restricts its conception of international law also to a non-universal community. The 
most radical version of this “regional” conception of international law is however 
developed by Hegel. For while his philosophy can describe a “subjective” international 
law within one group of states; Hegel gives absolute priority to the “one” dominant 
national spirit reigning over its epoch. Only one “regional” international law can thus 
exist and “the spirits of other nations are without rights”.161  
 















The “German” Nineteenth Century II 






Within the nineteenth century, German political thinking transited from a 
“cosmopolitan” to a “national” conception.1 The French victory over the (old) 
German Empire had shown to many – most famously Hegel – that the Empire was 
no more.2 And even if the older – dynastic and feudal – conceptions of the “droit 
public de l’Europe” were to anachronistically linger on for some time, international 
law had become firmly associated with the law of independent and sovereign states. 
But what “practical” themes and principles did the international jurists of the 
nineteenth century discuss; and what did German jurists regard as the foundation and 
sources of international law?  
The early decades of the nineteenth century were dominated by the reaction against 
“Bonapartist” imperialism; and the clearest expression of this was the “European 
Concert”. Based on the (dynastic) idea of legitimacy, the Concert – and within it: the 
Holy Alliance – embodied a defensive league that was to guarantee peace within 
Europe. Can this league be understood as a practical illustration of a Kantian peace 
federation? Section 1 wishes to show that this was not the case – but that the European 
Concert gradually developed in a “Rousseauian” direction. Yet importantly: the 
European Concert was only minimally the birthplace of a “European” conception of 
international law. That conception indeed chiefly derives, as Section 2 wishes to show, 
from the Historical School. It is this philosophical current – discussed in Chapter 2 – 
that dominates the better part of the nineteenth century. International law is here seen 
as only possible within a “community of states” that shares a common ethical and legal 
consciousness; and it is this conception that will ultimately “contract” the universalist 
scope of the natural law tradition(s) into a “regional” frame.  
What about the Hegelian School? We shall see that elements of Hegelian thinking were 
integrated into the Historical School, yet it is only by the end of the nineteenth century 
that a neo-Hegelian strand finds its way into mainstream German international law 
thinking. The new “state positivism” will come to view international law as a form of 
 
1 F. Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State (translator: R. B. Kimber; Princeton University Press, 
1970).  
2 G.W.F. Hegel, The German Constitution, in: Political Writings (translator: H.B. Nisbet; Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 6. 
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external state law; and this new school eventually elevates the international treaty into 
the main instrument of international law. The dethroning of custom as the principal 
source of international law will not only dissolve the organic idea of a (European) 
community of states as the spiritual basis of international law. But because 
international treaties are themselves subject to the idea of state sovereignty, the binding 
nature of international law itself becomes “voluntarist”; and with it, apologetic 
positivism starts to take root in fin-de-siècle Germany.  But let us tread slowly and 
begin at the beginning.  
 
 
1. The European Concert:  A Kantian “Federation” of States?  
 
The conservative reaction against the French Revolution was swift to challenge the 
eighteenth-century foundations of international law and its “classic” doctrine of state 
sovereignty. In a 1791 pamphlet, the question had thus been raised whether the 
European powers were authorized, “under the general principles of international law”, 
to launch war against the French republican government;3 and the anonymous author 
had little hesitation: Even if one assumed, with rationalist social contract theorists,  that 
all power originally derived from the people, once the people had transferred their 
sovereignty to their regent, they could not dispose or deprive him of his dynastic 
rights.4 Where this had nevertheless happened, the regents of all the civilised states of 
the world were under an obligation to intervene into the internal affairs of the “fallen” 
state: 
“Among the rulers of all civilized peoples of the world there exists a tacit contract 
according to which they mutually guarantee each other their sovereign, governmental 
and dynastic rights against any unauthorized attack; and because of the inviolability 
and holiness of their persons they have mutually guaranteed this, and according to 
general international law are bound to perform it. (...) The sentence is thus entirely 
correct that all the potentates of Europe ought to and are bound to avenge the shame, 
inflicted upon them in the person of the King of France, and to restore this 
unfortunate monarch to his freedom and the sovereign and dynastic rights of which 
 
3 Anonymous, Beleuchtung der Frage: Sind die Europäischen Mächte nach dem allgemeinen Völkerrecht befugt, die 
neue französische Regierungs-Verfassung, so wie sie gegenwärtig eingerichtet ist, nach fruchtlos versuchten Vorstellungen 
mit gewaffneter Hand zu bekämpfen? (1791).  
4 Ibid., 17. 
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he has been unlawfully deprived to the extent that he will in future exercise them for 
the true good of his kingdom with due regard for human rights and equity.”5 
  
This proposal in favour of a dynastic defence league was, of course, primarily directed 
against the French Revolution; yet the underlying principles were much wider. Should 
monarchic States be entitled to intervene into the internal affairs of a republican State; and, 
if so, on what normative grounds? The conservative reaction here reverted to the 
ancient “feudal” and “religious” conceptions of “legitimacy”; and it is in this spirit that 
the “Concert of Europe” and the “Holy Alliance” were conceived after the Napoleonic 
adventure had finally collapsed. 
 
 
a. The “Concert of Europe” and the “Holy Alliance”: Birth and Evolution 
 
Building on the 1814 Treaty of Peace and founded on the idea that the future of 
Europe required the various powers “to concert together”,6 an international congress 
had been called into existence in Vienna in 1815.7 The resulting “Final Act” was to 
resettle the political map of Europe comprehensively;8 but the idea of regular 
 
5 Ibid., 22-23. 
6 The 1814 Treaty of Peace can be found in E. Hertslet (ed.), The Map of Europe by Treaty –Volume I 
(Butterworths, 1875), 1. The idea of a “concert” can be found in the earlier Treaty of Chaumont (“Treaty 
of Union, Concert, and Subsidy, between Britannic Majesty and His Imperial and Royal Apostolic 
Majesty the Emperor of Austria”), esp. Article XVI: “The present Treaty of Defensive Alliance having 
for its object to maintain the equilibrium of Europe, to secure the repose and independence of its States, 
and to prevent the invasions which during so many years have desolated the World, the High 
Contracting Parties have agreed to extend the duration of it to 20 years, to take date from the day of its 
Signature; and they reserve to themselves, to concert upon its ulterior prolongation, 3 years before its 
expiration, should circumstances require it.” 
7 Ibid., Article XXXII: “All the Powers engaged on either side in the present War shall, within the space 
of two months, send Plenipotentiaries to Vienna, for the purpose of regulating, in General Congress, 
the Arrangements which are to complete the provisions of the present Treaty.” 
8 1815 General Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and 
Sweden – reproduced in E. Hertslet (ed.), The Map of Europe by Treaty –Volume I (supra n.6), 208.  On 
the “constitutional” nature of the act, see its preamble: “The Powers who signed the Treaty concluded 
at Paris on the 30th of May, 1814, having assembled at Vienna, in pursuance of Article XXXII of that 
Act, with the Princes and States their Allies, to complete the provisions of the said Treaty, and to add 
to them the arrangements rendered necessary by the state in which Europe was left at the termination 
of the last war; being now desirous to embrace, in one common transaction, the various results of their 
negotiations, for the purpose of confirming them by their reciprocal Ratifications, have authorized their 
Plenipotentiaries to unite, in a general Instrument, the regulations of superior and permanent interest, 
and to join to that Act, as integral parts of the arrangements of Congress, the Treaties, Conventions, 
Declarations, Regulations, and other particular acts, as cited in the present Treaty.” The most important 
choices of the Act relate to the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland (albeit under Russian 
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congresses to solve European issues for the future would only emerge, a year later, 
when the final convulsions of the Napoleonic Empire had ended. This new idea 
manifested itself at first in a “Holy Alliance” – a treaty between (Orthodox) Russia, 
(Catholic) Austria and (Protestant) Prussia.9 The principal provisions here stated: 
“Article I 
Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all men to 
consider each other as brethren, the Three contracting Monarchs will remain united 
by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as fellow 
countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and 
assistance; and, regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of 
families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are 
animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice. 
Article II 
In consequence, the sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments 
or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of 
testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with which they ought to be 
animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation; 
the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely designated by Providence to 
govern three branches of the One family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus 
confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has 
in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because 
in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom, that is 
to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life…”  
 
The “Holy Alliance” undoubtedly constituted the most tangible form of theocratic 
enthusiasm in post-Napoleonic Europe.10 But the proposed “Christianisation” of the 
European Concert was downright rejected by Britain. Considering the theocratic idea 
of a Christian commonwealth as “a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense”,11 a 
second peace treaty was quickly concluded: the 1815 Treaty of Alliance (“Quadruple 
 
domination), the creation of the “Germanic Confederation”, and the fusion of the ancient United 
Provinces of the Netherlands with the Belgian provinces into the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
Especially the last territorial choice was inspired by the idea of the “balance of power”, see Secret 
Articles to the First Paris Peace Treaty (Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty (supra n.6), 18), Article III: 
“The establishment of a just Balance of Power in Europe requiring that Holland should be so 
constituted as to be enabled to support her Independence through her own resources, the Countries 
comprised between the Sea, the Frontiers of France, such as thy are defined by the Present treaty, and 
the Meuse, shall be given up for ever to Holland.” 
9 The Treaty can be found in Hertslet, Map of Europe (supra n.6), 317. Article III allowed for the 
subsequent accession by other powers; and, indeed, France would accede in 1815, the Netherlands in 
1816, Saxony and Switzerland in 1817. According Hertslet, “the greater part of the Christian Powers 
acceded to this Treaty” (ibid., 319).  
10 For the religious and cultural background against which the Holy Alliance was formed see especially 
Schleiermacher’s “Addresses on Religion” (1799), and Chateaubriand’s “The Genius of Christianity” 
(1802).  
11 British Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh – quoted in H. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh 
and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 (Echo Point, 2013), 189. 
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Alliance”). The latter refrained from the mystical religiosity that had informed the Holy 
Alliance but it also re-confirmed that “the repose of Europe [was] essentially 
interwoven with the confirmation of the order of things”, which – founded on royal 
authority – was in need to be guaranteed.12 To that effect the celebrated Article VI 
now stated: 
“To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present Treaty, and to consolidate the 
connexions which at the present moment so closely unite the Four Sovereigns for the 
happiness of the world, the High Contracting Parties have agreed to renew their 
Meetings at fixed periods, either under the immediate auspices of the Sovereigns 
themselves, or by their respective Ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their 
common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those 
periods shall be considered the most salutary tor the repose and prosperity of Nations, 
and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe.” 
 
The four allied powers – later joined by France – here expressed their wish to “concert 
together” through regular congresses; and this “Congress system” became known as 
the “Pentarchy”. In its first decade, and chiefly as a result of the Troppau Congress, it 
became identified with the “legitimist” spirit of the Holy Alliance. For the Troppau 
“Preliminary Protocol” had set out three core principles that defended a reactionary 
and conservative dynasticism. In line with the first principle, States “which have 
experienced changes in the form of their internal government from revolution” were 
to be excluded from the “European alliance”. Secondly, “the respect owed to the 
authority of every legitimate government” meant that foreign recognition of illegal 
changes of government had to be refused. Finally, and most importantly, whenever 
any revolutionary changes would “cause other countries to fear immediate danger” 
and “in order to return them to the alliance”, the allied powers threatened collective 
intervention through “measures of coercion, whenever such coercion is required”.13  
On the basis of these three “international” principles, the European Concert famously 
intervened in Italy and Spain; yet its reactionary conservatism immediately provoked – 
pace Burke – the liberal opposition of Britain; and for some, the original conception 
of the “European Concert” therefore ceased to exist by 1822.14 The Concert however 
 
12 Preamble to the 1815 Treaty of Alliance and Friendship between Great Britain, Austria (Prussia, and 
Russia) – found in Hertslet, Map of Europe (supra n.6), 372. 
13 Preliminary Protocol (19 November 1820), Troppau – quoted in M. Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and 
its Legacy (Tauris, 2013), 260. 
14 W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European Alliance, 1813-1823 as an Experiment 
in the International Organization of Peace (Longmans, 1914), 266. For a criticism of this view, see I. Clark, 
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survived – albeit in a different form. For even if its “restorationist” character became 
defunct with the independence of Greece and Belgium;15 both situations had 
confirmed the “monarchical” philosophy of the Concert. The 1830 and 1848 
revolutions in France, on the other hand, buried even that minimalist substance. And 
if the European Concert, as a “confederation” of European states under the hegemony 
of “Great Powers,16 can therefore be said to survive into the second half of the 
nineteenth century, it was based on political principles very different to those of 1815. 
It is perhaps best characterised as “a new method of diplomacy – diplomacy by 
congress or conference”;17 whose task it is to sanction territorial changes that may 
affect the balance of power within Europe.18  
This novel focus has two important consequences. By leaving the “internal affairs” of 
each state to itself, the Concert evolves into a “security confederation” that is meant 
to only check the external ambitions of its members. And in its exclusive task to 
prevent European wars,19 it comes to assume a distinctly Rousseauian flavour. But 
even more importantly, the European Concert comes to be seen as playing an active 
role in the re-construction of Eastern Europe after the Crimean War. The “Eastern 
Question” indeed becomes a central task – a task that engages the European continent, 
including the Ottoman and Russian Empires. 
 
The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
126.  
15 According to T.E. Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question (Clarendon Press, 1885), the Greek 
revolt against the Turkish Empire “was naturally distasteful to the Holy Alliance” (ibid., 4). The Alliance 
indeed originally insisted that Greece should remain a dependency of that Empire because the Ottoman 
Empire was seen as the “legitimate” government (W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe (supra n.14), 
236). This position however dramatically changed by 1830. With regard to Belgium, see only: 1831 
Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, and Belgium, relative to the 
Separation of Belgium from Holland (E. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty– Volume II (Butterworths, 
1875, 858). 
16 On the notion of “confederacy” see W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe (supra n.14); on the 
notion of “collective hegemony”, see: I Clark, Hegemony in International Society (Oxford University Press, 
2011), Chapter 4; as well as Matthias Schulz, Normen und Praxis: Das Europäische Konzert der Grossmächte 
als Sicherheitstrat, 1815-1860 (Oldenbourg, 2009).  
17 R. Elrod, The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at the International System, (1976) 28 World Politics 
159 at 162. And see also: F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of 
Relations between States (Cambridge University Press, 1967), 212: “It is one of the ironies of international 
history – and perhaps it is also one of the lessons – that the failure of the [Holy Alliance] marked not 
the end but the beginning of an age of collaboration between the Great Powers, because they then fell 
back on the Congress system as it had been interpreted by [the British].”  
18 R. Elrod, The Concert of Europe (supra n.17), 162. 
19 M. Schulz, Normen und Praxis (supra n.16), 559: „Als Hauptfunktion des Konzerts sind die Regulierung 




b. The “Concert of Europe” and the Nature of International Law 
 
Did the European Concert, and the Holy Alliance, influence nineteenth century 
conceptions of the nature of international law? In 1804, the Russian Emperor had 
directly linked the idea of a European confederation with the Kantian idea of a re-
foundation of international law:  
“It is no question of realising the dream of perpetual peace, but one could attain at 
least some of its results if, at the conclusion of the general war, once could establish 
on clear, precise principles the prescriptions of the rights of nations. Why could one 
not submit to it the positive rights of nations, assure the privilege of neutrality, insert 
the obligation of never beginning a war until all the resources which the mediation of 
a third party could offer have been exhausted, until the grievances have by this means 
been brought to light, and an effort to remove them has been made? On principles 
such as these one could proceed to a general pacification, and give birth to a league, 
of which the stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of 
nations…”20  
 
The Holy Alliance had however significantly moved away from these liberal principles. 
And by 1815, the European Concert followed a number of normative principles that 
clearly went against the Kantian tradition. Not only did the hegemonic idea that “Great 
Powers” were legally entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of other states blatantly 
violate the sovereign equality of all states;21 the legitimistic idea that a republican 
revolution entitled such an intervention contradicted the internal sovereignty of all 
states. The early European Concert, and especially the Holy Alliance, were thus formed 
on distinctively un-Kantian principles.22  
But did they nonetheless create a “new code of the law of nations”; and if so, was the 
latter confined to “members” of the Concert or part of a broader evolution of 
international law? When Klüber’s “Europäisches Völkerrecht” first appeared in 1821, 
 
20 Quoted in: R. Albrecht-Carrie (ed.), The Concert of Europe (Walker, 1968), 27. 
21 I. Clark, The Hierarchy of States (supra n.14), 2: “a final de jure recognition of the inequalities that had 
always existed de facto in the balance of power system”. 
22 In the words of Rolin-Jaequemyns, De l’étude de la législation compare et de droit internationale, 
(1869) 1 Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 225 at 236 : « C'est ainsi que la Sainte-
Alliance elle-même et les actes des Congrès qui en furent la conséquence, en organisant une espèce 
d'assurance mutuelle des monarchies conservatrices contre l'incendie révolutionnaire, ne furent au fond 
que l'idée de Kant retournée au profil de l'absolutisme, et recouverte d'un vernis mystique. » 
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it was still too early to answer these questions;23 and by the time of Heffter’s “Das 
Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart” (1844), the Holy Alliance was already 
dismissed as a “personal” monarchic union that merely promised to enforce the – 
ordinary – principles of international law.24 This view became subsequently 
dominant;25 and the great majority of German jurists came to subsequently consider 
the Holy Alliance as a “childish” attempt to “re-Christianise” the normative 
foundations of international law.26 The principles underlying the early European 
Concert were consequently downplayed as being “only an interlude” with “no lasting 
effect on either the question of the recognition of new States and governments or the 
question of intervention”.27  
Yet the strongest voice against the Concert as the normative basis for a “new” 
international law came, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, from the United States. For 
fearful that the “old” European monarchies would attempt to restore their colonial 
empires in Latin American, the young American Republic came to support its Latin 
republican sisters. The resulting “Monroe Doctrine” thus categorically rejected the 
normative principles behind the European Concert for the American hemisphere. 
From the perspective of general international law, the European Concert must 
therefore be characterised as a “regional” international organisation; and it is against 
this “regionalist” reading that the position of the Ottoman Empire must also be 
judged. For while it is true that the original Concert was based on Christian values, the 
idea that European powers did not recognize the “Ottoman Empire” as a sovereign 
 
23 J. L. Klüber, Europäisches Völkerrecht (Cotta, 1821), 9: “Die Erschütterungen, welche unlängst den 
europäischen Staaten ein Vierteljahrhundert lang widerfahren sind, werden höchstwahrscheinlich 
manche Änderungen oder Modificationen in den Grundsätzen des positiven Völkerrechts zur Folge 
haben, deren Festsetzung man vergebens schon vor dem Wiener Congress erwartet hatte; doch hat man 
alle Ursache zu glauben, daß diese Änderungen weder so zahlreich noch so nah seyn werden, daß darum 
die Bekanntmachung dieses Werkes zu verschieben wäre.“  
24 A. W. Heffter, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (Schroeder, 1844), 9-10. With regard to the 
principle of non-intervention, the “classic” rules are thus reconfirmed and here especially in the general 
rule that no state would be entitled to impose a particular constitution onto another (ibid., 85). 
25 See for example: C. Kaltenborn von Stachau, Kritik des Völkerrechts (Mayer, 1847), whose influential 
textbook characterises the Holy Alliance as a “personal union” of monarchs; and who equally downplays 
the European Concert as a merely institutional arrangement to enforce the “classic” principles of 
international law.  
26 J.C. Bluntschli, Das Moderne Völkerrecht der Civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt (Beck, 1868), 47: 
„mittelalterliche Vorstellung“ within the „Fürstenrechts“, „unreif und beinahe kindlich“; and later (ibid., 
98): „Die heilige Allianz vom Jahr 1815, welche auf das Prinzip der christlichen Religion ein neues 
christliches Völkerrecht begründen will, kann nicht als modernes Völkerrecht gelten.“ 
27 W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (De Gruyter, 2000), 497. 
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member of the general society of nations runs counter to an extensive treaty practice.28 
When the 1856 Treaty of Peace would thus later speak of the “admission of the 
Sublime Porte into the European System”,29 this admission was by no means a belated 
admission of Turkey as a moral – international - person; it was instead the recognition 
that Turkey was part of the “republic of Europe”, that is: a regional international 
organisation that subjected the European sphere to “collective” considerations.30  
 
 
2. “European” International Law: The Rise of the Historical School 
 
The “European Concert” constituted a formidable – yet ultimately failed – attempt to 
reconceive international law. Did this mean that the older eighteenth century 
conceptions of international law had survived; or did the nineteenth century draw on 
the philosophical writings discussed in Chapter 2?  
A good starting point for an answer may be Theodor von Schmalz’s “European 
International Law”. Writing in 1817, it followed a predominantly Kantian approach,31 
which accepted the existence of a “natural” international law derived from a “legal 
metaphysics” distinct from positive contracts and custom.32 Yet this was to change 
dramatically. And while Klüber would still confirm the existence of a “natural” 
 
28 For an extensive discussion of the treaty relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European 
state system since the sixteenth century, see: T. Naff, The Ottoman Empire and the European States 
System, in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford University Press, 
1985), 143. It might also be important to recall that the embassy of the Ottoman Empire was opened 
in London in 1793.  
29 1856 General Treaty of Peace between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Sardinia, and Turkey 
(E. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty– Volume VII (Butterworths, 1875), 1250), and especially Article 
VII entitled “Admission of the Sublime Porte into the European System. Guarantee of Independence 
of Ottoman Empire”. The provision states that the parties “declare the Sublime Porte admitted to 
participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, 
each on his part, to respect the Independence and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; 
Guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any 
act tending to its violation as a question of general interest”. 
30 In the words of T. E. Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question (Clarendon Press, 1885), the 
Turkish Empire was placed “under the tutelage of Europe” (ibid., 2). 
31 T. von Schmalz, Das Europäische Völkerrecht in acht Büchern (Duncker und Humblot, 1817), 3: “Wie nun 
die Moral, als Metaphysik der Sitten, Wissenschaft der Freiheit überhaut, so ist Ethik Wissenschaft der 
inneren, Rechtslehre Wissenschaft der äußeren Freiheit.“ 
32 Ibid., 9. 
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international law as the “cement” for any system of positive international law in the 
early 1820s,33 this residuary natural law thinking was progressively abandoned. It was 
henceforth not Kant but the Historical School which, combined with Hegelian 
splinters,34 came to offer the most successful conception of international law. For the 
majority of international lawyers came to accept that there existed a “natural” society 




a. Synthesizing Hegel and Savigny: Heffter’s “European International Law”  
 
The best representative of a new approach vis-à-vis the foundations of international 
law is August Heffter, whose 1844 textbook became a milestone for nineteenth century 
international law. Natural law thinking is here categorically rejected; and a new 
synthesis between the “Philosophical School” (Hegel) and the “Historical School” 
(Savigny) is attempted. Originally conceived as a primarily Hegelian project,35 the final 
book takes over much more of the Historical School. For in clearly rejecting the idea 
that there is no international “law” apart from each individual state will,36 the 
 
33 J. L. Klüber, Europäisches Völkerrecht (supra n.23), 6: “Es füllt die Lücken aus, die zu oft in einem 
System des positive Völkerrechts sich zeigen, und so weit ist sein Gebrauch wesentlich. Überdies dient 
es demselben System als Bindemittel[.]“; and see ibid., 18: „Daher ist das Völkerrecht, auch das 
natürliche, ein Theil des öffentlichen Rechtes.“ For a similar view, see also  F. Saalfeld; Handbuch des 
Positiven Völkerrechts (Osiander, 1833), 1: „Das Völkerrecht – Droit des gens, law of nations, international 
law – wird eingeheilt in allgemeines oder natürliches und in positives.“ 
34 The only “pure” Hegelian in nineteenth century Germany appears to be Adolf Lasson, whose “Princip 
und Zukunft des Völkerrechts” (Hertz, 1871) directly applies Hegelian philosophy to international law. 
His denial of international law and the centrality of “war” is however generally rejected by the German 
mainstream – something he himself admits (ibid., iii). For a softer Hegelianism. See: K. T. Pütter’s “Die 
Staatslehre oder – Souveränität als Princup des practischen Europäischen Völkerrechts”, (1850) 6 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 299. 
35 A. W. Heffter, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (supra n.24). Heffter‘s textbook was supposed 
to be co-authored with E. Gans – the famous “Oberhegelianer”. But Gans had suddenly died in 1839; 
and the book begins with a homage to his friend in which Heffter states that Gans – in true Hegelian 
spirit – was supposed to write about war, whereas Heffter was to write on “peace” (ibid., iii: “Er wählte 
den Krieg und überließ mir den Frieden.")  
36 Ibid., v. Heffter rejects the idea that there must be a “guaranteed” sanction; and he here draws a 
contrast between “guaranteed law” and “free law”. For an express reference to Austin, see ibid., 3 – 
footnote 1.  
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normative foundation of that law is seen in the “common” (!) consciousness that is 
formed within a “society” of nations:  
“I find the deeper reason for all international law in the rational will of men, based on 
the necessity of thought, when it enters into a common consciousness. The latter not 
only asserts itself in the individual state as positive law… but also, and in the same 
way, among nations that enter into a social relationship with each other. For where 
there is a society, there is also a right; the State itself here becomes the rational man 
of the species; and if several isolated nations come together in this way, they can only 
exist on this normative basis[.]“37 
 
This re-foundation of international law, along the lines suggested by the Historical 
School, would have an important consequence: only those states that “shared” a 
normative consciousness could be considered as part of the same “society” in which a 
“common” law could develop. This legal consciousness had not developed 
everywhere, and international law could consequently not be “universal”.38 Within 
Europe, on the other hand, a common society had been created on the basis of 
Christianity and Roman law, and a “European” international law had therefore 
emerged.39 The central principle underling this law was the (Hegelian) idea of a mutual 
recognition:  
“A law based on mutual recognition can only have validity among those States in 
which reciprocity of application is ensured and a reciprocal commerce exists, or is 
presumed to exist, according to the same principles... European international law, in 
its historical roots, is thus valid essentially only among Christian states whose common 
morality is guaranteed by an agreement in the highest laws of humanity and the 
concordant character of their state powers. On the other hand, it finds only a partial 
application to non-Christian states, depending on the reciprocity to be expected, 
unless one voluntarily wishes to make the moral principle the guiding principle of 
one's actions[.]"40 
      
This “synthesis” of Hegel’s principle of mutual recognition and Savigny’s idea of an 
“ethical” European community offered a new basis for international law. This new 
basis is decidedly not “positivist” in that it accepts an international normativity 
 
37 Ibid., vi. 
38 Ibid., 2: „Gibt es nun ein solches äußeres Staatsrecht überhaupt und überall? In der Wirklichkeit gewiß 
nicht für alle Staaten oder Völker des Erdballs. Immer hat es nur einen Theil derselben umfasst; nur in 
Europa und in den von hier aus geründeten Staaten ist es in das allgemeine Bewußtsein getreten, so daß 
man ihm den Namen eines Europäischen gegeben hat und mit Recht noch immer geben darf.“ 
39 Ibid., 7: „Hierin lag der Anfang eines allgemeinen europäischen Völkerrechts. Seine positiven 
Grundlagen waren die Grundsätze des Christentums und das Römische Recht, so weit es die Kirche 
nicht missbilligte; die für unantastbar, weil natürlich und göttlich, gehaltenen Regeln des Privatrechts 
wurden nun auch auf die Völkerrechtsverhältnisse übertragen....“ 
40 Ibid., 11.  
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independent and above individual state wills. The primary source of international law, 
rooted in the common consciousness of a plurality of States, is here customary law;41 
but more importantly still: the existence of a set of a priori principles is presumed. 
These foundational principles derive from the “internal necessity” of the existing 
society of states; and they are consequently equated with a “hypothetical natural law 
of states”.42 This new “organic” or “societal” natural law accepts – like the classic ius 
gentium tradition – private individuals as subjects of international law.43 Individual 
human rights as well as a “private” international law can therefore be conceived as an 
integral part of international law.44  
A similar combination of Savignian and Hegelian elements can be found in 
Oppenheim;45 but the subsequent triumph of the Historical School over Hegel can be 
found in later international jurists. Kaltenborn von Stachau thus dismisses Hegel’s 
denial of an international law above States outright,46 and assuredly confirms the 
“normativity” of international law.47 Locating this normativity in the “collective 
consciousness” of European nations, this collective normativity becomes gradually 
identified with “Christian” values: “Positive international law is rightly called a Christian law. 
Only the Christian peoples and kingdoms have so far been able to develop their legal life to an 
international legal life.”48 But under the influence of British authors, this identification of 
 
41 Ibid., 13. 
42 Ibid., 12. 
43 Ibid., 26. 
44 Ibid., 1. 
45 H. B. Oppenheim, System des Völkerrechts (Kröner, 1866 - originally published in 1845). Forcefully 
rejecting the “old” metaphysical natural law (ibid, 1), Oppenheim also tries to find a synthesis between 
the “philosophical” and the “historical” school (ibid., 5). And while closer to Hegel than Heffter, he 
nonetheless accepts the existence of a “cosmopolitan” private law (ibid., 3): “Das Völkerrecht umfaßt 
die Rechtsbeziehungen der verschiedenen Staaten und auch die der Bürger verschiedener Staaten zu 
einander. Es enthält demnach auch das sogenannte „Weltbürgerrecht“, und das eigentliche „Allgemeine 
Menschenrecht“.“ Part IV of Oppenheim’s textbook indeed explores this „Weltbürgerrecht“and 
especially private international law (Chapter XV).  
46 C. Kaltenborn von Stachau, Kritik des Völkerrechts (supra n.25), 156: „Freilich gerade Hegel ist hier am 
schwächsten und macht vielleicht einen Rückschritt; er stellt das Völkerrecht in die Willkür der 
Staaten[.]“  
47 Stachau expressly rejects a conception of international law that would require a guaranteed “sanction”, 
ibid, 308-310: „Auch ist die Erzwingbarkeit nicht der einzige Charakter des Rechts, auch nicht sein 
wesentlichster. Dieser besteht vielmehr darin, dass es Norm und Ordnung für alle menschlichen 
Gemeinverhältnisse in allen Sphären und Dimensionen des  privaten und des öffentlichen Lebens, 
mithin auch des sozialen Verhältnisses der Völker und Staaten untereinander, also Völker-Recht. – Der 
Zwang geht nun aber von der Gemeinschaft als solcher aus. Dies ist die Ordnung, die aufrecht erhalten 
werden soll. Das Rechtsleben ist das Gemeinleben.“  
48 Ibid., 270. What, then, is the relationship between Christian and non-Christian states? For von 
Stachau, this relation, while an “international” relation, is not one regulated by international law (ibid.): 
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the collective consciousness with a “Christian” value system is itself gradually replaced 
by the secular idea of a common “culture” or “civilisation”. Von Holtzendorff, for 
example, soon identifies the “common legal consciousness” with being member of the 
same “cultural community” that is itself seen as the product of a historical process of 
progress and civilisation.49 And building on the work of Lorimer,50 three classes of 
nations are subsequently identified.51  
This “European” rejection of a universal international law would increasingly gain 
ground and was defended in the “standard textbooks” of the time.52 Importantly, the 
Historical School clearly affirms the “normativity” and “positivity” of international 
law: “The norms of international law are real legal rules; they bind all civilised states 
and are positive law.”53 For even if there is no European “state” above the plurality of 
sovereign states, for the Historical School, there exists “a legislative, judicial and 
executive power” within the international legal order that is offered by the “community 






„Das allgemeine positive Völkerrecht ist einzig das christliche. Die andern Staaten haben internationale 
Beziehungen; diese stehen aber nicht auf der Basis des Rechts.“  
49 F. von Holzendorff, Handbuch des Völkerrechts (Habel, 1885). See also F. von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht 
(Haering, 1902), 2: „Die Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (la communauté du droit des gens, la famille des 
nation) wird umgrenzt durch die gemeinsame Rechtsüberzeugung, die auf der Gemeinsamkeit der 
Kultur und der Interessen beruht. (...) Die durch das Völkerrecht umschlossene Staatengemeinschaft ist 
zunächst (das ist das ideelle Moment) eine Kulturgemeinschaft.“ 
50 For a discussion of this British author, see Chapter 5. According to Grewe, Epochs of International Law 
(supra n.27), 465, it was mainly von Holzendorff who took over “the civilisation ideology, emanating 
from Britain”.  
51 F. von Holzendorff, Handbuch des Völkerrechts (supra n.49), 12: „So lange jene wesentlichen 
Unterscheidungen im Bewusstsein der Nationen fortbestehen, deren Merkmale durch 
Geschichtsforschung, Völkerpsychologie und Ethnographie als Barbarei, Halbkultur oder Zivilisation 
nachgewiesen werden, kann es ein allgemeines, practisches die Menschheit umfassendes Völkerrecht 
nicht geben.“ For a „French“ comparison, ee also F. de Martens, Traité de Droit International (Librairie 
Maresco, 1883), 241-2 (with reference to J. St. Mill). 
52 For example: F. von Liszt’s textbook (supra n.49). For a „history“ of this „standard textbook“, see: 
F. Herrmann, Das Standardwerk: Franz von Liszt und das Völkerrecht (Nomos, 2001). 
53 F. von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht (supra n.49), 6. 
54 Ibid., 7. 
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b. The Nationality Principle and the Rise of Private International Law 
 
The probably most important consequence of this triumph of the Historical School in 
Germany is the phenomenal rise of “private” international law in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. After all, Savigny – a private law scholar himself – had made 
his comments on the possibility of a legally binding international law in the context of 
a common private law – a ius commune between European States. This idea was further 
developed, on the European continent more generally, around the middle of the 
nineteenth century.55 A vital impulse would here come from a number of Italian 
scholars,56 and especially Pasquale Mancini.  
The particular aim behind the “Italian School” was to elevate the principle of 
“nationality” to the very centre of international law. Having won early victories in the 
context of the Greek and Belgian independence, the nationality principle was soon 
seen as “a doctrine justifying the novel aspirations of the Italians”.57 And according to 
Mancini,58 the nationality principle ought to be regarded as a philosophical 
achievement because it can – substantively – regard each national community – as 
opposed to the formal category of the state – as the “elementary unit” of the science 
of international law.59 Each nation is animated by a national consciousness (“coscienza 
della Nazionalità”) that grants each individual people its own legal “personality”.60  
With this change of perspective, three corollaries follow. First, each nation is always 
free to adopt its internal constitution; second, because of its internal sovereignty, it 
 
55 For an excellent historical overview, see:  R. de Nova, Historical and comparative introduction to 
conflict of laws (1966) 118 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 435; and 
more recently and more specifically on the nineteenth century: R. Banu, Nineteenth-Century 
Perspectives on Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 2018). 
56 For an overview of the Italian scene, see specifically: A. Pierantoni, Geschichte der Italienischen 
Völkerrechtsliteratur (Manz, 1872), Part IV; and A. P. Sereni, The Italian Conception of International Law 
(Columbia University Press, 1943), Chapter IX. 
57 Ibid., 157. Sereni quotes von Holzendorff, claiming in 1870, “that a history of the literature of 
international law in Italy is at the same time a history of the conceptions of the principle of nationality”. 
58 P. S. Mancini, Della Nazionalità Comme Fondamento Del Diritto Delle Genti, avialable here: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=dHC445QKgSQC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_su
mmary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.  For an extensive discussion of Mancini’s conception, see 
A. Droetto, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini e la Scuola Italiana di Diritto Internazionale del Secolo XIX 
(Giuffrè, 1954), esp. 147-204. 
59 Mancini, Della Nazionalità Comme Fondamento Del Diritto Delle Genti (supra n.58), 47. 
60 Ibid., 38-39. 
 94 
must also be able to externally demand its independence vis-à-vis foreign States.61 A 
third corollary would, finally, “revolutionise” the field of private international law. For 
Mancini now comes to reorient the law produced by a “common” ethical community 
alongside the principle of nationality with the effect that the territoriality principle is 
fundamentally undermined. Following Mancini, each state may thus be legally bound 
to apply foreign law within its territory, where persons of a different nationality are 
involved. Private international law becomes consequently perceived as a legally binding 
international law:  
“[F]or centuries, the prevailing doctrine argued that every extension of national law 
for the benefit of foreigners and every recognition of foreign legislation was 
exclusively based on the voluntary comity between nations, or their express or tacit 
consent … This false idea, according to which the civil condition of foreigners outside 
their home state as well as the legal force of a foreign law solely derived from a 
generous and spontaneous concession [of the host state], constituted the main 
obstacle to the emergence of a scientific understanding of private international law. 
(…) [However], the treatment of foreigners cannot depend on the comity or the 
sovereign and arbitrary will of each State. The science cannot but consider this 
treatment as a rigorous duty of international justice from which a nation cannot relieve 
itself without violating international law and without breaking the bond that unites the 
human species into a great legal community that is itself based on … that universal 
society that Wolf called the “respublica maxima gentium”.”62  
 
This powerful affirmation of the idea of a legally binding private international law 
henceforth challenged the internal sovereignty of States from the private law side. For 
founded on the principle of nationality, it obliges states to forsake the application of 
their own domestic laws; and this limitation on its internal sovereignty is not regarded 
as a voluntary concession but as a legal obligation arising from a compulsory and 
binding international law. Yet according to Mancini, not all rules of private 
international law had such binding force; and following Wolff (and Vattel) once more, 
he thus distinguished between a “necessary” and a “voluntary” private international 
law (while also conceding a sovereign prerogative to maintain “public order”).63 
But despite these normative qualifications, Mancini’s conception of private 
international law, as a form of international law proper, quickly gained ground. The 
 
61 Ibid., 43. 
62 P. S. Mancini, Rapport Première Commission – Droit International Privé, (1875) 7 Revue De Droit 
International 329 at 334-5. See also: Fiore, Diritto Internazioanle Privato – Volume I (Unione Tipografico, 
1888), 59: „Gli Stati, in quanto sono considerati come persone, che coesistono nella Magna Civitasm 
vanno soggetti alla suprema legge del diritto a della giustizzia. La società di fatto trag li Stati non sarebbe 
possibile, senza la società di diritto: ubi societas ibi jus.“ 
63 P. S. Mancini, Rapport Première Commission – Droit International Privé (supra n. 62), 352-3.  
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view would, for example, be promoted by von Bar – the famous heir to Savigny in 
Germany. In “The Theory and Practice of Private International Law”, we indeed find 
one of the finest defences of the international nature of private international law:  
 “[T]he rules of private international law cannot possibly be dependent merely upon 
the arbitrary determination of particular States. The State cannot assert the 
competency of its own legal system in absolute independence of other States, and in 
the face of their sovereign rights, which are of as much weight as its own. (…) It can 
be demonstrated that there is to a certain extent a real communis consensus of civilised 
States, a true law of custom. (…) Of course, every State has, in the abstract, the power 
of denying effect within its own territory to such a law of custom. But up to that limit 
the general law of custom, if it can really be shown to be such, will be recognised in 
the individual States. A law of custom is simply the instinctive development of right, 
tied down to no particular form, and this instinctive development does not draw its 
virtue from the will of the State. We cannot admit the objection, therefore, that there 
can be no such thing as a general law of custom, with reference to the rules of private 
law, for the whole of the civilised world. (…) It would be, as a matter of principle, 
correct to take up public law and private international law together, under the 
description "international law."64 
 
Private international law is here conceived as part and parcel of international law; and 
this idea of a legitimate private law sister to classic (public) international law became 
dominant in the final quarter of the nineteenth century.65  
But how exactly are private and public international law connected? The Historical 
School had originally assumed that both were coordinated branches stemming from 
the same tree: the legal consciousness of an international “community”. Yet this 
implied that both States and individuals were equally subject to international law, and 
by the end of the nineteenth century, this position became increasingly attacked by 
“public” international law scholars. The attempt was thus undertaken to derive 
“private” international law from “public” international law; and to argue – 
presupposing the existence and binding nature of “public” international law – that the 
latter universally “limited” the jurisdiction of each state in such a way that only one 
State held exclusive jurisdiction over private law matters. The most elaborate attempt 
 
64 L. von Bar, The Theory and Practice of Private International Law (translator: G. Gillespie; Green, 1892), 2, 
5-6. 
65 A. Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 42 
Columbia Law Review 189 at 194, who even goes so far as to claim that “the Law-of-Nations doctrine 
constituted a virtually unified conception“. “Nearly all of the leading continental writers of the period 
espoused the Law-of-Nations conception: in France, Weiss, Pillet and Bartin; in Germany, von Bar and 
Zitelmann; in Italy, Fiore and Diena; in Holland, Jitta; in Belgium, Laurent; in Switzerland, Brocher and 
Meili…. [S]upported by the "weight of authority" the Law-of-Nations doctrine slipped into most of the 
familiar civil law textbooks and commentaries. It dominated the debates in the Institut de Droit 
International and other learned societies, and it became the familiar view of the continental legal 
profession.” On this point, see also the overall “Conclusion – Apologetic Endings”. 
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in this direction was made by Ernst Zitelmann.66 In an intellectual move, reminiscent 
of Kant, it was argued that the very idea of a – conclusive – private right presupposes 
a national and an international legal order that guarantees that right: 
“If, therefore, any subjective private right is likely to be subject to the possibility that 
other states may also assess its existence during its practical realisation, it follows that, 
in order to be fully effective, the subjective right must also be recognised as existing 
by other states. And since, following the earlier argument, the valid existence of a 
subjective right is based on the legislative power of the State, this proposition arrives 
at the top: in order for the subjective private right to be fully effective, the legislative 
power of the State that conferred it must be recognized under international law. If this 
is the case, then, the subjective right under international law must also be regarded as 
existing by every foreign state ... We must therefore adopt this maxim:  only that state can 
confer upon me a justified claim to international recognition of a subjective private right, to which the 
international legal order has granted the general public power to confer the private right conferred; and 
likewise only that state can withdraw such private right again.”67 
 
Starting from the premise that all private rights are to be conclusive rights that must 
be enforceable everywhere, it logically followed that “every state is obliged to refrain 
from interfering into the internationally demarcated jurisdiction of another State”.68 For 
a dual jurisdiction shared by two States was “unthinkable”.69 This “monistic” and 
universal solution insists on a mutually exclusive division of legislative competences 
between States with regard to private law; and it roots the normative basis of that 
division ultimately in public international law.70 This conception of private 
international law delegates the validity question to public international law; and the 
normative nature and scope of the latter will thus inform the character and scope of 
the former.  
 
 
66 E. Zitelmann, Internationales Privaterecht – Volume I (Duncker & Humblot, 1897).  
67 Ibid., 67-68 (my translation, emphasis added). 
68 Ibid., 70 (emphasis added). 
69 Ibid., 72: „Da aber jede staatliche Rechtsmacht, im wirklich Rechtsmacht zu sein, streng genommen 
ausschließlich sein muß, eine Macht zweier Staaten, die inhaltlich völlig die gleiche wäre, nicht denkbar 
ist, so kann es auch immer nur das Gesetz eines bestimmten  Staates und keines anderen sein, das vom 
völkerrechtlichen Standpunkt aus diese bestimmte rechtliche Wirkung, den Erwerb oder Verlust eines 
subjektiven Privatrechts, eintreten lassen kann.“   
70 Ibid., 73. By contrast, A. Pillet, Principles de Droit International Privé (Pedone, 1903) tries to utilise a form 
of Hegelianism (via Lorimer) and Kantianism and seems to ultimately settle for the latter (ibid., 76 – 
footnote 1): “Le principe général auquel aboutit notre méthode se rapproche beaucoup de la définition 
du droit d’après Kant, et même si l’on considère que le souveraineté est bien la liberté de l’État dans ce 
qu’ elle a de rationnellement intelligible et de légitime, il se confond tout à fait avec elle et peut être 
présentée en ces termes : c’est le principe d’après lequel la souveraineté (ou liberté) de chacun peut 
coexister avec la souveraineté de tous, d’après un principe général de respect de la souveraineté [.] »   
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c. Excursus: Nineteenth Century Counter-Currents –Bluntschli  
 
Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the triumph of the “Historical School” 
and its “European” conception of international law had been almost unconditional; 
yet German international law also produced one major “universal” conception during 
this time. It is offered by Johann Caspar Bluntschli. For despite having been trained in 
the tradition of the “Historical School”, Bluntschli came to oppose many of its 
positions and replaced them with a humanistic universalism.71 He thus not only 
favoured the codification of international law – pace Savigny; more importantly, he 
categorically rejected the core premise underlying the Historical School: the need for 
a homogeneous “moral” medium as a necessary precondition for the “legal” nature of 
international law.  
For Bluntschli, international law is a universal law that derives from the “natural bond 
that united all peoples into humanity”; and this especially meant that “every people” 
would enjoy a “natural right” to be respected as a part of humanity.72 International law 
stemmed from the “common consciousness of humanity” and thus could not be a 
“regional” law.73 True, the “common consciousness” of humanity had yet to be fully 
developed and in some ways, the civilised European nations were the vanguard of this 
development; yet international law was nonetheless “not limited to the European 
society of nations”.74 This universalist conception of international law was 
subsequently developed alongside – utopian – lines. For once the “common 
consciousness” of mankind was ripe, a World State should crown this development: 
"And if mankind is, in truth, a totality, if it is animated by a common spirit, how could 
it not strive for the incarnation (Verleiblichung) of its own being, that is: to become a 
state? The nationally limited states only have a relative truth and validity... The perfect 
 
71 For an analysis of Bluntschli’s international law thinking, see: B. Röben, The Method Behind 
Bluntschli’s „Modern“ International Law, (2002) 4 Journal of the History of International law 249; as 
well as more extensively: “Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Francis Lieber und das moderne Völkerrecht 1861-
1881 (Nomos, 2003).  
72 J. C. Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht (supra n.26), 1 and 54. 
73 The „binding“ nature of international treaties is here explained not on the basis of the free will of 
states but on the basis of the “consciousness of humanity” standing above these wills (ibid., 234): “Die 
Rechtsverbindlichkeit der Statenvertäge beruht auf dem Rechtsbewusstsein der Menschheit, und ist ein 
nothwendiger Bestandteil der völkerrechtlichen Weltordnung. (...) Die Verbindlichkeit der Verträge ist 
selbst ein nothwendiger Rechtssatz. Sie ist nothwendig, weil ohne sue kein gesichtert Rechtsverkehr und 
kein friedlicher Rechtszustand der Völker möglich wäre.“ 
74 Ibid., 56: „Das Völkerrecht ist nicht auf die europäische Völkerfamilie beschränkt. Das Gebiet seiner 
Herrschaft ist die ganze Erdoberfläche, so weit auf ihr sich Menschen berühren.“ 
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state however physically coincides with all humanity. The world state or empire is the 
ideal of mankind in progress. (...) The common consciousness of mankind is of course 
still caught in a dreamy state and confused in many ways. It has not yet awakened to 
full clarity and has not progressed to unity of will. Humanity therefore has not yet 
been able to develop its organic existence. Only later centuries will see the world 
empire be realized. (...) Until then the world empire will be an idea which many aspire 
to but which no one is capable of realising. But as an idea of the future, the science of 
jurisprudence must not overlook it. Only in this empire will the true human state be 
revealed."75  
 
Bluntschli here reconnects with the (utopian) universalism of the enlightenment 
tradition. The telos of the world state or the civitas maxima was however not shared by 
many.76 Nevertheless: the idea that international law was ultimately “universal” in 
scope and that it should theoretically apply to all peoples had re-staked its 
philosophical claim; and by 1874, Bulmerincq followed suit and confidently asserted 
that the idea of a European or American international law was mistaken, as there only 
existed one – universal – international law that applied to all regions and religions of 
the world.77 This universalist counter-current could however not dethrone the 
Historical School. The latter became nonetheless increasingly contested in the last 






75 Ibid., 25-27 and 33. The „World State“ is organised along federal lines: “Zu dem Weltreich verhalten 
sich die Einzelstaaten, wie sich die Völker zur Menschheit verhalten. Die Einzelstaaten sind Glieder des 
Weltreiches und erlangen in ihm ihre Ergänzung und ihre volle Befriedigung, wie die Glieder im Körper. 
Das Weltreich hat nicht die Aufgabe, die Einzelstaaten aufzulösen und die Völker zu unterdrücken, 
sondern den Frieden jener und die Freiheit dieser besser zu schützen.“ 
76 See only: A. Bulmerincq, Praxis, Theorie und Codification des Völkerrechts (Duncker & Humblot, 1874), 
5 : „Nur das Völkerecht garantiert die stete Entwicklung der Völker und Einzelnen nach ihrer 
Individualität, denn sein Ziel ist nicht ein Universalstaat, nicht eine civitas maxima, nicht ein 
Einheitsstaat, sondern die Aufrechterhaltung der Varietät in dem genus, der Mannichfaltigkeit in der 
Einheit des Menschengeschlechts und die Anknüpfung, Erhaltung und Fortbildung der in der Form 
von Staaten erscheinenden Völkerrechtsindividualitäten.“ 
77 Ibid., 5: „Denn das Völkerrecht ist weder ein bloß europäisches, noch ein europäisch-amerikanisches, 
noch ein christliches-europäisch-amerikanisches, wenn auch christliche Grundsätze auf dasselbe 
eingewirkt und es zunächst nur eine beschränkte Geltung gehabt hat, sondern es ist für alle Völker aller 
Weltteile, und jeden religiösen Bekenntnisses berufen, eine gemeinsame Rechtsordnung aufzurichten, 
zu erhalten und durchzuführen, und weist schon jetzt Verträge europäischer und amerikanischer Staaten 
mit Staaten andere Weltteile und dieser unter einander, sowie Verträge der Bekenner verschiedener 
Religionen auf.“ 
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3. “Neo-Hegelian” International Law: The Rise of State Positivism  
 
The Historical Scholl had dominated German university life for the better part of the 
nineteenth century. In the last quarter of that century, its philosophical grip however 
loosened. After 1871, its “conceptual jurisprudence” had received an “internal” 
critique from which it would never fully recover.78 But more importantly still: the new 
school of “state positivism” had begun to stake its own claim. This new school 
considered, with Hegel, all law from the perspective of the “state”. The sole 
“empirical” source of all law was the state – not the people – because “[o]nly through 
the State will a people gain political and legal consciousness”.79 All law is consequently 
viewed as the product of the state’s will and this “voluntarist” rationale essentially 
reduces law to a “command” emanating from the (legislative) will of the state. This so-
called “legislative positivism” (Gesetzespositivismus) emerged at a time when Germany 
had finally obtained national unification; and this unique historical context may explain 
the fundamental change of purpose and methodology in German public law after 
1871.80  
What are the philosophical premises of the state positivist school? The new “positivist” 
project finds its most celebrated expression in Bergbohm’s “Jurisprudence and Legal 
Philosophy” (1892).81 Within it, Bergbohm brilliantly exposed the natural law premises 
of the Historical School;82 and through it, a “pure positivism” receives its best 
manifestation in German public law. What does the new “positive” philosophy mean 
for the nature and character of international law? If all “law” must be traceable to a 
 
78 What I have in mind here are the works by R. von Jhering, such as: “Der Kampf ums Recht” (1872) 
as well as “Der Zweck im Recht” (1877) but especially “Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz” (1884). 
79 C. F. von Gerber’s „Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts“ (Tauchnitz, 1880), 226. 
80 P. von Oetzen, Die soziale Funktion des staatsrechtlichen Positivismus (Surkamp, 1974), 254: „Diese Bindung 
an ein neues und geschlossenes, darüber hinaus politisch bedeutsames Verfassungswerk bestimmt ohne 
Zweifel die gesamte deutsche Staatsrechtswissenschaft nach 1871 und bedingt wesentliche Unterschiede 
gegenüber der vorangegangenen Zeit. Das Bedürfnis, allgemeine theoretische Grundsätze zu gewinnen, 
tritt zurück gegenüber dem Bestreben, das gegebene positive Recht angemessen zu begreifen.“ On the 
rise of „state positivism“ in imperial Germany generally, see: J. Schröder, Zur Geschichte der 
juristischen Methodenlehre zwischen 1850 und 1933, (2008) 13 Rechtsgeschichte 160. 
81 K. Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie: Kritische Abhandlungen – Erster Band (Duncker & 
Humblot, 1892). On the importance of this critique, see: D. Tripp, Der Einfluß des 
neturwissenshaftlichen, philosophischen und historischen Positivismus auf die deutsche Rechtslehre im 
19. Jahrhundert (Duncker & Humblot, 1983), 277. 
82 K. Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie: Kritische Abhandlungen (supra n.81), §16.  
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legislative command backed up by a sanction,83 the autonomous character of all 
customary law is automatically denied. The normativity of international law must 
instead be sought somewhere else; and it will be found in the individuality of each and 
every state will.84 This Neo-Hegelian perspective catapults the international treaty into 
the forefront of international law; and the early “international” positivists – 
represented in Germany by Georg Jellinek and Heinrich Triepel – indeed come to 
analyse the foundations of international law through the prism of the binding nature 
of international treaties. 
 
 
a. From Custom to Treaties: Jellinek and the New Kant-Hegel Synthesis 
 
The renewed interest in the nature of international treaties finds a remarkable 
expression in Georg Jellinek’s 1880 monograph on the subject;85 and in many ways, 
this short book projects a very different – new – way of thinking about international 
law. This novel way abruptly moves away from “custom” to “treaties”; and adopting 
the “positivist” spirit of German constitutional law, the foundation of all international 
law shifts from the collective consciousness of a plurality of states to that of the 
individual “State will”.86 It is therefore no coincidence that “The Legal Nature of State 
Treaties” begins by invoking Hegel: in the absence of a common will above the states, 
the indisputable starting point for any international law rests in the “reality” and 
“particularity” of subjective state wills.87  
 
83 Ibid., 546: “[E]s ist der Augenblick, wo der Rechtssatz als solcher anerkannt, sanktioniert, gesetzt 
wird, d.h. eben Positivität erlangt – liegt seine individuelle Entstehungsgeschichte als Rechtsatz.“ 
84 Importantly, Bergbohm is the author of „Staatsverträge und Gesetze als Quellen des Völkerrechts“ 
(Mattiesen, 1876), which precedes and ultimately inspires G. Jellinek’s „Die rechtliche Natur der 
Staatsverträge“ (1880). 
85 G. Jellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge: Ein Beitrag zur Juristischen Construction des Völkerrechts 
(Hölder, 1880). 
86 For an excellent discussion of Jellinek in the context of „classic“ German constitutionalism, see: J. 
Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (Mohr Siebeck, 2000). 
87 G. Jellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge (supra n.85), 3. The express reference is to §333 of 
Hegel’s “Philosophy of Law”, that is: “[S]ince the sovereignty of states is the principle governing their 
mutual relations, they exist to that extent in a state of nature in relation to one another, and their rights 
are actualized not in a universal will with constitutional powers over them, but in their own particular 
wills. (…) There is no praetor to adjudicate between states, but at most arbitrators and mediators, and 
even the presence of these will be contingent, i.e. determined by particular wills.” 
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What does this new perspective mean for the normativity of international law? For 
Jellinek, all law ultimately derives from the will of the state;88 and this must mean that 
all international law must also – always – be rooted in the will of each and every state. 
The central question therefore becomes this: is a state ever capable of externally 
binding itself for the future? Only if such a “self-binding” were possible, Jellinek 
claims, can the normativity of international law be demonstrated.89 And reverting to 
the Kantian idea of the categorical imperative, he claims: 
“The denial of the possibility of a self-binding will for the reason that a free will can 
prove its freedom even in the detachment from the decisions once made, therefore 
leads, when thought to its end, to a denial of morality and justice, and with it to a 
denial of the possibility of the idea of human community. If, therefore, the idea of a 
self-binding will is logically possible, it is also morally and legally necessary; legally in 
the sense of the idea of law, which is the indispensable precondition for an ordered 
community. (...) When Kant thus wishes to conclude his discussion on the binding 
force of treaties with the assertion that the obligation to keep a treaty is a categorical 
imperative, he has taken the right step in this respect.”90 
 
All normative expressions of the state, so the argument goes, are always manifestations 
of a self-binding will.91 The normative quality of “law” is thus not determined by 
whether or not a norm is backed up by a sanction; it is purely a question of whether 
the state “wills” to “bind” itself. But if that is the case, there simply is no categorical 
distinction between national and international law;92 as both derive their validity and 
limits from the “state purposes” (Staatszwecke). These state purposes determine every 
expression of the state’s will; and the state will is therefore always – whether acting 
internally or externally – subject to the “rebus sic stantibus” rule.93 This however does 
not mean that international treaties could be broken off arbitrarily. For one of the 
 
88 G. Jellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge (supra n.85), 5: „Alles Recht ist der Wille der 
staatlichen Gemeinschaft[.]“ 
89 Ibid., 7: „Denn nur sich selbst kann der Staat sich unterordnen und nur, wenn er sich selbst 
unterordnen kann, ist er im Stande, sich ein Recht nach Aussen zu setzten.“  
90 Ibid., 16-17.  
91 Ibid., 27: „In jedem concreten Wollen liegt eine Beschränkung des Willens als die Fähigkeit des 
Wollens... Daher ist jeder Act staatlichen Wollens eine Beschränkung des Staatswillen[.]“ 
92 Ibid., 37: “Es ist damit bewiesen, dass das innerstaatliche Recht einer seiner wichtigsten Beziehungen 
nach an denselben angeblichen Mangeln leidet, wie das Völkerrecht und seiner Natur nach ewig leiden 
muss.“ The difference between the two bodies of law is seen to lie in the “moral” sanction attached to 
a violation, whereby the “moral guarantees” offered for state law are greater than the moral sanction 
that follows a breach of international law. 
93 Ibid., 40: „Daher trägt jeder Act des Staatswillens die Clausel: Rebus sic stantibus in sich.“ For an 
elaboration of this point, see later: E. Kaufmann, Das Wesen des Völkerrechts und die Clausula Rebus 
Sic Stantibus (Mohr, 1911) to be discussed below.  
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purposes of the modern State is – contra Fichte – to peacefully entertain external 
relations with other States;94 and from here, Jellinek makes a second Kantian move 
(albeit with a strongly Hegelian undercurrent) : 
“Also the state can only will by raising the conditions of its realizability to the contents 
of the same. If the state exists, if it wants to fulfil the purposes predestined for it by 
its nature, it must also will the means by which this alone is possible. (...) And now it 
is clear that there is not the slightest conflict between the substantive-philosophical 
and the formal-legal justification of international law. If one of the state purposes is 
to communicate with other states, if the non-fulfilment of this state purpose also 
means an attack on the existence of the state, like the arbitrary breaking of a self-
binding law, then it is a requirement that derives from the nature of the state to 
establish norms by which the relations of the state with the others are regulated. These 
norms, while arising from the nature of the state as a person which can only exist in 
the community of states, are nonetheless free acts of the state will. Even if it is his 
nature to prescribe the establishment of binding norms for relations with other states, 
it is his free will with which he fulfils this necessity. ”95 
 
The source of all international law is here seen as the “free will” of each state; and 
international law is therefore nothing but “external state law”.96 Yet in order to 
demonstrate that this external state law can grant “objective” rights to other states, 
Jellinek is forced to recruit a Kantian idea: the “objective nature” of an international 
society.97 The idea of such an international society is thereby – unlike what the 
Historical School had claimed – not rooted in regional custom; rather it is viewed as a 
(universal) “reality” in which all states find themselves and which therefore pre-
conditions how all states positively create (treaty) law.98 It is hard to fully understand 
this argument but, at its heart, appears to lie a “transcendental” deduction: to negate 
 
94 G. Jellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge (supra n.85), 42: “Denn unter die Staatszwecke gehört 
auch, was nur zu oft ausser Acht gelassen wird, die Herstellung und Aufrechterhaltung des Verkehres 
mit andern Staaten. Nur eine die reale Welt total verkennende Stubenphilosophie konnte dem Staate, 
besonders dem modernen Staate , Autarkie zuschreiben in dem Sinne, dass es in seinem Belieben stehe, 
ob er mit anderen Staaten verkehren wollte oder nicht.“  
95 Ibid., 44-45. 
96 Ibid., 46. 
97 Ibid., 48: “Der Staatswille ist hier gebunden an die objective Natur der Staatenbeziehungen. Hier 
bewahrt der alte Satz seine Gültigkeit: Ubi societas, ibi jus. Es steht dem Staate formell frei, ob er in die 
societas eintreten will oder nicht. Hat er es aber gethan, dann hat er mit der societas auch ein jus 
gewollt.“ 
98 Ibid., 49: “Es ist kein Naturrecht etwa, welches den Staat in diesen Fällen bindet, denn die objectiven 
Momente der internationalen Lebensverbaltnisse und deren logische Consequenzen haben unabhängig 
vom Staatswillen überhaupt keine rechtliche Natur[.]“ 
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the legally binding nature of international treaties is to deny the “objective nature” of 
the – postulated and a priori - international society of states.99  
Be that as it may, with Jellinek, the nature of international treaties becomes the central, 
if not exclusive, focus in discussions about international normativity. The replacement 
of custom as the primary source stems directly from the “voluntarist” emphasis on the 
– conscious – sovereign state. State positivism is “un-organic” and “non-
communitarian”: all legal norms originate in a sovereign “command” that must be 
imposed from above.100 Seen in this light, only “treaty law” can be of a true legal nature 
as external state law. And this rejection of customary law, dialectically, undermines the 
very idea of the older European conception of international law. For the positivist 
school does no longer tie the “normativity” of international law to a “regional” moral 
base; and Jellinek has indeed no problem in affirming the universal nature of his 





99 Ibid., 58. In “Die Lehre on den Staatenverbindungen“ (originally published 1882; Keip, 1996)), 
Jellinek writes (ibid., 94-95): „Die natürliche Thatsache der Vielheit der Staaten verwandelt sich daher 
durch den Umstand, dass die einzelnen Staaten durch ihre Beschaffenheit gezwungen sind, mit einander 
in Verkehr zu treten, in eine Gemeinschaft und zwar in eine Rechtsgemeinschaft. Denn Gemeinschaft 
ist überall da vorhanden, wo es Verkehr gibt.... Keine Nation darf es wagen, den hochmütigen 
Hegel’schen Gedanken sich anzueignen, dass in ihr allein der Weltgeist seinen Thron aufgeschlagen 
habe[.]“  This rejection of Hegelian thinking seems inspired by Kantian transcendentalism. In this sense: 
J. Kersten, Georg Jellinek (supra n.86), 423; yet see also his critical evaluation (ibid., 434): „Es ist also 
weniger das kantische Sittengesetz, das Jellinek für den Staatswillen rezipieren will, als vielmehr der 
Autonomiegedanke eines auf sich selbst normativ reflektierenden Willens, wie ihn Kant in der 
Auflösung der dritten Autonomie in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft entwickelt.“ 
100 Within the constitutional law scholarship at the time, this in particular means that the “Gesetz” 
replaces “custom” as the dominant legal source (J. Schröder, Zur Geschichte der juristischen 
Methodenlehre zwischen 1850 und 1933, (2008) 13 Rechtsgeschichte 160 at 164): “Für die historische 
Rechtsschule war das Gesetz ein Organ des Volksgeistes, d.h. es brachte nicht selbst wirkliches Recht 
hervor, sondern gab nur der vernünftigen Volksüberzeugung eine Form. Mit dem vordringenden 
Voluntarismus im späten 19. Jahrhundert verliert sich diese Vorstellung. Das Gesetz wird zur bloßen 
Willensäußerung des Gesetzgebers. Es ist nun “Wille des Staats”[.]”). For customary law this, in 
particular, means that its source is no longer seen in the common legal “consciousness” of the people, 
but following the “Gestattungstheorie”, the State must consent to all customary law to be valid (ibid., 
166).    
101 G. Jellinek, Die Lehre on den Staatenverbindungen (supra n.99), 95-96: “[Das Völkerrecht] umfasst all 
miteinander in Gemeinschaft stehenden Staaten. (...) Die in der Natur gegründete und durch das 
Völkerrecht zur Rechtsgemeinschaft erhobene Staatengemeinschaft ist die erste und umfasste Form 
einer Staatenverbindung. Sie ist die dauerndste Form der Staatenverbindung, denn sie ist unauflöslich, 
sie hat Bestand, so lange es eine Vielheit von Staaten gibt, also für immer.“ 
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b. From Monism to Dualism: Triepel and the Future “Twentieth Century” Doctrine 
 
Jellinek’s attempt to discover the nature of international law from a “positivist and 
“monist” conception of law had forced him to have recourse to the idea of self-
limitation. But following this logic to its end, there simply cannot be an “objective” 
international law because even where two state wills meet through an international 
treaty, in the final analysis, only two “subjective” understandings of that treaty exist. 
This is a philosophical paradox inherent in all “individualist” (or solipsistic) accounts 
of law; and in order to tackle that problem, a second attempt was soon made to explain 
the “objective” nature of international treaties. This second attempt was made by 
Heinrich Triepel, whose monographic study on the relationship between 
“International Law and Domestic Law” (1899) would become a revered starting point 
for much twentieth-century international law scholarship.102 
Triepel thereby completely shares the premises of state positivism: only state wills can 
be source(s) of law.103 But in opposition to Jellinek, the normativity of international 
law is no longer found in a single state’s will – let alone the ability of that will to bind 
itself.104 Self-binding is relegated to the realm of morality, because, in a true Kantian 
spirit, the idea of a legally self-binding will is considered logically impossible (as a legal 
norm is, by definition, always above an individual will).105 With regard to international 
law two corollaries follow. First, only a “common will” can become a source of 
international law; and not all “treaties” can create such a common will but only – some 
– law-making international conventions.106 This common will is “superior” to and yet 
also a part of the sovereign state will:  
 
102 H. Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Hirschfeld, 1899). 
103 For his critique of the Historical School, see ibid., 30-31 (with reference to Bergbohm). 
104 Ibid., 31: „Nun ist es aber sofort einleuchtend, dass dieser Wille, der für eine Mehrheit von Staaten 
verbindlich sein soll, nicht einem Staate allein angehören kann.“  
105 Ibid., 77-79. 
106 One of the idiosyncratic distinctions that Triepel here makes is between (bilateral) “treaties” and 
(multilateral) “conventions”; for according to him, only the latter generate a “common will”, whereas 
bilateral treaties cannot create a common will because they are formed by complementary yet “different” 
wills (ibid.46). And quoting Bergbohm, Triepel concludes that bilateral treaties can therefore never 
create objective international law but will always remain dependent on the subjective and individual wills 
of the state parties (ibid., 47). “Conventions”, by contrast, are expressions of a common will in which 
states “will” the same object; and as such, they can create “objective” international law, see ibid., 70: 
“Der Vertrag ist unfähig, Rechtsätze zu erzeugen, weil er seiner Natur nach nicht im Stande ist, einen 
Gemeinwillen hervorzubringen. Was aber der Vertrag nimmer vermag, das vermag die Vereinbarung. 
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“I find the reason for the binding force of international law to lie in the existence of 
a common will, the content of which appears to the state as the norm of its behaviour 
towards other states, and which is simultaneously a foreign will but also its own will, 
so that nothing is imposed on it that it has not imposed on itself. (...) But one thing 
emerges from all this with compelling necessity: such a common will cannot possibly 
arise, under international law, from a majority decision. (...) Since international law can 
only arise from an agreement and since an agreement in which all existing states 
participated cannot be shown to exist, there thus cannot be a generally valid 
international law that universally dominates all states. (...) If one may say so, there 
exists only particular international law, only norms that apply to two, three, many, but 
never to all states.”107  
 
All international law is here reduced to “particular” treaties; yet this treaty law – if 
based on a common consent – is seen as “objectively” binding, since states cannot 
unilaterally decide to breach or withdraw from a common convention. Only the 
common consent of all parties can dissolve states from their previous contractual 
obligations.108 The “common” consent thus “cements” individual states together; and 
it alone constitutes the normative foundation of international law. 109 This voluntarist 
origin is a necessary and sufficient condition for international law because – unlike 
Kant – law and external force are not correlative concepts.110 The ability to enforce a 
norm is thus not an essential but merely an accidental characteristic of a legal norm; 
and from here, Triepel draws a second momentous conclusion. For unlike Austin’s 
command theory of law – to be discussed in the next chapter,111 Triepel’s positivism 
accepts a law without a common sovereign. However, in order to cater for a definition 
of domestic law that is based on a command theory with regard to individuals, Triepel 
must “divide” the legal world into two spheres so as to allow for a concept of 
international law that does not have such a sovereign commander:  
“International law and national law are not only different parts of the law; they are 
different legal systems. They are two circles that at most touch but never intersect. 
From our point of view, it is a complete contradiction to let international law be at 
the same time national law or vice versa. (...) If a state encounters, in international law, 
a will different from its own, albeit one which it helped to build, then this source is 
 
Die Staaten können objektives Recht schaffen, wenn sie eine Regel vereinbaren, nach der sich ihr 
künftiges Verhalten dauern bestimmen soll.“  
107 Ibid., 82-84. 
108 Ibid., 88-89. 
109 Triepel consequently rejects the idea that “custom” can be an independent source of international 
law (ibid., 98).  
110 Ibid., 107: „Kant’s bekannter Satz: „Recht und Befugnis zu zwingen bedeuten einerlei“ ist, wenn er 
wörtlich verstanden sein will, falsch. Gerade das Gegenteil ist wahr.“ 
111 For an explicit discussion of Austin’s theory, see ibid., 135-136. 
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fundamentally different from the one from which national law flows, namely a law set 
by it alone for all that it thinks it controls.“112  
 
The normativity of international law and the normativity of national law are thus 
posited to be radically different: the sphere of international law is the sphere of 
“coordination” of independent state wills; the sphere of national law is the sphere of 
“subordination” under a unilateral – sovereign – will.113 And this legal “dualism” allows 
Triepel to speak of international “law” as much as national “law” – even though both 
systems of law do not share the same the same characteristics!  
This abandonment of a monistic philosophy that had been part of both the natural 
lawyers and the Historical School (and that had indeed still informed Hegel’s and 
Jellinek’s thinking), has important consequences. First, it categorically rejects the idea 
that individuals are – like states – subjects of international law; and this, in particular, 
means that there cannot be a “private” international law.114 Secondly, while not denying 
that there exists a relationship between the two legal orders, the dualist answer 
principally disconnects national and international law.115 Living in different spheres, 
normative conflicts are no longer possible and breaches of international law become 
– legally and morally – “immunised” from within national law. International law is 





The nineteenth century is the century during which the “professionalisation” of 
international law begins its victorious course. By the end of that century, discussions 
about the nature of international law almost exclusively belong to “professional” 
 
112 Ibid., 111and 133. 
113 At some point Triepel seems to be suggesting that the two spheres also have a distint material content 
(ibid., 19): „Völkerrecht und Landesrecht müssen, wenn sie verschiedenen Quellen entstammen, 
verschiedenen Inhalt haben“; yet at a later stage this is relativised, (ibid., 111): dualism „bedeutet nicht 
ohne Weiteres, dass jeder Satz völkerrechtlicher Herkunft allein schon um seiner Provenienz willen 
ungeeignet sei, Inhalt eines landesrechtlichen Satzes, etwa eines Gesetzes zu werden“.  
114 Ibid., 24. 
115 Ibid., especially 256-259. 
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jurists. This move from “philosophers” to “lawyers” did however not immediately 
trigger a move from metaphysical “constructivism” to positive “empiricism”. Indeed, 
for the better part of the German nineteenth century, a metaphysical approach to 
international law did prevail. True, the older ideas of natural law had lost all academic 
credentials and the attempt to “re-theologise” international law through the Holy 
Alliance had failed early on. But with the rise of the Historical School, a different 
“communitarian” and “spiritual” metaphysics came to dominant the academic scene.  
For the Historical School, the key source behind all law is the legal “consciousness” 
that a “society” generates. Wherever a society exists, there also exists law. This 
however means – as we saw in Chapter 2 – that there can be a “positive” international 
law as long as it is rooted in the common morality among states.116 The lack of a 
sovereign or an “institutional” machinery to enforce international law is not seen as a 
fatal problem. All that matters is that there is a society;117 and affirming the “reality” of 
moral similarities among “civilised” states, the moral bonds within a “European” 
society are seen as strong enough to make international law “like” national law. One 
important consequence of this “societal” conception of international law is that it can 
expressly acknowledge a “private” law side. International law thus applies to 
individuals when they came into contact with foreign legal orders; and this conception 
of private international law, as a legitimate sister of public international law, becomes 
and remains dominant in Europe until 1914.118  
The gradual decline of this way of “organic” and “societal” thinking starts around after 
1870; and two famous proponents of the new positivism were discussed in Section 3. 
Georg Jellinek should, despite some passages to the contrary, be ranked among the 
state positivists that begin to reshape German legal thinking after the foundation of 
the German Empire. His conception of international law is firmly rooted in the idea 
 
116 F. von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht (supra n.49), 9: „Das Völkerrecht beruht auf der übereinstimmenden 
Rechtsüberzeugung der Kulturstaaten, soweit sich diese zur Erklärung des gemeinsamen Rechtswillens 
verdichtet hat. Diese Erklärung äußert sich zum weitaus größeren Teile als Rechtsübung, zum kleineren 
als ausdrückliche Rechtssatzung.“)  
117 C. Kaltenborn von Stachau, Kritik des Völkerrechts (supra n.25), 310: „Auch ist die Erzwingbarkeit 
nicht der einzige Charakter des Rechts, auch nicht sein wesentlichster. Dieser besteht vielmehr darin, 
dass es Norm und Ordnung für alle menschlichen Gemeinverhältnisse in allen Sphären und 
Dimensionen des privaten und des öffentlichen Lebens, mithin auch des sozialen Verhältnisses der 
Völker und Staaten untereinander, also Völker-Recht. – Der Zwang geht nun aber von der 
Gemeinschaft als solcher aus. Dies ist die Ordnung, die aufrecht erhalten werden soll. Das Rechtsleben 
ist das Gemeinleben.“ 
118 See footnote 65 above; and see also T. Niemeyer, “Internationales Privaterecht” in „Deutschland 
unter Kaider Wilhelm II – Erster Band“ (Hobbing, 1914), 346. 
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of state sovereignty; and that idea leads him to view all law as an emanation of a defined 
state will. For international law, this means, in particular, that its main source cannot 
be (unconscious) custom but its normativity must lie in conscious expressions of state 
wills, that is: international treaties. How can he justify the binding nature of a treaty 
under the premise of state sovereignty? For Jellinek, just as for Hegel before him, the 
binding nature of international law stems from each state itself; yet this is ultimately 
not enough, and Jellinek thus tries to revert to Kantian transcendentalism to ground 
the normativity of international law.  
A more successful “state positivist” construction of international law emerges a few 
decades later. Writing at the dawn of the twentieth century, Heinrich Triepel is the true 
founding father of the continental “positivists” of that future century. His dualistic 
theory insists that the foundations of international and national law are fundamentally 
different. This separation thesis radically rejects the (monistic) view of the unity of all 
law – a view that had been part of both the natural law philosophers as well as the 
Historical School. This dualist perspective soon spread from Germany to Italy,119 and 
from there to other parts of the world. Importantly however: for Triepel international 
“conventions” – based on a common will – are “objectively” binding; and they 
therefore cannot be renounced or broken by an individual state claiming a change of 
circumstances or simply a changed will. Yet even this last normative limit will 
subsequently be abandoned by E. Kaufmann. Writing in 1911,120 Kaufmann’s study 
on the “rebus sic stantibus” clause (probably inspired by the 1908 Annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire),121 thus criticises Triepel 
for having severely misunderstood the normative nature of international treaties.122  
 
119 For Italy, see especially: D. Anzilotti, Il Diritto Internatzionale nei Giudizi Interni (Zanichelli, 1905), 
esp.41: „Di qui un duplice criterio di distinzione e di contrapposizione fra il diritto internazionale ed il 
diritto interno. Anzitutto per la diversa volontà che li pone in essere: il diritto internazionale emana della 
volontà collettiva di più stati, mentre le norme giuridiche interne sono sempre l’emanazione della 
volontà di uno stato…  In secondo luogo per la diversa specie die rapporti regolati: le norme giuridiche 
internazionali regolano i rapporto di enti coordinato ed autonomi, uniti in una comunità priva di 
organizzazione giuridica, e perciò prescindono affatto dall’esistenza di ogni potere sopra di essi, mentre 
le norme giuridiche interne regolano rapporto che si svolgono nel seno do società giuridicamente 
organizzate, e perciò  contengono implicita un’idea di preminenza e di subordinazione, un imperium della 
collettività sopra i consociati.” For a discussion of Anzilotti, see also: A. P. Sereni, The Italian Conception 
of International Law (supra n.56), 214-5 as well as 225: “Through Donati and Anzilotto the Italian school 
accepted and developed the dualist theory expounded by Triepel in his fundamrntal work, Völkerrecht 
und Landesrecht (1899). International order and national orders are absolutely separate.” 
120 E. Kaufmann, Das Wesen des Völkerrechts und die Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus (Mohr, 1911). 
121 Ibid., 31-38. 
122 Ibid., 161. 
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The nature of international treaties is henceforth rooted in and subject to the absolute 
priority of each and every state will.123 Each state stays permanently “above its 
treaties”;124 and the binding nature of international treaties must thus always find a limit 
in the sovereign interest of each state.125 This “Neo-Hegelianism” here comes to deny 
the objective normativity of all international law.  
 
 
123 Ibid., 179 (with express reference to Hegel).  
124 Ibid., 181. 
125 Ibid., 204: “Alle Staatsverträge haben als Verträge des Koordinationsrechts eine immanente Grenze: 
sie sollen und wollen nur binden, solange die Macht- und Interessenlage, die zur Zeit des Abschlusses 
bestand, sich nicht so ändert, daß wesentliche Bestimmungen des Vertrages mit dem 
Selbsterhaltungsrecht der kontrahierenden Staaten unvereinbar werden.“ And, ibid., 220: “Es muß also 











The “British” Nineteenth Century I  




For many British onlookers, the French Revolution had proven the danger of abstract 
rationalism turning into revolutionary terror. And the subsequent philosophical 
“reaction” would, just as on the European continent, take one of two – opposite – 
directions. A conservative reaction here insisted on the need to “restore” the ancient 
order; and the best representative of this “British” restoration is Edmund Burke whose 
reflections on the French revolution reached an enormous audience within and 
without Great Britain.1 Steeped in an early “historicist” natural law thinking,2 Burke 
countered the abstract rationalism of the French Jacobins with a “dynastic” conception 
of the “order things” that even advocated a counterrevolutionary intervention into 
France.3 The fiercest attack on abstract rationalism, whether or not in French colours, 
however did not come from the “conservative” camp. It came from a group of self-
styled “reformers”: the utilitarian philosophers. Their criticism was directed at all 
forms of “natural law” thinking, which they reproached for its social conservatism and 
speculative metaphysics.  
The founder of this second – reformist – current is Jeremy Bentham. His “critical” 
project had originally begun as a challenge to the standard “natural law” account within 
British jurisprudence: Blackstone’s “Commentaries on the Laws of England”. 
Published in the later part of the eighteenth century, and saturated with references to 
Grotius and Pufendorf, the “Commentaries” famously held that all law emanated from 
the “law of nature” and that it was the legislator’s and the judges’ sole task to 
“discover”, by means of “reason”, what the law demanded in each particular 
circumstance.4 The first attack on such metaphysical thinking was launched in 
 
1 E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Penguin, 1968). 
2 On Burke’s conception of natural law generally see P. Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law 
(University of Michigan Press, 1958).  With regard to international law, one of the best descriptions of 
his values and believes has come from J. Davidson, Natural Law and International Law in Edmund 
Burke, (1959) 21 The Review of Politics 483 491: “He believed that such a community actually existed 
among the nations of Europe, made effective by a similarity in religion, social structure, customs, and 
intellectual outlook.” And ibid., 493: The European commonwealth from which he derived the laws 
governing the behavior of its constituent nations was for Burke a historical fact rather than a theory. 
The thread of law in Burke always leads back to the society out of which it is spun.” 
3 J. Welsh, Edmund Burke and International Relations (St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 115. 
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England – Volume I (Clarendon Press, 1765), 39-41. 
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Bentham’s “A Fragment on Government” (1776).5 Designed as a critical companion 
to Blackstone’s “Commentaries”, this (very) uncharitable “book review” already 
contains the heart of Bentham’s radical critique: the “naturalistic” failure to distinguish 
between “is” and “ought”. Blackstone was charged with having committed the 
conservative fallacy that “every thing is as it should be”;6 and yet, as Section 1 wishes 
to show, the Benthamite attack was not confined to the conservative natural law vision. 
His empiricist utilitarianism equally charged the French revolutionary rationalists for 
relying on natural law as “non-sense on stilts”.  
The impact of Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy on nineteenth-century Britain is hard 
to exaggerate; and it has even been claimed that “[a]lmost all jurisprudential territory 
traversed during the nineteenth century bore the stamp of Bentham”.7 This view is, as 
the next chapter will subsequently show, not correct as regards international law. 
Indeed, there is little, if anything, that Bentham here imprinted. This enormous gap 
within the utilitarian project would partly be narrowed by the second generation of 
utilitarian thinkers: James Mill and John Austin. Their “positivist” definition of what 
the “law” is, discussed in Section 2 here, famously cast a doubt over the very nature of 
international law – culminating in the outright denial of international law as law proper. 
But, again, apart from this “analytical” critique of international law, the theoretical 
contribution of utilitarianism to discussions about the normative foundations of 
international law also remained minimal. The only – dubious – British contribution 
would here be offered by a third-generation utilitarian: John Stuart Mill. Mill’s 
“civilisational” liberalism finally gave the utilitarian project a distinctly “imperialist” 
dimension that will be analysed in Section 3.  
 
 
5 J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in: “The Works of Jeremy Bentham” – Volume 1 (editor: J. 
Bowring; Tait, 1838-1843), 221. The work’s subtitle is “An examination of what is delivered, on the 
subject of government in general in the introduction to Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries”.  It is 
a “fragment” that was originally part of a broader project entitled “A Comment on the Commentaries”. 
The entire manuscript reads like a terrible – and personal – book review. 
6 For this point, see: P. Schofield, Jeremy Bentham’s ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’, (2003) 15 Utilitas 1 at 3. 
7 C. Sylvest, International Law in Nineteenth-Century Britain, (2005) 75 British Yearbook of 
International Law 12. But see: P. Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 70: “Bentham’s influence on the substantive law was more dramatic than his influence on 
legal theory, partly because there was very little writing which could properly be called legal theory.” ; 
as well as D. Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed: A Study in Bentham's Philosophy of Utility and Law (Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 7: “[Bentham] was always more concerned to apply his utilitarianism than to 




1. Bentham’s “Utilitarianism” and the Nature of International Law  
 
All legal and moral considerations must, according to Bentham, begin with the 
fundamental distinction between what the law “is” and what the law “ought to be”.8 
The historical and empirical existence of law has to be categorically distinguished from 
its normative and ethical value; and even the latter must not be measured against 
“traditional” conceptions of the public good; instead, all normative value must 
ultimately derive from the “rationalist” principle of utility. The manifesto for this 
“positivist” revolution is published in 1789 – the year of the French Revolution – and 
is entitled “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”.9 Within it, 
Bentham espouses a positivist philosophy in a dual sense: for not only is “law” itself 
regarded in a positivistic manner; morality and ethics are themselves “positively” 
founded on the basis of the principle of utility! In order to better explain this dual 
positivism let us look at it in some detail first (a), before a second section explores its 
potential for into international law (b). 
 
 
a. Bentham’s Dual Positivism: Positive Morality, Positive Law 
 
Conceptions of morality and ethics will generally have a metaphysical foundation that 
may itself be rooted in religion. But rejecting all traditional (metaphysical) definitions 
of community and happiness, Bentham advances an “empirical” counter-definition: 
“Ethics at large may be defined, the art of directing men’s actions to the production 
of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in 
 
8 Bentham, A Fragment on Government (supra n.5), 229: “To the province of the Expositor it belongs to 
explain to us what, as he supposes, the Law is: to that of the Censor, to observe to us what he thinks it 
ought to be. The former, therefore, is principally occupied in stating, or in inquiring after facts: the 
latter, in discussing reasons.” 
9 The book had however been privately printed in 1780; and a revised version was finally published in 
1823. 
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view.”10 Ethics is here given a new “positive” foundation: the principle of utility. The 
principle, also known as the “greatest happiness principle”, postulates that the sole 
ethical standard behind all public (and private) acts should always be “the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number”.11 Denouncing the existence of “natural” 
communities – there are only natural persons – as metaphysical fictions,12 the only 
ethical standard is that of private individuals. This individualistic “hedonism” – for that 
is what it is – reduces the “public good” to the collection of individual wills. These 
“private” wills can be scientifically measured and subsequently aggregated;13 and the 
“art” or “science” of legislation consists in codifying the aggregate result.14 Good law 
must thus always and regularly be “codified”, because regular codification “actualises” 
the preferences of its subjects and reforms whatever “customary” law has been 
inherited from the past.    
Should the author of these – radical – ideas not warmly welcome the French 
Revolution? Whilst the “rationalist” potential of the principle of utility was not lost on 
 
10 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in: “The Works of Jeremy Bentham 
– Volume 1” (editor: J. Bowring; Tait, 1838-1843), 84 at 143: “It may here be asked, how it is that upon 
the principle of private ethics, legislation and religion out of the question, a man’s happiness depends 
upon such parts of his conduct as affect, immediately at least, the happiness of no one but himself: this 
is as much as to ask, What motives (independent of such as legislation and religion may chance to 
furnish) can one man have to consult the happiness of another? by what motives, or (which comes to 
the same thing) by what obligations, can he be bound to obey the dictates of probity and beneficence? 
In answer to this, it cannot but be admitted, that the only interests which a man at all times and upon 
all occasions is sure to find adequate motives for consulting, are his own. Notwithstanding this, there 
are no occasions in which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness of other men. In 
the first place, he has, on all occasions, the purely social motive of sympathy or benevolence: in the next 
place, he has, on most occasions, the semisocial motives of love of amity and love of reputation. The 
motive of sympathy will act upon him with more or less effect, according to the bias of his sensibility: 
the two other motives, according to a variety of circumstances, principally according to the strength of 
his intellectual powers, the firmness and steadiness of his mind, the quantum of his moral sensibility, 
and the characters of the people he has to deal with.” 
11 For an excellent study of the origins of this phrase within Bentham’s writings, see: R. Shackleton, 
‘The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: The History of Bentham’s Phrase’, (1972) 90 Studies 
on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 1461. For an extensive definition within Bentham’s “Principles 
of Morals and Legislation”, see supra n.10, 1: “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which 
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have 
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same 
thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and 
therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.” 
12 Ibid., 2. “The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered 
as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the 
interests of the several members who compose it.” 
13 Ibid., especially Chapters IV-V. 
14 Ibid., especially Chapter XIX, IV. 
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the French revolutionaries,15 Bentham himself famously disagreed with the justification 
behind French revolutionary rationalism. In his “Anarchical Fallacies” (1795), a fierce 
attack is thus launched.16 Using the weapons of analytic philosophy,17 Bentham 
vehemently criticised the natural law conception behind human rights. A good 
example of Bentham’s formal style and substantive criticism can be found in his 
discussion of Article II of the (proposed) French Revolutionary Constitution. Stating 
that “[t]he aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of man”, Bentham holds:  
“More confusion—more nonsense,—and the nonsense, as usual, dangerous 
nonsense. The words can scarcely be said to have a meaning: but if they have, or rather 
if they had a meaning, these would be the propositions either asserted or implied:— 
1. That there are such things as rights anterior to the establishment of governments: 
for natural, as applied to rights, if it mean anything, is meant to stand in opposition 
to legal—to such rights as are acknowledged to owe their existence to government, 
and are consequently posterior in their date to the establishment of government. 2. 
That these rights can not be abrogated by government: for can not is implied in the 
form of the word imprescriptible, and the sense it wears when so applied, is the cut-
throat sense above explained. (…) How stands the truth of things? That there are no 
such things as natural rights—no such things as rights anterior to the establishment 
of government—no such things as natural rights opposed to, in contradistinction to, 
legal: that the expression is merely figurative; that when used, in the moment you 
attempt to give it a literal meaning it leads to error, and to that sort of error that leads 
to mischief—to the extremity of mischief. (…) That which has no existence cannot 
be destroyed—that which cannot be destroyed cannot require anything to preserve it 
from destruction. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, 
rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.”18  
 
15 The French revolutionaries indeed thought that Bentham shared their views and made him, on the 
basis of his “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, an honorary citizen! 
16 J. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in: “The Works of Jeremy Bentham – Volume 2” (editor: J. Bowring; 
Tait, 1838-1843), 489. David Armitage has pointed to an even earlier pamphlet against the American 
Declaration of Independence, see: Bentham’s “Short Review of the Declaration” to be found in: D. 
Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Harvard University Press, 2007), 173.  
17 J. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies (supra n.16), 497: “The logic of it is of a piece with its morality:—a 
perpetual vein of nonsense, flowing from a perpetual abuse of words,—words having a variety of 
meanings, where words with single meanings were equally at hand—the same words used in a variety 
of meanings in the same page,—words used in meanings not their own, where proper words were 
equally at hand,—words and propositions of the most unbounded signification, turned loose without 
any of those exceptions or modifications which are so necessary on every occasion to reduce their 
import within the compass, not only of right reason, but even of the design in hand, of whatever nature 
it may be;—the same inaccuracy, the same inattention in the penning of this cluster of truths on which 
the fate of nations was to hang, as if it had been an oriental tale, or an allegory for a magazine:—stale 
epigrams, instead of necessary distinctions,—figurative expressions preferred to simple ones,—
sentimental conceits, as trite as they are unmeaning, preferred to apt and precise expressions,—frippery 
ornament preferred to the majestic simplicity of good sound sense,—and the acts of the senate loaded 
and disfigured by the tinsel of the playhouse.” 
18 Ibid., 500. 
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The idea of natural law in general, and natural rights, in particular is denounced as 
“execrable trash”.19 There cannot be “rights” outside “civil society” and civil law. 
“Right, the substantive right, is the child of law: from real laws come real rights; but 
from imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets, rhetoricians, 
and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons, come imaginary rights”.20 The language of 
imaginary right is said to even have real – anarchical –consequences: 
“The revolution, which threw the government into the hands of the penners and 
adopters of this declaration, having been the effect of insurrection, the grand object 
evidently is to justify the cause. But by justifying it, they invite it: in justifying past 
insurrection, they plant and cultivate a propensity to perpetual insurrection in time 
future; they sow the seeds of anarchy broad-cast: in justifying the demolition of 
existing authorities, they undermine all future ones, their own consequently in the 
number. (…) For such is the difference—the great and perpetual difference, betwixt 
the good subject, the rational censor of the laws, and the anarchist—between the 
moderate man and the man of violence. The rational censor, acknowledging the 
existence of the law he disapproves, proposes the repeal of it: the anarchist, setting up 
his will and fancy for a law before which all mankind are called upon to bow down at 
the first word—the anarchist, trampling on truth and decency, denies the validity of 
the law in question,—denies the existence of it in the character of a law, and calls upon 
all mankind to rise up in a mass, and resist the execution of it.”21 
 
These negative consequences would get worse and worse. Merely “prejudicial to the 
growth of knowledge” at first, the French Revolution had offered a “practical 
comment” on the language of natural rights, and the very use of the idea of natural law 
was therefore “already a moral crime” that is “hostile to the public peace”.22 The great 
“reformer” Bentham thus arrives, somewhat ironically, at the very same conclusion as 
the great British conservative: Edmund Burke! However: what does Bentham’s radical 
rejection of natural law thinking mean for his conception of the “law of nations”? Let 






19 Ibid. See also the uncharitable attack on Article I and especially the idea that social distinctions should 
be based on “common utility” – something potentially close to Bentham.  
20 Ibid., 523. 
21 Ibid., 496 and 498. 
22 Ibid., 524. 
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b. Utilitarianism and Bentham’s “International Law” 
 
If the idea of a “right” or “law” is a “positive” phenomenon that can only exist in “civil 
society”, what does this mean for the Benthamite conception of a law of nations? If 
all law must be civil law, can there be a law above States? Surprisingly, Bentham thinks 
there can be; and insisting on a new term that aims to divorce the “universalist” natural 
law undertones associated with the term “law of nations”,23 he calls this part of his 
jurisprudential analysis “international” law or international jurisprudence. This 
international jurisprudence is distinguished from “universal” jurisprudence;24 and it is 
equally distinguished from “internal” jurisprudence.25 What, then, is international 
jurisprudence? Unlike Blackstone’s broader definition, Bentham gives it a restrictive 
state-centred scope that excludes all private individuals, including the sovereign acting 
in a private capacity: 
“Now as to any transactions which may take place between individuals who are 
subjects of different states, these are regulated by the internal laws, and decided upon 
by the internal tribunals, of the one or the other of those states: the case is the same 
where the sovereign of the one has any immediate transactions with a private member 
of the other: the sovereign reducing himself, pro re natâ, to the condition of a private 
person, as often as he submits his cause to either tribunal; whether by claiming a 
benefit, or defending himself against a burthen. There remain then the mutual 
transactions between sovereigns, as such, for the subject of that branch of 
jurisprudence which may be properly and exclusively termed international.”26  
 
 
23 The famous footnote in the “Principles of Morals and Legislation” reads (supra n.10, 149) : “The 
word international, it must be acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and 
intelligible. It is calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law which goes commonly 
under the name of the law of nations: an appellation so uncharacteristic, that, were it not for the force of 
custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence. The chancellor D'Aguesseau has already 
made, I find, a similar remark: he says that what is commonly called droit des gens, ought rather to be 
termed droit entre les gens.” 
24 Bentham calls “universal jurisprudence” those legal matters that apply to all nations; and – what is 
often overlooked – he believes that there indeed exist matters that fall within this sphere (ibid. 149): 
“That the laws of all nations, or even of any two nations, should coincide in all points, would be as 
ineligible as it is impossible: some leading points, however, there seem to be, in respect of which the 
laws of all civilized nations might, without inconvenience, be the same. To mark out some of these 
points will, as far as it goes, be the business of the body of this work.” For an analysis of this Benthamite 
“jurisprudential cosmopolitanism”, see: D. Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013), 176-7. 
25 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (supras n.10), 149.  
26 Ibid. 
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Importantly, and unlike later doubts,27 international law, as the law between sovereign 
states, is affirmatively seen as “existing” in a treatment of the positive law (expository 
jurisprudence) as well as in the form of future principles of legislation (censorial 
jurisprudence).28 And Bentham himself would try his hand at being an – 
unauthoritative – “legislator of the world”.29 His “Principles of International Law” 
(1789),30 published only after his death, indeed offer a fascinating – if often 
disappointing – insight into Bentham’s thinking. What are the principles that – should 
– govern international law? The object of international law must, in line with 
Bentham’s utilitarian positivism, be the “common and equal utility of all nations”.31 
But what is it; how can it be calculated; and in what way does it differ from the 
“national” utility found within states? The complex answer he gives us deserves to be 
quoted in full:  
“The end of the conduct which a sovereign ought to observe relative to his own 
subjects,---the end of the internal laws of a society,---ought to be the greatest 
happiness of the society concerned. (…) The end of the conduct he ought to observe 
towards other men, what ought it to be, judging by the same principle? Shall it again 
be said, the greatest happiness of his own subjects? Upon this footing, the welfare, the 
demands of other men, will be as nothing in his eyes: with regard to them, he will have 
no other object than that of subjecting them to his wishes by all manner of means. He 
will serve them as he actually serves the beasts, which are used by him as they use the 
herbs on which they browse---in short, as the ancient Greeks, as the Romans, as all 
the models of virtue in antiquity, as all the nations with whose history we are 
acquainted, employed them. Yet in proceeding in this career, he cannot fail always to 
experience a certain resistance---resistance similar in its nature and in its cause, if not 
always in its certainty and efficacy, to that which individuals ought from the first to 
experience in a more restricted career; so that, from reiterated experience, states ought 
either to have set themselves to seek out---or at least would have found, their line of 
least resistance, as individuals of that same society have already found theirs; and this 
will be the line which represents the greatest and common utility of all nations taken 
 
27 On Bentham’s subsequent doubts as to the quality of international jurisprudence as “law” properly 
speaking, see: H.B. Jacobini, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law”, (1984) 78 
American Journal of International Law 405 at 417. 
28 In a footnote in Bentham’s “Principles” we read (supra n.10, 150): “Of what stamp are the works of 
Grotius, Puffendorf [sic], and Burlamaqui? Are they political or ethical, historical or juridical, expository 
or censorial? Sometimes one thing, sometimes another: they seem hardly to have settled the matter with 
themselves. A defect this to which all books must almost unavoidably be liable, which take for their 
subject the pretended law of nature; an obscure phantom, which, in the imaginations of those who go 
in chase of it, points sometimes to manners, sometimes to laws; sometimes to what law is, sometimes 
to what it ought to be.” 
29 P. Schofield, Jeremy Bentham: Legislator of the World, (1998) 51 Current Legal Problems 115. 
30 J. Bentham, Principles of International Law, in: “The Works of Jeremy Bentham2 – Volume 2 (editor: J. 
Bowring; Tait, 1838-1843), 535. The “Principles” consist of four separate essays, namely: (1) “Objects 
of International Law”, (2) “Of Subjects, or of the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Law”, (3) 
“Of War, considered in respect of its Causes and Consequences”, and (4) “A Plan for an Universal and 
Perpetual Peace“. Especially the last essay is often seen through a “utopian” lens.  
31 Ibid., 536. 
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together. The point of repose will be that in which all the forces find their equilibrium, 
from which the greatest difficulty would be found in making them to depart.”32 
 
The passage suggests a number of explicit and implicit assumptions that need 
unpacking before further analyzing the author’s explanation. First, an “imperial” utility 
according, to which the greatest utility is achieved in the interest of one single nation, 
is straightforwardly rejected.33 However, secondly, the idea of a “cosmopolitan” utility 
is equally rejected. For instead of taking individual utility as the basic ingredient for the 
calculation of utility in a “cosmopolitan” State, international utility is calculated on the 
basis of the common utility of nations – as individual collectivities.34 The principle of 
utility does, consequently, not apply to humanity as such; it only applies to nations. 
(This intellectual inconstancy ultimately prevents utilitarianism from realizing the 
“cosmopolitan” potential that is inherent in its moral individualism;35 and Bentham’s 
utilitarianism has therefore – rightly –  been accused of being “parochial”.36) Thirdly, 
 
32 Ibid., 537-538. 
33 In his fourth essay, Bentham actively councils Britain and France to “[g]ive up all the colonies” and 
to “[f]ound no new colonies” (ibid., 548). On Bentham as a critic of empire, see: J. Pitts, A Turn of 
Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University Press, 2005), Chapter 4: 
“Jeremy Bentham: Legislator of the World?”. 
34 Bentham himself seems to have realised that the assumption of a “nation” as a moral “person” 
contradicted his own – negative – views on legal fictions and in particular his “positivist” view that the 
idea of a moral “community” was but a fiction; and so he now leaves this point open (ibid., 539: “Will 
it [a nation] be said that it has its person? Let us guard against the employment of figures in matter of 
jurisprudence.”); and yet almost all of the essays are based on the existence of nations as autonomous 
moral persons; and, in my view, Bentham here thus fundamentally betrays his own “individualists” 
utilitarianism. For Bentham’s state-based international law, see especially: E. Nys, Notes Inédites de 
Bentham sur le droit international (1885) 1 L.Q. Rev. 225.  
35 Admittedly, Bentham mentions in his “Comment on the Commentaries” (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart 
(eds.), The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government 
(Oxford University Press, 1977), 36) that such a world state might not be impossible: “States there are 
in the world: we see it. Nay, says [Blackstone], have but a little patience and I will prove it to you: ay 
and commonwealths and nations into the bargain. His argument is that it is impossible the world should 
be all in one state. Improbable enough indeed I should suppose it but I pretend not to understand like 
him what is impossible, nor should I much want to know that one thing (if it be so) is impossible, for 
the sake of knowing that another thing is, which I see with my own eyes.”. However, the argument is 
nowhere elaborated, and indeed just seems to be one of the many contrarian positions taken just to 
contradict Blackstone. 
36 In this sense, see: D. Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed (supra n.7), 24-27, esp. 26: “And this is striking, 
for a parochial principle has potentially significant implications. The interests of a powerful nation might 
tragically conflict with the interest of mankind at large, and once committed to testing acts by the interest 
of the agent’s community could therefore find himself endorsing conduct detrimental to the welfare of 
mankind as a whole. A parochial political philosophy would have frightening possibilities in the realm 
of international relations.” For a criticism of that view, see: J.H. Burns, Happiness and Utility: Jeremy 
Bentham’s Equation, (2005) 17 Utilitas, 46 who has claimed that the reference to “the common and 
equal utility of all nations” would imply “a ‘universalism’ capable of transcending whatever 
‘parochicalism’ Bentham’s principle of utility may sometimes seem to sustain” (ibid., 52). The major 
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in the absence of an international “legislature”, there simply is no way to scientifically 
calculate and aggregate “national” utilities and the only way of “finding” the common 
utility for all nations is therefore to engage in a Kantian-style thought experiment. Each 
nation should anticipate the general good on the basis of a priori international 
principles. To quote Bentham on this last point: 
“[I]n order to regulate his proceedings with regard to other nations, a given sovereign 
has no other means more adapted to attain his own particular end, than the setting 
before his eyes the general end---the most extended welfare of all the nations on the 
earth. So that it happens that this most vast and extended end---this foreign end---will 
appear, so to speak, to govern and to carry with it the principal, the ultimate end; in 
such manner, that in order to attain to this, there is no method more sure for a 
sovereign than so to act, as if he had no other object than to attain to the other;---in 
the same manner as in its approach to the sun, a satellite has no other course to pursue 
than that which is taken by the planet which governs it.”37 
 
And having identified five utilitarianist “objects” of international law;38 Bentham finally 
concludes:   
“Expressed in the most general manner, the end that a disinterested legislator upon 
international law would propose to himself, would therefore be the greatest happiness 
of all nations taken together. In resolving this into the most primitive principles, he 
would follow the same route which he would follow with regard to internal laws. He 
would set himself to prevent positive international offences---to encourage the 
practice of positively useful actions. (…) In the same manner, he would regard as a 
negative offence every determination by which the given nation should refuse to 
render positive services to a foreign nation, when the rendering of them would 
produce more good to the last-mentioned nation, than would produce evil to itself. 
(…) The thread of analogy is now spun; It will be easy to follow it. There are, however, 
certain differences. A nation has its property---its honour--and even its condition. It 
may be attacked in all these particulars, without the individuals who compose it being 
affected. (…) Among nations, there is no punishment...”39  
 
 
problem with this objection is however that it the aggregation of national utilities is not “universalistic” 
but “international” (even in Bentham’s own terminology)!  
37 Bentham, Principles of International Law (supra n.30), 538. 
38 Ibid., “1. The first object of international law for a given nation:---Utility general, in so far as it consists 
in doing no injury to the other nations respectively, having the regard which is proper to its own well-
being. 2. Second object:---Utility general, in so far as it consists in doing the greatest good possible to 
other nations, saving the regard which is proper to its own well-being. 3. Third object:---Utility general, 
in as far as it consists in the given nation not receiving any injury from other nations respectively, saving 
the regard due to the well-being of these same nations. 4. Fourth object:---Utility general, in so far as it 
consists in such state receiving the greatest possible benefit from all other nations, saving the regard due 
to the well-being of these nations. (…) 5. Fifth object:---In case of war, make such arrangements, that 
the least possible evil may be produced, consistent with the acquisition of the good which is sought 
for.” The first objects are clearly inspired by Blackstone (supra n.4), 66: “This general law is founded 
upon this principle, that different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the good they 
can; and, in times of war, as little harm as possible[.]“), who had himself been inspired by Montesquieu. 
On Montesquieu’s conception of international law, see Chapter 1.  
39 Ibid. 
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What are we to make of all this? It is hard to distill much sense from Bentham’s 
apodictic and changing assembly of points.40 The central proposition, especially within 
the last passage, however seems to be that the principle of utility, while applicable 
analogously, would need to be adjusted to the “international” sphere on the ground 
that nations differ from individuals. But no argument or reason is given; and not much 
else can be deduced. With the exception of Bentham’s utopian “Plan for an Universal 
and Perpetual Peace”, there simply are no substantive guidelines that Bentham’s 
philosophy offers for international law. Bentham’s utilitarianism indeed, 
disappointingly, seems to settle for a purely formalist project: the future of 
international law is thus purely seen in international “codification” – a word coined by 
this tireless inventor of neologisms.41 In sum: not much consistency or thought appears 
to have been given to international law by the founding father of British utilitarianism; 
even if the subject remained of some interest until his death in 1832.  
 
 
2. From Legislative Utilitarianism to Analytic Positivism  
 
Bentham’s authority within Britain had remained marginal until the early decades of 
the nineteenth century; yet his fame dramatically rose once popularised and refracted 
in the work of the second generation of utilitarians. This second generation played “a 
crucial intermediary role in the transformation of the utilitarian tradition”;42 and with 
regard to international law and jurisprudence, it has even been claimed – by none other 
than Bentham’s own editor – that “it was almost solely in the great article by Mr. Mill 
on the “Law of Nations” in the Encyclopædia Britannica, that the public could find a 
distinct account of the utilitarian theory of International law”.43 The Mill article had 
indeed taken up a number of Benthamite themes; but more importantly still, it can be 
seen as the founding stone of what was to become British “analytical” jurisprudence. 
 
40 On Bentham changing views on international law, see: J. Pitts, Boundaries of the International (Harvard 
University Press, 2018), 144-145.  
41 Bentham, Principles of International Law (supra n.30), 540. 
42 J. Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University Press, 
2005), 104. 
43 J.H. Burton, Introduction to the study of the Works of Jeremy Bentham, in: “The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham – Volume 1” (editor: J. Bowring; Tait, 1838-1843), 1 at 75. The great irony here of course is 
that Mill’s article did not (!) use the Benthamite neologism “international law” but instead referred the 
older concept of the “law of nations”! 
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This tradition of legal positivism received, a decade later, its classic formulation in the 
work of John Austin – the first “professional” legal philosopher within the United 
Kingdom. 
 
a. James Mill and the “Empirical” Foundations of International Law 
 
James Mill plays a “transformative” role in the British utilitarian tradition. For while 
elaborating many of Bentham’s terms and ideas, the interpretation and meaning given 
to them oftentimes moves into directions unintended or unforeseen by the founder of 
utilitarianism. An excellent illustration of Mill’s “transformative” role is the 
development and refinement of Bentham’s “theory” of international law. Mill’s 
treatment of the subject will henceforth cast a serious doubt on the legal quality of that 
type of law.44 In his “Law of Nations” (1825),45 the discussion of the nature of 
international law is indeed placed into the following novel intellectual frame:  
“In the meaning of the word Law, three principal ideas are involved; that of a 
Command, that of a Sanction, and that of the Authority from which the command 
proceeds. Every law imports, that something is to be done; or to be left undone. But 
a Command is impotent, unless there is the power of enforcing it. The power of 
enforcing a command, is the power of inflicting penalties, if the command is not 
obeyed. And the applicability of the penalties constitutes the Sanction. There is more 
difficulty in conveying an exact conception of the Authority which is necessary to give 
existence to a law. It is evident, that it is not every command, enforced by penalties, 
to which we should extend such a title. A law is not confined to a single act; it embraces 
a class of acts; it is not confined to the acts of one man; it embraces those of a 
community of men. And the authority from which it emanates must be an authority 
which that community are in the habit of obeying. (…) The conditions, which we have 
thus described, may all be visibly traced, in the laws which governments lay down for 
the communities to which they belong. There we observe the command; there the 
punishment prescribed for its violation; and there the commanding authority to which 
obedience is habitually paid. Of these conditions how many can be said to belong to 
any thing included under the term Law of Nations?”46 
 
 
44 Admittedly, Bentham had himself raised some doubts about the very quality of international law as 
law (“Principles of Morals and Legislation” (supra n.10), 150: “With what degree of propriety, rules for 
the conduct of [sovereign states] can come under the appellation of laws, is a question that must rest till 
the nature of the thing called a law shall have been more particularly unfolded.”), Bentham however 
never pursued or analysed his line of thought in much depth. It therefore appears that he ultimately 
held that there was such a thing as international law (M.W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning 
of “International Law”, (1984) 78 American Journal of International Law 405 at 411-2).   
45 [J. Mill], Law of Nations: Reprinted from the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, available 
here: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-law-of-nations.  
46 [J. Mill], Law of Nations (supra n.45), 3. 
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All the defining elements of an analytical positivism – whose classic definition would 
be given by Austin a few years later – are already here; yet the answer that Mill gives 
with regard to the normative or “legal” quality of international law remain ambivalent. 
For whereas he clearly denies that nations could “command” other nations,47 a 
complex and nuanced answer is given to the question whether or not nations can be 
“sanctioned” or “punished” for violations of international law. True, the reality and 
efficacy of an ordinary penal sanction is denied;48 yet Mill still considers that 
international law is not “without force and influence”.49 And reverting to the 
intellectual tradition of Bentham’s utilitarianism, we read: 
“That the human mind is powerfully acted upon by the approbation or 
disapprobation, by the praise or blame, the contempt and hatred, or the love and 
admiration, of the rest of mankind, is a matter of fact, which, however it may be 
accounted for, is beyond the limits of dispute. Over the whole field of morality, with 
the exception of that narrow part which is protected by penal laws, it is the only power 
which binds men to good conduct, and renders man agreeable and useful to man. (…) 
When persons, who have been educated in a virtuous society, have, from their infancy, 
associated the idea of certain actions with the favourable sentiments, and with all the 
advantages which flow from the favourable sentiments of mankind; and, on the other 
hand, have associated the idea of certain other actions with the unfavourable 
sentiments, and all the disadvantages which flow from the unfavourable sentiments 
of mankind; so painful a feeling comes in time to be raised in them at the very thought 
of any such action, that they recoil from the perpetration of it, even in cases in which 
they may be perfectly secure against any unfavourable sentiments, which it might be 
calculated to inspire. It will, we apprehend, upon the most accurate investigation, be 
found, that this is the only power to which we can look for any considerable sanction 
to the laws of nations;—for almost the only species of punishment to which the 
violation of them can ever become amenable: it is the only security, therefore, which 
mankind can ever enjoy for the benefit which laws, well contrived for this purpose, 
might be calculated to yield.”50 
 
 
Two important conclusions are here drawn. First: since the human mind is “acted 
upon” by feelings of moral pleasure and pain, morality itself can provide an effective 
 
47 Ibid., 4: “It is therefore clear, that the term Command cannot be applied, at least in the ordinary sense, 
to the laws of nations.” Bentham’s conception of law was here wider than a pure command or 
imperative theory of law because it allowed for “permissive laws”, see: H.L.A. Hart, Bentham’s of Laws 
in General, (1971) 2 Cambrian Law Review 24.  
48 [J. Mill], Law of Nations (supra n.45), 4: “If it be said, that several nations may combine to give it a 
sanction in favour of the weak, we might, for a practical answer, appeal to experience. Has it been done? 
Have nations, in reality, combined, so constantly and steadily, in favour of the law of nations, as to 
create, by the certainty of punishment, an overpowering motive, to unjust powers, to abstain from its 
violation? For, as the laws against murder would have no efficacy, if the punishment prescribed were 
not applied once in fifty, or a hundred times, so the penalty against the violations of the law of nations 
can have no efficacy, if it is applied unsteadily and rarely.” 
49 Ibid., 5. 
50 Ibid., 6-7. 
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sanction vis-à-vis “illegal” human conduct. International law may therefore be “law” 
in situations where there is such a moral sanction; yet this is only possible – secondly 
– if people are “educated in a virtuous society” that has taught them to associate 
international wrongs with “so painful a feeling” that “they recoil from the perpetration 
of it”. What types of societies will be able to generate this – moral – sanction? Only 
those societies that are capable of guaranteeing “man’s dependence upon the 
sentiments of others”! International law will consequently only fully operate, as law, 
“in countries, the rulers of which are drawn from the mass of the people, in other 
words in democratical countries”,51 whereas it cannot be guaranteed in despotic 
societies.  
Mill here ingeniously connects the normativity of international law to the efficiency of 
moral sanctions, which is – in turn – dependent on the nature of the internal 
government within national societies. This “utilitarian” proposition thus converges 
with the Kantian thought that there is a connection between international law and the 
(internal) “republican” constitution of states that it is supposed to govern.52 And 
importantly: Mill’s utilitarianism – albeit conditionally – confirms the “legal” quality of 
international law. For in democratic or liberal societies, there exists an internal morality 
that guarantees a “public opinion” that will morally sanction violations of international 
law. However, unlike natural law thinking à la Blackstone, there is no “natural” link 
between the (formal) quality of international law as “law” and its moral “substance”. 
International law is not binding because it stems from a moral “ought” but because it 
“is” effective in triggering an empirical – moral – sentiment.  
 
 
b. John Austin and the Denial of International Law  
 
Mill’s relative affirmation of the legal nature of international law derived from his 
emphasis on the “sanction” aspect within his tripartite definition of “law”. This – 
 
51 Ibid., 8-9. With regard to “monarchical” or “aristocratic” societies, Mill considers that the moral 
sanction attached to violations of international law only operates to “a very low degree” (ibid).  
52 However, unlike Kant’s normative universalism, the nineteenth century will draw a dramatically 
different conclusion from this connection. For once the quality of international law, as law, is seen as 
depending on the “democratic” or “civilised” status of nations, it can only have force – as law – between 
such nations. For this point, see below. 
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fundamentally – changes into an absolute denial in the positivist revolution caused by 
another contemporary utilitarian: John Austin.53 Thoroughly inspired by Hobbes’ 
philosophical ontology, Austin’s “The Province of Jurisprudence Determined” (1832) 
henceforth focused on the “command” element within the positivist theory of law. 
For Austin, “[e]very law or rule… is a command.”;54 and since “the term superiority (like 
the terms duty and sanction) is implied by the term command”,55 the identification of 
laws with sanctions becomes side-lined.56 The simplified definition of what are legal 
rules is thus condensed to “laws emanate from superiors”;57 and where the command is 
issued by a human superior, its laws are positive laws.58  
This re-fashioning of Mill’s older definition into a pure command theory has 
significant consequences for the province of jurisprudence: 
“The science of jurisprudence (or, simply and briefly, jurisprudence) is concerned with 
positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, as considered without regard to their 
goodness or badness. Positive morality, as considered without regard to its goodness 
or badness, might be the subject of a science closely analogous to jurisprudence. I say 
'might be:' since it is only in one of its branches (namely, the law of nations or 
international law), that positive morality, as considered without regard to its goodness 
or badness, has been treated by writers in a scientific or systematic manner. (…) The 
science of ethics (or, in the language of Mr. Bentham, the science of deontology) may 
be defined in the following manner. - It affects to determine the test of positive law 
and morality, or it affects to determine the principles whereon they must be fashioned 
in order that they may merit approbation.”59  
 
With this, Austin famously comes to clinically distinguish between “positive 
jurisprudence”, “positive morality”, and “ethics”. The former two sciences deal with 
“positive” rules, that is: rules that empirically “exist”, whereas “ethics” relates to rules 
that “ought” to exist in the future. For both types of positive rules – “legal” as well as 
“moral” rules – their ethical “goodness of badness” is said to be irrelevant, as an 
 
53 The legal philosopher John Austin (1790-1859) was the holder of the first chair of jurisprudence at 
the newly founded University College London; a neighbour of Bentham and a friend of James Mills; 
and who would also later on tutor J.S. Mill.    
54 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (editor: W. Rumble; Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
21. 
55 Ibid., 30. 
56 Ibid., 118: “Every sanction properly so called is an eventual evil annexed to a command.”  
57 Ibid., 30. 
58 Importantly, however, Austin also recognizes the existence of the “laws of God” or the “Divine law“ 
(ibid., 38: “The Divine laws, or the laws of God, are laws set by God to his human creatures. As I have 
intimated already, and shall show more fully hereafter, they are laws or rules, properly so called.”). 
59 Ibid.; 112-113. 
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“ought” cannot affect an “is”.60 And with this utilitarian denial of ethical “essentialism” 
as regards the question of legality, Austin becomes the true father of a “pure theory of 
law”.61  
The true Austinian innovation is however the conceptual invention of the idea of 
“positive morality”. Lying between present-day “laws properly so called” and what 
future laws “ought” morally to be, positive moral rules are defined as rules that actively 
propose or restrain a certain behaviour; and the two famous illustrations Austin gives 
are customary law in general,62 and “international law” in particular. Both constitute 
“positive” – that is humanly created – rules that “sanction” certain types of conduct; 
but in the absence of a superior authority, these rules are not “commands” and 
therefore not laws “properly so called”. For international law, this quickly follows from 
the very idea that it constitutes a law between sovereign states in which – by definition 
– states do not recognize a superior: 
“Society formed by the intercourse of independent political societies, is the province 
of international law, or of the law obtaining between nations. For (adopting a current 
expression) international law, or the law obtaining between nations, is conversant 
about the conduct of independent political societies considered as entire communities: 
circa negotia et causas gentium integrarum. Speaking with greater precision, international law, 
or the law obtaining between nations, regards the conduct of sovereigns considered 
as related to one another. And hence it inevitably follows, that the law obtaining 
between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by a given sovereign 
to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. As I have already intimated, 
the law obtaining between nations is law (improperly so called) set by general opinion. 
The duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of 
nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and 




60 To make his point clearer, Austin here expressly criticises Blackstone (ibid, 159): “In another passage 
of his 'Commentaries,' Blackstone enters into an argument to prove that a master cannot have a right 
to the labour of his slave.  Had he contented himself with expressing his disapprobation, a very well-
grounded one certainly, of the institution of slavery, no objection could have been made to his so 
expressing himself. But to dispute the existence or the possibility of the right is to talk absurdly. For in 
every age, and in almost every nation, the right has been given by positive law, whilst that pernicious 
disposition of positive law has been backed by the positive morality of the free or master classes.” 
61 In this sense, G. Radbruch, Anglo-American Jurisprudence through Continental Eyes, 52 L. Q. Rev. 
530 (1936), 531: “What the Continent achieved only after long byways through historical and 
philosophical systems of many kinds, was suddenly created by Austin fifty years earlier; but it must be 
added that his work had no great influence upon later Continental development.” 
62 It is often forgotten that Austin also considered the English “common law”, as conceived by 
Blackstone, as a form of positive morality. For Blackstone, the common law was rooted in natural law 
in which judicial decisions were only evidence of that (natural) common law. For Austin, by contrast, 
only judge-made law is “law”. On this point, see “Conclusion: Apologetic Endings” below.  
63 Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined (supra n.54), 171. 
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In essence: since States, as political communities, do not recognize a superior authority 
above them, international law must be equated with “public opinion”; and, in clear 
opposition to James Mill, these rules are no longer seen as “legal” because they are 
sanctioned by public opinion; but, on the contrary, because they are only sanctioned by 
public opinion, they become reduced to rules of “positive morality”. This classification 
of international law as positive morality carries – of course – no deontological 
judgement: Austin simply acknowledges their “existence” – not their moral essence –  
as “posited” human rules; and he unambiguously chastises classic international law 
scholars for having confused positive morality as it “actually obtain[s]” among nations 
with international morality “as it ought to be”.64  
What, however, is Austin’s position with regard to international “ethics”? Due to his 
“positivistic” focus on “jurisprudence”, very little is discussed in “The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined”. Indeed, unlike his utilitarian predecessors, there is no 
reformist zeal within him; and apart from Austin’s “theological utilitarianism”,65 not 
much “utilitarian” philosophy can be found either.66 Only at the very end of the book, 
do some passages reveal his thinking on international “utility”:  
“The proper purpose or end of a sovereign political government, or the purpose or 
end for which it ought to exist, is the greatest possible advancement of human 
 
64 Ibid., 160: “Grotius, Puffendorf [sic], and the other writers on the so-called law of nations, have fallen 
into a similar confusion of ideas: they have confounded positive international morality, or the rules 
which actually obtain among civilized nations in their mutual intercourse, with their own vague 
conceptions of international morality as it ought to be, with that indeterminate something which they 
conceived it would be, if it conformed to that indeterminate something which they call the law of nature. 
Professor Von Martens, of Gottingen, who died only a few years ago, is actually the first of the writers 
on the law of nations who has seized this distinction with a firm grasp, the first who has distinguished 
the rules which ought to be received in the intercourse of nations, or which would be received if they 
conformed to an assumed standard of whatever kind, from those which are so received, endeavoured 
to collect from the practice of civilized communities what are the rules actually recognized and acted 
upon by them, and gave to these rules the name of positive international law.” 
65 On this point, see W. Rumble, Nineteenth-Century Perceptions of John Austin Utilitarianism and the 
Reviews of The province of Jurisprudence Determined (1992) 3 Utilitas, 199 at 211, who rightly points 
out that for Austin, the principle of utility “provides the index to the tacit commands of God”. This 
had, to some extent, already been true for Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in: J. Bowring (ed.), The 
Works of Jeremy Bentham – Volume 1 (Tait, 1838), 365 at 412: “But if we presume that God wills 
anything, we must suppose that he has a reason for so doing, a reason worthy of himself, which can 
only be the greatest happiness of his creatures. In this point of view, therefore, the divine will cannot 
require anything inconsistent with general utility.” 
66 This did not prevent J.S. Mill for praising the book for its service to the utilitarian “cause”, see: J.S. 
Mill, Austin’s Lectures on Jurisprudence (1832), in: “The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill” – 
Volume XXI (editor: J. Robson; University of Toronto Press, 1984), 51 at 57: “Mr. Austin is a strong 
partisan of the doctrine which considers utility as the test or index to moral duty. Though he has stated 
some, he has omitted others of the essential explanations with which we think that this doctrine should 
be received; but he has treated the question in a most enlarged and comprehensive spirit, and in the 
loftiest tone of moral feeling, and has discussed certain branches of it in a manner which we have never 
seen equalled.” 
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happiness: Though, if it would duly accomplish its proper purpose or end, or advance 
as far as is possible the weal or good of mankind, it commonly must labour directly and 
particularly to advance as far as is possible the weal of its own community. The good of the 
universal society formed by mankind, is the aggregate good of the particular societies 
into which mankind is divided: just as the happiness of any of those societies is the 
aggregate happiness of its single or individual members. Though, then, the weal of mankind 
is the proper object of a government, or though the test of its conduct is the principle of general utility, 
it commonly ought to consult directly and particularly the weal of the particular community which the 
Deity has committed to its rule. If it truly adjust its conduct to the principle of general utility, it 
commonly will aim immediately at the particular and more precise, rather than the general and less 
determinate end. It were easy to show, that the general and particular ends never or rarely 
conflict. Universally, or nearly universally, the ends are perfectly consistent, or rather 
are inseparably connected.”67  
 
Sadly, this proof is never offered.68 And indeed: just as Bentham’s utopian 
utilitarianism had failed to apply the principle of utility to humanity as such, Austin 
equally rejects its application beyond sovereign states. The principle of utility only 
works through the medium of nation states; and the greatest happiness of mankind is 
consequently defined as the aggregate sum of happiness among States. Seeing that this 
is not quite the same as the common happiness of the universal community of 
mankind, Austin is forced – not unlike Bentham before him – to take refuge in a petitio 
principii: the presumed harmony between national and universal objects of government. 
Hidden in a long footnote at the end of “The Province of Jurisprudence Determined”, 
we therefore read: 
“To advance as far as is possible the weal or good of mankind, is more generally but 
more vaguely its proper purpose or end: To advance as far as is possible the weal of 
its own community, is more particularly and more determinately the purpose or end 
for which it ought to exist. Now if it would accomplish the general object, it 
commonly must labour directly to accomplish the particular: And it hardly will 
accomplish the particular object, unless it regard the general. Since, then, each of the 
objects is inseparably connected with the other, either may be deemed the paramount 
object for which the sovereign government ought to exist. We therefore may say, for 
the sake of conciseness, that its proper paramount purpose, or its proper absolute end, 
is 'the greatest possible advancement of the common happiness or weal:` meaning 
indifferently by 'the common happiness or weal,' the common happiness or weal of 
its own particular community, or the common happiness or weal of the universal 
community of mankind.”69 
 
The “cosmopolitan” potential in the utilitarians’ emphasis on individuals and their 
consequent rejection of “natural” human communities remains here, once more, 
unredeemed. Instead of drawing the radical – and logical – conclusion that the scope 
 
67 Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined (supra n.54), 242.  
68 For Austin, the proof belongs to the realm of “ethics” and not “jurisprudence” and thus falls outside 
the ambit of his own project (ibid). 
69 Ibid., 243. 
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of the principle of utility must be cosmopolitan in that all human interests are 
calculated by a cosmopolitan legislator that guarantees the greatest happiness for all 
members of humanity, “states” remain, strangely, regarded as quasi-natural 
communities endowed with their own – autonomous – normative interests. The radical 
individualism – this core element of British utilitarianism – is thus confined to national 
contexts only; perhaps because the empirical world is seen as composed of sovereign 
states.70 Austin’s analytical positivism consequently remains, just as Bentham’s earlier 
version, “parochial” in nature.  
 
 
3. From Analytic Positivism to Liberal Imperialism  
 
 
The classic utilitarian tradition had, until Austin, remained within a form “national” 
framework; and, with its focus on the “command” element within law, the normativity 
of international law had come to be denied. A third generation of utilitarians – 
especially John Stuart Mill – partly resumes this programme.71 International law 
continues to be seen with suspicious eyes as a “falsely-called” law;72 and Mill also 
applies the greatest happiness principle solely to national communities – and not to 
the world of humanity as such.73  
 
70 Austin’s theory of sovereignty is an “empirical” and not a “normative” theory. Sovereignty is defined 
as follows (ibid., 166): “[T]he notions of sovereignty and independent political society may be expressed 
thus. - If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual 
obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determine superior is sovereign in that society, and the 
society (including the superior) is a society political and independent.“ The essence of sovereignty and 
political society is seen as the „habitual obedience“ to a – supreme – superior that may happen to differ 
– as an empirical matter – between different nations.    
71 For a generally discussion of J.S. Mill’s international thought see now G. Varouxakis, Liberty Abroad: 
J.S. Mill on International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
72 J.S. Mill, Vindication of the French Revolution, in “The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill” – Volume 
XX (editor: J. Robson; University of Toronto Press, 1985), 317 at 345.  
73 The passage that is often quoted to show Mill’s “anti-cosmopolitanism” can be found in his book on 
“Utilitarianism” (in: “The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill” – Volume X (editor: J. Robson; 
University of Toronto Press, 1985), 203 at 247): “Justice implies something which it is not only right to 
do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right. No 
one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to practise 
those virtues towards any given individual. And it will be found with respect to this as with respect to 
every correct definition, that the instances which seem to conflict with it are those which most confirm 
it. For if a moralist attempts, as some have done, to make out that mankind generally, though not any 
given individual, have a right to all the good we can do them, he at once, by that thesis, includes 
generosity and beneficence within the category of justice.”  
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However: in stark contrast to the earlier utilitarian traditions;74 Mill no longer extends 
his doubts to “imperial” arrangements. The older Benthamite “anti-imperialism” is 
dropped, and utilitarian thinking now comes to embrace British colonialism. This 
utilitarian imperialism is often called “liberal” or “civilisational” imperialism.75 Its 
underlying idea is that through a benign and “enlightened” despotism over “backward” 
peoples, their happiness will be better served in the long run; and in this indirect way, 
the common good of humanity will generally be served. For international law, this 
means that the rules that it contains should not be applied indistinctively; and taking 
up his father’s connection between international law and the internal constitution of a 
society, Mill now firmly draws a line between “civilised” and “barbarian” societies. But 
let us begin by exploring Mill’s general views on the nature of international law first 
(a), before analysing his utilitarian philosophy with regard to British imperialism (b). 
 
 
a. Mill’s General Position on the Nature of International Law  
 
Sharing the views of his former tutor, John Austin, serious doubts about the legal 
character of international law are equally voiced by Mill. What is the law of nations? 
Since it is not a legislative command, it is a “falsely-called law” that is best seen as 
morality. For Mill, then, “[t]he law of nations is simply the custom of nations”. This 
customary law has “grown up like other usages, partly from a sense of justice, partly 
from common interest or convenience, partly from mere opinion and prejudice.”76 
International law is a relative mix of theoretical principles and practical conveniences 
that, due to their changing nature, cannot be regarded as static. On the contrary, 
following utilitarian logic, international law must be subject to progress and 
improvement; and from here a radically relativistic conclusion is drawn: “[w]hat is 
 
74 This view of the older utilitarians can be found in Bentham, and especially his 1793 essay “Emancipate 
Your Colonies”. On Bentham’s anti-imperialist view, see especially: J. Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The rise of 
Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University Press, 2005), Chapter 4.  
75 For an excellent analysis, see: E. Sullivan, Liberalism and Imperialism: J.S. Mill’s Defense of the British 
Empire, (1983) 44 Journal of the History of Ideas 599. Mill, it is here claimed, “became the most 
prominent of the mid-nineteenth century defenders of empire and the most important influence on the 
generation of liberal imperialists who followed him” (ibid., 605).  
76 .S. Mill, Vindication of the French Revolution (supra n.72), 345. 
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called the law of nations is as open to alteration, as properly and even necessarily 
subject to it when circumstances change or opinions alter, as any other thing of human 
institution”.77  
But if international law changes over time, and with the times, what are the engines of 
change? In the absence of a formal legislature of judiciary capable of repealing 
international norms, change in international law will need to be effected by violations of 
existing rules: “The improvement of international morality can only take place by a 
series of violations of existing rules[.]”78 Each epoch and era is tasked to develop its 
own “customary” principles; and just as the “old” international principles, established 
by the 1815 Vienna Congress, have been repealed by “new” principles in the 1820 and 
1830s, so the present age would need to find its own international principles. This 
utilitarian philosophy of progress and change is subsequently applied to international 
treaties concretely. Rejecting Kantian ethics in general,79 Mill’s philosophy of change 
here allows him to relativize the binding nature of treaties by insisting that they can be 
broken when the societal preconditions on the basis of which they were concluded 
have changed: 
“In 1814 and 1815, a set of treaties were made by a general Congress of the States of 
Europe, which affected to regulate the external, and some of the internal, concerns of 
the European nations, for a time altogether unlimited. These treaties, having been 
concluded at the termination of a long war, which had ended in the signal discomfiture 
of one side, were imposed by some of the contracting parties, and reluctantly 
submitted to by others. Their terms were regulated by the interests, and relative 
strength at the time, of the victors and vanquished; and were observed as long as those 
interests and that relative strength remained the same. But as fast as any alteration 
took place in these elements, the powers, one after another, without asking leave, 
threw off, and were allowed with impunity to throw off, such of the obligations of the 
treaties as were distasteful to them, and not sufficiently important to the others to be 
worth a fight. The general opinion sustained some of those violations as being 
perfectly right; and even those which were disapproved, were not regarded as 
justifying a resort to war.”80 
 
Mill’s utilitarian philosophy, when applied to international law, thus pragmatically 
admits that interests change and that states, as masters of international law, are 




79 Mill, Utilitarianism (supra n.73), 249. 
80 J.S. Mill, Treaty Obligations (1870), in “The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill” – Volume XXI (editor: 
J. Robson; University of Toronto Press, 1984), 314 at 343-4. 
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while international treaties ought generally to be binding, there nonetheless are 
“treaties which never will, and even which never ought to be permanently observed”.81 
For Mill, only two principles states should thus always be followed for international 
treaties: “abstain from imposing conditions which, on any just and reasonable view of 
human affairs, cannot be expected to be kept”; and, secondly, conclude treaties “only 
for terms of years”.82 International treaties are – like all international law - temporal 
and situational; and this includes the question of war and peace.83  
Mill will soon develop his changing and situational concept of international law in a 
second direction – a direction that comes to deny the very existence of a universal 
international law for all peoples and states. It is indeed only a small step from Mill’s 
“situational” international law to the idea that its norms should depend on the level of 
“civilisation” the nations involved have.  
 
 
b. British Utilitarianism and Civilisational Imperialism 
 
The idea that human societies can be divided into various stages of (economic) 
evolution had been part of the Scottish enlightenment. In Adam Smith’s “Lectures on 
Jurisprudence”, we thus read that mankind passes through “four distinct states”: the 
age of hunters, the age of shepherds, the age of agriculture, and the age of commerce.84 
From here derives a division of the world into “barbarous and uncivilised” states, 
especially in Africa and Asia,85 and the civil commercial societies of Europe.86 Mill had 
 
81 Ibid., 345. 
82 Ibid., 346. 
83 For Mill’s complex relations to “war”, see: G. Varouxakis, Liberty Abroad (supra n.71), Chapter 6. 
84 A. Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (Liberty Fund, 1982), 14. 
85 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (Oxford University Press, 1993) 30: “All the inland parts of Africa, and all 
that part of Asia which lies any considerable way north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, the ancient 
Scythia, the modern Tartary and Siberia, seem in all ages of the world to have been in the same barbarous 
and uncivilized state in which we find them at present.” 
86 On the concept of “civilisation, see J. Starobinski, The Word Civilzation, in: “Blessings in Disguise; 
or, The Morality of Evil” (Harvard University Press, 1993), 1 at 4: “Ferguson, influenced by lectures 
given by Adam Smith in 1752, seems to have been the first to use the word civilization in English.” 
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himself worked on the idea of “civilisation” since 1836;87 and he built on this political 
economy tradition when he subsequently crafted his changing conception of 
international law onto societies that differed in their civilisational degree.  
In his “Few Words on Non-Intervention” (1859),88 Mill thus began to contend a 
categorical distinction between the international principles governing civilised nations 
and those principles that would have to govern situations in which one party was of a 
“high” and the other of a “low” stage of civilisation.89 Within the former situation, 
“civilised peoples” are seen to be “members of an equal community, like Christian 
Europe”, whose independence and sovereignty will need to be respected. Intervention 
into their internal affairs is, as a general rule, legally prohibited.90 Yet the same 
principles could, on the other hand, not apply to the relationship between civilised and 
uncivilised states:  
“To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international 
morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized 
nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no statesman can fall into, 
however it may be with those who, from a safe and unresponsible position, criticise 
statesmen. Among many reasons why the same rules cannot be applicable to situations 
so different, the two following are among the most important. In the first place, the rules 
of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot 
be depended on for observing any rules… In the next place, nations which are still barbarous 
have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that 
 
87 J.S. Mill, Civilisation (1836), in: “The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill” – Volume XVIII (editor: J. 
Robson; University of Toronto Press, 1977), 117 at 120: “We shall on the present occasion use the word 
civilization only in the restricted sense: not that in which it is synonymous with improvement, but that 
in which it is the direct converse or contrary of rudeness or barbarism. (…) In savage life there is no 
commerce, no manufactures, no agriculture, or next to none: a country rich in the fruits of agriculture, 
commerce, and manufactures, we call civilized. (…) In savage life there is little or no law, or 
administration of justice; no systematic employment of the collective strength of society, to protect 
individuals against injury from one another; every one trusts to his own strength or cunning, and where 
that fails, he is generally without resource. We accordingly call a people civilized, where the arrangements 
of society, for protecting the persons and property of its members, are sufficiently perfect to maintain 
peace among them; i.e. to induce the bulk of the community to rely for their security mainly upon  social 
arrangements, and renounce for the most part, and in ordinary circumstances, the vindication of their 
interests (whether in the way of aggression or of defence) by their individual strength or courage.”  
88 J.S. Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859), in: “The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill” – 
Volume XXI (editor: J. Robson; University of Toronto Press, 1984), 109. 
89 Ibid., 118. 
90 Ibid., 122: “[T]he answer I should give to the question of the legitimacy of intervention is, as a general 
rule, no.” Interestingly, this rejection is – in line with the pragmatic nature of utilitarian thought – not 
rooted in a principle but rather in “utilitarian” considerations (ibid): “The reason is, that there can 
seldom be anything approaching to assurance that intervention, even if successful, would be for the 
good of the people themselves. The only test possessing any real value, of a people’s having become fit 
for popular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient portion of them to prevail in the contest, are willing 
to brave labour and danger for their liberation.” Mill nevertheless accepts a number of exceptions to 
the principle of non-intervention among civilised states, for example: assistance to a legitimate self-
defence (ibid., 123).  For an excellent analysis of this position that places Mill’s argument in the context 
of the “Italian Question”, see: G. Varouxakis, Liberty Abroad (supra n.71), Chapter 4. 
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they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners. Independence and 
nationality, so essential to the due growth and development of a people further 
advanced in improvement, are generally impediments to theirs.”91 
 
The classic principles of international law are, it follows, be confined to civilised 
nations (as only they will reciprocate), while conquest and interference into the internal 
affairs of “barbarian” societies is justified so long as they have not formed nations or 
states.92 The central question thus becomes: what is the dividing line between 
“civilised” and “barbarian” states? For Mill, a people will be civilised “where the 
arrangements of society for protecting the persons and property of its members, are 
sufficiently perfect to maintain peace among them”;93 and more importantly still, the 
accurate test of civilisation is “the progress of the power of co-operation”.94 Only a 
division of labour within a society under which each individual has learnt to sacrifice 
some portion of its will “for a common purpose” signals an “organized combination” 
that grants independence and nationality to each other.95 For peoples or societies that 
have not reached this stage, international law and – more generally – the ordinary 
principles of morality should not apply: 
“It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that [Mill’s harm principle] is meant to apply 
only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of 
children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood 
or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, 
must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the 
same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in 
which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the 
way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means 
for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the 
use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable.”96 
 
Since non-civilised societies have not reached human “maturity” – a maturity that 
would entitle them to decide on their own what was in their best interest – it is in their 
(!) best interest to have a guardian (and protector) to lead them on their path to 
 
91 J.S. Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention (supra n.88), 118-9. 
92 Ibid, 119: “A violation of great principles of morality it may easily be; but barbarians have no rights 
as a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming 
one.” 
93 J.S. Mill, Civilisation (supra n. 87), 120. 
94 Ibid., 122. 
95 Ibid., 122-3. 
96 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in “The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill” – Volume XVIII (editor: J. Robson; 
University of Toronto Press, 1977), 213 at 224. 
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civilisation. But why should a “mother country” do this and, for example, maintain its 
colonies? Jeremy Bentham, and before him Adam Smith, had strongly advised Britain 
to emancipate its colonies; yet John Stuart Mill, arrives at the opposite conclusion: 
“though Great Britain could do perfectly well without her colonies, and though on 
every principle of morality and justice she ought to consent to their separation… there 
are strong reasons for maintaining the present slight bond of connexion”.97  
What are these reasons? Four main reasons are offered. The most important of which 
builds on – but ultimately perverts – a Kantian idea: a colonial empire represents a step 
“towards universal peace, and general friendly co-operation among nations”, because 
“[i]t renders war impossible among a large number of otherwise independent 
communities”. (This replaces the Kantian idea of peace among free states with the 
distinctively un-Kantian idea of peace within a colonial empire.98) In a similar vein, and 
secondly, colonialism is said to serve a benign economic function as it “keeps the 
markets of the different countries open to one another” and therefore assists 
international trade – which, according to British dogma, serves everyone.99 The third 
reason is specific to the mother country: through its colonial possessions, Britain 
would have added “moral influence and weight in the councils of the world” – a benefit 
that would also radiate to the rest of the world as Britain, among all states of the world, 
“best understands liberty”.100 But there is a – fourth – reason that is particularly strong 
with regard to colonies whose population has not yet reached “a sufficiently advance 
state”. For unlike the colonies that can govern themselves, these backward colonies 
 
97 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in “The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill” – 
Volume XIX (editor: J. Robson; University of Toronto Press, 1977), 317 at 565. 
98 Mill expressly rejects the idea of a federation of free states in favour of an unequal empire. Considering 
the possibility of an “imperial federation” along the U.S. American lines he finds (ibid., 564): “Countries 
separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one government, or 
even members of one federation. If they had sufficiently the same interests, they have not, and never 
can have, a sufficient habit of taking counsel together. They are not part of the same public; they do not 
discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what 
passes in the minds of one another. They neither know each other’s objects, nor have confidence in 
each other’s principles of conduct. Let any Englishman ask himself how he should like his destinies to 
depend on an assembly of which one-third was British American, and another third South African and 
Australian. Yet to this it must come, if there were anything like fair or equal representation; and would 
not every one feel that the representatives of Canada and Australia, even in matters of an imperial 
character, could not know, or feel any sufficient concern for, the interests, opinions, or wishes of 
English, Irish, and Scotch? Even for strictly federative purposes, the conditions do not exist, which we 
have seen to be essential to a federation. England is sufficient for her own protection without the 
colonies; and would be in a much stronger, as well as more dignified position, if separated from them, 
than when reduced to be a single member of an American, African, and Australian confederation.”   
99 Ibid., 565. 
100 Ibid. 
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“must be governed by the dominant country” so as to “facilitate[] their transition to a 
higher state of improvement”.101  
This “civilisational” imperialism  is further explained as follows: 
“There are, as we have already seen, conditions of society in which a vigorous 
despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is 
specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization. There are others, 
in which the mere fact of despotism has indeed no beneficial effect, the lessons which 
it teaches having already been only too completely learnt; but in which, there being no 
spring of spontaneous improvement in the people themselves, their almost only hope 
of making any steps in advance depends on the chances of a good despot. Under a 
native despotism, a good despot is a rare and transitory accident: but when the 
dominion they are under is that of a more civilized people, that people ought to be 
able to supply it constantly. (…) Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous 
or semibarbarous one.”102 
    
Mill’s defence of a liberal imperialism here present the “British” alternative to Kant’s 
vision of a free federation of states. His civilisational imperialism would, as the next 
chapter will show, come to exercise a strong hold on British international lawyers 
within the last quarter of the nineteenth-century (and here in particular on John 






This chapter has tried to offer a panoramic overview of the British philosophical 
landscape during the nineteenth century – a landscape that is dominated by three 
generations of utilitarian thinkers. Utilitarianism constitutes, by no means, the sole and 
exclusive philosophical school influencing the Victorian “public moralists”,104 yet after 
 
101 Ibid., 567. 
102 Ibid., 567. In the following pages, Mill explains how best to govern a colony – whether directly 
through a British cabinet minister or not; and – with regard to India – concludes (ibid., 573): “It is not 
by attempting to rule directly a country like India, but by giving it good [native] rules, that the English 
people can do their duty to that country; and they can scarcely give it a worse one than an English 
Cabinet Minister[.]”. 
103 On the J. Westlake’s relationship to J.S. Mill, see: G. Varouxakis, Liberty Abroad (supra n.71), 40-42. 
104 S. Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930 (Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
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Bentham, “continental” and British philosophy had – especially with regard to moral 
and legal philosophy – fundamentally parted ways:  
 “To the influence of Bentham and his followers is chiefly due the almost complete 
discredit into which in England the doctrine of natural law has fallen. Till the days of 
Kant on the Continent and of Bentham in England, there was no very striking 
discordance between English and Continental jurisprudence. It is not possible to draw 
any sharp line of distinction between the teaching of Hobbes, Locke, Cumberland and 
Blackstone on one side of the Channel, and that of Grotius, Pufendorf, Spinoza, 
Thomasius and Wolff on the other. All were the inheritors of the same traditions. The 
acceptance, however, of Kant's metaphysical theory on the one hand, and of 
Bentham's sceptical theory on the other, established between English and Continental 
juridical and ethical thought a wall of separation that has not yet been broken 
down.”105 
 
This breakdown into two philosophical worlds, while not complete,106 manifests itself 
in a number of stark differences between the “European” and the British view on the 
nature and role of international law. Rejecting all “natural law” thinking, the utilitarians 
simply cannot accept any a priori anchorage for international law; and lacking an 
empirical legislator that could bundle the preferences of mankind, all that Bentham 
can ultimately suggest is to ameliorate the formal qualities of international law through 
clarification and codification via international treaties. The subsequent attempt, by 
James Mill, to “found” international normativity on public opinion was equally frail, 
because it was still based on the idea of legal sovereignty of each and every nation. 
With John Austin, analytical positivism, then, finally arrived at its logical and infamous 
conclusion: international law is, strictly speaking, not law but “positive morality”. All 
human law must be adopted by a sovereign; and since states do not acknowledge a 
sovereign above them, there cannot be any international law.  
With John Stuart Mill, British utilitarianism takes – arguably – its most distinctive 
shape. Mill thereby both continues and rejects elements of the two earlier utilitarian 
generations. He shares the Austinian doubt as to the normativity of international law; 
and by reducing it to a special form of custom and morality, he expressly acknowledged 
a dynamic conception of international law that accepts that each epoch and place must 
develop its own legal principles. Combining Bentham’s reformist zeal with his father’s 
civilisational ambitions, Mill comes to elaborate a liberal imperialist philosophy. For in 
contrast to the Kantian idea of a federation of free states, the best option to prevent 
 
105 J. W. Salmond, Law of Nature, (1895) 11 Law Quarterly Review 121 at 137. 
106 On the influence of Hegelianism in England, see J.H. Muirhead, How Hegel came to England, (1927) 
36 Mind 423. 
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war and create international order is seen in an ever-greater empire of states led – of 
course – by an enlightened Great Britain.  
Once this “imperial” conception is combined with an evolutionary standard of 
civilisational progress, a new fundamental distinction emerges: there exists an 
international law of civilised states that is different from an international law of non-
civilised states. Two major reasons were produced to justify this result. According to 
the first, non-civilised states cannot “reciprocate”, because moral obligations and 
sanctions are regarded as not having the same “moral” force within “savage” societies. 
However, and more importantly still: in line with the principle of utility, the “highest” 
civilisation is seen as naturally entitled to govern – and advance – those peoples that 
are lagging behind the “present” stage of humanity. Part and parcel of liberal 
imperialism is thus a “particularistic” universalism. For in seeing one nation or a family 
of nations – here: the United Kingdom and the British Empire – as the highest 
civilisation on earth and considering mankind as “one not because it [is] everywhere 
the same, but because the differences represent[] different states in the same process”, 
the idea of human progress gets converted from a “social theory into a moral and 
political one”.107 A hierarchy of states comes to be established, and that hierarchy 
ultimately justifies advanced states to lead and teach non-civilised states in the general 

















The “British” Nineteenth Century II 




Despite Bentham’s ferocious attack, by the turn of the nineteenth century, two 
“natural” law traditions – one absolute, one relative – continued to be commonplace 
among British international jurists. The former – absolute – conception can for 
example be found in the work of James Mackintosh, whose “Discourse on the Study 
of the Law of Nature and Nations” (1799) is an often overlooked monument to classic 
scholarship.1 Building on the work of Blackstone, international law here continues to 
be conceived of as a “Law of Nature and Nations” that applies to states as well as 
private individuals,2 and which evenly governs “the universal commonwealth of the 
human race”.3 This law of nature is thereby “discoverable by natural reason” and must 
be “considered as a law” adopted by the “great Legislator of the universe for the 
guidance of his creatures to happiness”.4  
A relativistic conception of natural law, by contrast, can be found in in the work of 
Robert Ward – briefly discussed in Chapter 1.5 It may be recalled that Ward accepts 
the “Law of Nature as forming a part of the foundation of the Law of Nations”.6 But 
in line with other eighteenth century positivists, he also thinks that a special and 
positive law is required to make that abstract law more concrete; yet for this positive 
part to be binding, it normatively needs a “binding principle”. For Ward, that binding 
principle is found in “religion, and the moral system engrafted upon it”;7 and with it, 
he conceived of a different international legal orders that apply to different “classes” 
of nations.  
It is perhaps surprising that these two brilliant voices would not come to influence the 
early decades of the British nineteenth century. But Britain had never been too 
“academic” or “professional” when it came to law; and unlike the rich and long-
standing traditions of legal publicists on the (European) continent, British international 
 
1 J. Mackintosh, Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations (Lincoln’s Inn, 1790). 
2 Ibid., 3. 
3 Ibid., 7. 
4 Ibid., 9. 
5 R. Ward, An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe – Volume I 
(Butterworth, 1795). 
6 Ibid., xxxi. 
7 Ibid., xxxv. 
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law writing had remained shockingly underdeveloped by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.8 Writing in 1839, the first English “systematic” textbook on the 
law of nations could thus justly lament: 
“It is indeed singular that, in the multiplicity of works which are published on almost 
every subject, we have never had a systematic treatise on the Law of Nations by an 
English writer. There are two productions on this subject in our language, both of 
which I should be proud to claim as belonging to our literature, but both are written 
by Americans … The fact of the systematic writers on the Law of Nations having 
been all foreigners, is, I think, chiefly attributable to the similarity of the method of 
studying the Law of Nations, and that adopted in the study of the Roman Law, the 
basis of jurisprudence on the continent.”9 
 
Systematic and doctrinal writing on international law had indeed, for centuries, been 
overshadowed by “empirical” philosophy.10 When international law therefore 
subsequently became a subject of some academic interest, the main “British” ideas 
originated, at first, from the other side of the Atlantic. For the young United States of 
America had heavily relied on international law when establishing itself in the world; 
and the scholarly tradition of Vattel, Montesquieu and Blackstone had been continued 
in this new Anglo-Saxon member of the international community. A first section will 
consequently start with the early American conception of international law. Yet, as we 
shall see in Section 2, this incorporation of American ideas was superseded by an 
extensive reception of the German Historical School, whose metaphysical premises 
come to generally dominate British international law in the second half of the 
nineteenth-century. This metaphysical “transplant” is however only one part of the 
story. For the liberal imperialism – principally developed by J. S. Mill – would, in a 
third step, superimpose a utilitarian “British” conception of international law that 
would become dominant by the end of the nineteenth century.  
 
 
8 One reason behind this intellectual absence was the lack of a wider university culture, especially for 
jurisprudence and law. In the words of A. Carty, 19th Century Textbooks and International Law (Cambridge 
PhD thesis, 1972), 277: “Legal education in the universities was almost non-existent.” Up to the early 
decades of the 19th century, it seems therefore plausible to consider Vattel’s “Law of Nations” to have 
remained the dominant textbook in Britain (J. Pitts, Boundaries, Boundaries of the International: Law and 
Empire (Harvard University Press, 2018), 119. For a brief history of the English Vattel editions, see the 
2008 Liberty Fund edition by B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore (ibid., xxi-xxii), which is itself based on the 
1797 English edition. A newly commented – and swiftly famous – edition of Vattel would be published 
in 1834 by Joseph Chitty. 
9 O. Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations (Milliken and Clark, 1839), v-vi. 
10 See only: R. Woolhouse, The Empiricists (Oxford University Press, 1988); and S. Priest, The British 
Empiricists (Routledge, 2007). 
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1. Early US American Scholarship on “International Law” 
 
The celebrated legal authority in the early decades of the young American republic had 
remained the “British” Blackstone, whose “Commentaries” were reprinted and 
annotated by George Tucker with special references to the United States.11 A first truly 
“American” discussion of international law can be found in Kent’s “Commentaries on 
American Law” (1826).12 Inspired by an understanding of the United States as itself 
founded upon the principles of international law,13 the very first part of Kent’s 
exposition of American (!) law is dedicated to “Law of Nations”. This celebrated 
mind,14 looking at the “foundations” of international law, here tried to find a 
“pragmatic” middle ground between naturalism and positivism: 
“There has been a difference of opinion among writers, concerning the foundations 
of the law of nations. It has been considered by some as a mere system of positive 
institutions, founded upon consent and usage; while others have insisted that it was 
essentially the same as the law of nature, applied to the conduct of nations, in the 
character of moral persons, susceptible of obligations and laws. We are not to adopt 
either of these theories as exclusively true. The most useful and practical part of the 
law of nations is, no doubt, instituted or positive law, founded on usage, consent, and 
agreement. But it would be improper to separate this law entirely from natural 
jurisprudence… There is a natural and a positive law of nations.”15  
 
This syncretic view looked back at the eighteenth-century positivists that had elevated 
the positive law of nations to the same normative rank as natural law. And paralleling 
James Mill, international law is seen as “a code of present, active, durable, and binding 
obligation” whose sole “efficient sanction” is found to lie in “public opinion”.16 There 
 
11 St. G. Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: With Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal 
Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Carr, 1803). 
12 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law (Halsted, 1826). The title is of course again evocative of 
Blackstone’s “Commentaries”. 
13 The book is divided into three parts: Part I deals with the “Law of Nations”, Part II then deals with 
the “constitutional jurisprudence” of the United States, while Part III explored the “municipal law of 
the several states”.  
14 On Kent’s prestige, see M.W. Janis, The American Tradition of International Law: Great Expectations 1789-
1914 (Clarendon Press, 2004), 26: “In the early decades of the New Republic, when lawyers commanded 
the heights of American’s political and intellectual terrain, no jurist was more generally revered than 
James Kent (1763-1847), Chancellor of the State of New York and Professor of Law at Columbia.” 
15 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law (supra n.12), 2. 
16 Ibid., 169. With subsequent editions, the influence of analytic positivism becomes more pervasive, 
especially in the English editions. See only J.T. Abdy, Kent’s Commentary on International Law (Steven 
and Sons, 1866), 6-10 and esp. 7 “[O]f the body of International Law we never can predicate that its 
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is however a second compromise between naturalism and positivism that Kent 
suggests. For while granting that there exists a universal natural law that “is equally 
binding in every age, and upon all mankind”; this universal natural law must be 
distinguished from the “regional” phenomenon of positive international law: 
“[T]he Christian nations of Europe, and their descendants on this side of the Atlantic, 
by the vast superiority of their attainments in arts, and science, and commerce, as well 
as in policy and government; and, above all, by the brighter light, the more certain 
truths, and the more definite sanction which Christianity has communicated to the 
ethical jurisprudence of the ancients, have established a law of nations peculiar to 
themselves.  They form together a community of nations united by religion, manners, 
morals, humanity and science, and united also by the mutual advantages of 
commercial intercourse, by the habit of forming alliances and treaties with each other, 
of interchanging ambassadors, and of studying and recognizing the same writers and 
systems of public law.”17 
 
A “special” European international law is here posited; and unlike many an earlier 
positivist, this particular “European” law is not grounded in the special – empirical or 
social – union between European states that had, in Vattel’s words, turned Europe 
into a kind of “republic”. A normative union of values is identified; and the particular 
identification of European particularism with Christianity appears to have come from 
Robert Ward, whose work Kent had most assuredly studied.18  
This “normative” conception of a European law of nations allowed the United States 
– geographically far remote from Europe – to explain why it could partake in (and 
benefit from) the customs and laws of the old continent. The United States could thus 
rightly invoke the European “authorities” to defend its international rights. Yet in one 
important way, the “New World” quickly opposed the old one. For with the 
emergence of the European Concert and the Holy Alliance in post-Napoleonic Europe 
(discussed in Chapter 3), the young American Republic could not accept the monarchic 
principle; and in what became known as the “Monroe Doctrine”, the United States 
insisted:  
 
rules are commands; we cannot assert that they shall be obeyed, because they have through long 
observance grown into a sort of law; we can only say they ought to be obeyed because of their long 
observance and of their consequent utility. Hence, fourthly, neither the law of God, nor positive rules 
of morality, not the law of nature (whatever that may be) can be considered as the source or foundation 
of International Law[.]”  
17 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law (supra n.12), 3-4.  
18 Robert Ward is quoted already in Lecture 1 (ibid., 4) and when Kent comes to assert that of all causes 
“the most weight is to be attributed to the intimate alliance of the great powers as one Christian 
community”, he has heavily relied on Ward.   
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“In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never 
taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. (…) With the movements 
in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes 
which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. (…) The political 
system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. 
This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments… 
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the 
United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on 
their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to 
our peace and safety. (…) It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their 
political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and 
happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, 
would adopt it of their own accord.” 
 
The United States here conscientiously objected to the idea, underlying the original 
European Concert, that any change of regime (or the balance of power) on the 
European continent would entitle the European states to interfere into the affairs of 
the American continent(s). Insisting on the independence and sovereignty of each state 
under classic international law,19 any such intervention within the American 
“hemisphere” was to be considered an unfriendly act. This “Monroe Doctrine” would 
become a cornerstone of “American” international doctrine and clearly articulated the 
pro-republican and anti-colonial feelings of the young United States.20 
Be that as it may, for the first generation of American jurists the “European” law of 
nations had remained complemented by a universal – natural – law of nations. This 
universalist naturalism was however subsequently dropped by the second generation 
of US American publicists. A profoundly “particularistic” solution can indeed be 
found in the thought of Henry Wheaton – whose 1836 “Elements of International 
Law” was to influence Anglo-Saxon thinking for almost a century.21 Consciously and 
confidently using Bentham’s neologism as referent for his subject, this “nineteenth-
 
19 See only: H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Caray, Lea & Blanchard, 1836), 86-94; and see 
already J. Kent, Commentaries on American law (supra n.12), 24: “And it is not to be doubted that the 
government of the United States had a perfect right in the year 1822, to consider as it then did, the 
Spanish provinces in South America as legitimate powers, which had attained sufficient solidity and 
strength to be entitled to the rights and privileges belonging to independent states.” 
20 It would take some time before the “two spheres” doctrine would become operative in practice; see: 
D. Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine: 1826-1867 (John Hopkins Press, 1933); and resistance came especially 
from the British government (ibid., 5): “The policy of the British government was indeed very far from 
accepting the doctrine of the two spheres, or American hegemony in the New World. In the course of 
the fifteen years which followed on the Doctrine, the British took possession, or repossession as might 
be claimed, for the Falkland Islands, and extended their already existent interests in Central America.”  
21 The influence of Wheaton‘s “Elements of International Law” can hardly be exaggerated. In addition 
to the editions Wheaton published himself, posthumous American edition by W.B. Lawrence and R.H. 
Dana ran alongside separate English and French editions. Italian, Chinese and Japanese editions started 
to be published after 1860.   
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century Vattel” was well- informed about English positivist thinking.22 And without 
revealing his sources too much, he quickly came to deny the existence of universal 
natural law of nations:  
“There is … no universal immutable law of nations, binding upon the whole human 
race – which all mankind in all ages and countries, ancient and modern, savage and 
civilized, Christian and pagan have recognised in theory or in practice…  If there be 
any such universal law acknowledged by all nations, it must be that of reciprocity, of 
amicable or vindictive retaliation, as the case may require the application of either. The 
ordinary jus gentium is only a particular law, applicable to a distinct set or family of 
nations, varying at different times with the change in religion, manners, government, 
and other institutions, among every class of nations. Hence the international law of 
the civilized, Christian nations of Europe and America, is one thing; and that which 
governs the intercourse of the Mohammedan nations of the East with each other, and 
with Christians, is another and a very different thing.  
The international law of Christendom began to be fixed about the time of Grotius, 
when the combined influence of religion, chivalry, the feudal system, and commercial 
and literary intercourse, had blended together the nations of Europe into one great 
family. This law does not merely consist of the principles of natural justice applied to 
the conduct of states considered as moral beings. It may, indeed, have a remote 
foundation of this sort; but the immediate visible basis on which the public law of 
Europe, and of the American nations which have sprung from the European stock, 
has been erected, are the customs, usages, and conventions observed by that portion 
of the human race in their mutual intercourse.”23  
 
While the first paragraph was undoubtedly influenced by Montesquieu (and Ward),24 
what was the intellectual inspiration behind the second paragraph? Both Blackstone 
and Kent had already referred to the idea of the consent of “civilised” nations; and 
having consulted Ward’s earlier treatise on the history of international law, Wheaton’s 
identification of “civilisation” with “Christendom” had also been in the air. But the 
reference to the “family” of European nations and its “customs, usages, and 
conventions” had a third – and decisive – source that had remained unrevealed. This 
 
22 While a diplomat in London, Wheaton had met Jeremy Bentham as well as his editor, John Bowring; 
and according to Lawrence (ibid, lxi), Bentham exercised a strong influence on Wheaton. We indeed 
find references to Bentham and Austin already in Wheaton’s 1836 edition. Referring to Bentham’s 
“Morals and Legislation”, we thus read (ibid, 46): “A distinguished writer upon the science of law has 
questioned how far the rules which have been adopted for the conduct of independent societies of men, 
or sovereign states, in their mutual relations with each other, can with strict propriety be called laws.” 
And quoting an extensive passage of “one of his disciples”, the Austinian theory of law as command is 
imported into international law (ibid, 47 with reference to Austin’s “Province of Jurisprudence 
determined”).   
23 Ibid., 44-45 (reference is made to Grotius and Montesquieu but also Ward).  
24 The key influence is Montesquieu who is referred to as saying that “every nation has a law of nations 
– even the Iroquois, who eat their prisoners, have one”, and a footnote explains (ibid., 44): 
“Montesquieu deduces the peculiar law of nations prevailing among different races from their peculiar 
moral and psychological circumstances, in the same philosophical spirit with which he traces the origin 
and history of the civil laws of different nations.” However, as the second part of the first paragraph 
shows, Wheaton also borrowed from Ward, whose work on the “History of the Law of Nations in 
Europe” was cited. 
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this source came to the fore in later editions of the “Elements”.25 For after having once 
more paid his respects to “[t]hat very distinguished legal reformer, Jeremy Bentham” 
(as well as “one of his disciples”),26 Wheaton here continues: 
“Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all the 
nations and states of the world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always 
been, and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those 
of European origin. This distinction between the European law of nations and that of 
the other races of mankind has long been remarked by the publicists… According to 
Savigny: “there may exist between different nations the same community of ideas 
which contributes to form the positive unwritten law (das positive Recht) of a particular 
nation. This community of ideas, founded upon a common origin and religious faith, 
constitutes international law as we see it existing among the Christian States of 
Europe…  International law may therefore be considered as a positive law, but as an 
imperfect positive law, (eine unvollendete Rechtsbildung), both on account of the 
indeterminateness of its precepts, and because it lacks that solid basis on which rests 
the positive law of every particular nation, the political power of the State and a judicial 
authority competent to enforce the law….”. International law, as understood among 
civilized nations, may be defined as consisting of those rules of law. conduct which 
reason deduces, as consonant to justice, from the nature of the society, existing among 
independent nations[.]”27 
 
Wheaton here expressly acknowledged his intellectual debt to the German Historical 
School and in particular Savigny. (He was likely to have encountered the latter when 
stationed as American ambassador in Berlin between 1835 and 1846.) This influence 
places Wheaton into a “middle position between positivists and naturalists”,28 because 
– like the German Historical School – he simultaneously rejects core elements of both 
naturalism and positivism. For while discarding the idea of a universal and unchanging 
natural law, he equally rejects the Austinian idea that there is no “positive” 
international law. The foundation of – positive – international law is, following the 
Historical School, seen in the “society” or “family” of nations (a new metaphor that 
would make an enormous career in the second half of the nineteenth-century). And 
 
25 H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law (editor: W. B. Lawrence; Little Brown, 1855).  
26 Ibid., 18. 
27 Ibid., 16 and 20. This idea of “ubi societas ibi jus est” as the foundation of international law had 
already been suggested by Heffter’s “Das Europäische Völkerrecht” to whom Wheaton expressly refers 
(ibid, 14-16). 
28 R. Lesaffer, Roman Law and the Early Historiography of International Law: Ward, Wheaton, Hosack 
and Walker, in: T. Marauhn, & H. Steiger (eds.), Universality and Continuity in International Law (Eleven, 
2012), 149 at 163. 
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with that, the philosophical precepts of German “idealism” were absorbed into 
American international law.29  
 
 
2. Victorian Legal Scholarship in Nineteenth Century Britain 
a. “Natural Law” Thinking: From Christian Morality to Divine Law  
 
The traditional starting point for a distinctively “British” conception of international 
law is often set by O. Manning’s “Commentaries on the Law of Nations”.30 Drawing 
on the classic “European” and the modern American authors,31 it came to expressly 
reject Austinian positivism and its denial of the legal quality of international law.32 For 
Manning, there exists a law of nature; and that law is “identical with the will of God”.33 
What is the will of God? The will of God is to make mankind happy; and the 
foundation of the “Law of Nations” is therefore rooted in British utilitarian ideas: 
“Every thing around us proves that God designed the happiness of his creatures. It is 
the will of God that mankind should be happy. To ascertain the will of God regarding 
any action, we have therefore to consider the tendency of that action to promote or 
diminish human happiness. The right application of this principle, commonly known 
as the principle of utility, is identical with the law of nature, the laws prescribed by 
human nature being obviously the laws tending to human happiness. (…) The 
bringing this principle into general circulation is due to the writings of Bentham, and 
constitutes his real claim to be regarded as an improver of the science of morals. 
Bentham's classifications may be regarded as unnecessary, and his works may, and 
probably will, fall into disuse; but the benefit he conferred on moral science should 
never be forgotten. He was the propagator of a doctrine of which he expressly 
 
29 It has been pointed out that Wheaton’s third edition subsequently came under the influence of Hegel, 
especially in respect to the theory of recognition, see C. H. Alexandrowicz, The Theory of Recognition 
in Fieri, (1958) 34 British Yearbook of International Law 176 at 195-6. 
30 O. Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations (Milliken, 1839). For a contextualisation of Mannings’s 
work, see: A. Carty, 19th Century Textbooks (supra n.8), 279 et seq.  
31 Manning refers to von Martens, Klüber, Dumont and Ompteda and, of course, also to Kent and 
Wheaton. He singles out Martens as the most important influence (ibid, 39: “[p]erhaps the most valuable 
writer on the law of nations”); yet he is also wonderfully harsh on the “Germanic” erudition of Klüber 
(ibid., .41: “It is a curious specimen of the results of a class of minds, little known in this country, but 
of which many examples are found in Germany, minds which are stored with an astonishing, and even 
uselessly abundant, collection of materials, but which seem to have no power of making a proper 
application of these materials. With the erudition of a German professor, Klüber has the faults of the 
cloister, as well as its advantages; his reading his most profound, but his mind seems to have been 
formed wholly by books.”).  
32 John Austin is extensively disused and rejected (ibid., 5): “But my objection is that the world law, 
which has, in our language, so long been employed in a much wider sense, should, by a single writer, be 
declared to be only “properly” used with this restricted meaning.”   
33 Ibid., 58. 
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disclaims being the originator; but it is to him that we owe the common use of the 
most correct, and readiest, test of moral action.”34 
 
Heavily influenced by William Paley (and Robert Ward),35 Manning believed that 
“Christianity reveals to us a general system of morality” and that “[i]t is as an 
‘authoritative publication of natural religion’ that Christianity must be looked to in 
international relations”.36 This contrast strikingly with the “relativist” Ward, because 
the “law” of Christianity is no longer seen as solely imposing positive obligations on 
Christian nations; it is “the law of nature – obligations from which none can be exempt”.37  
This new form of Christian “universalism” can also be detected in Phillimore’s 
“Commentaries Upon International Law” (1854).38 Here, the “precepts of Natural 
Law” are considered to be “obligatory upon Heathen States in their intercourse with 
each other” and much more so “are they binding upon Christian Governments in their 
intercourse with Heathen States”.39 The “principles of international justice” thus 
assume a strong “theocratic” flavour, which is directly reflected in the sources of 
international law. For Phillimore, they are: 
1. “The Divine Law, in both its branches – namely: The principles of Eternal Justice 
implanted by God in all moral and social creatures, of which nations are the 
aggregate, and of which governments are the International organs -    
2. The Revealed Will of God, enforcing and extending these principles of Natural 
Justice. 
3. Reason, which governs the application of these principles to particular cases, itself 
guided and fortified by a constant reference to analogous cases and to the written 
reason embodied in the text of the Roman Law, and in the works of 
Commentators thereupon. 
4. The universal consent of Nations, both as expressed (1) by positive compact or 
treaty, and (2) as implied by usage, custom and practice[.]”40 
 
This mix of divine law and positive international law can also be found in Halleck’s 
“International Law” (originally published 1861 in the United States and widely read in 
 
34 Ibid., 58-59. 
35 The former was famous for his “Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of 
the Deity” (1802), while the latter had published his “Inquiry into the Foundation and History of the 
Law of Nations“ (1795). 
36 O. Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations (supra n.9), 65.  
37 Ibid., 67. 
38 R. Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (Johnson, 1854).  
39 Ibid., 60. 
40 Ibid., 86. 
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the United Kingdom).41 Here we read one of the standard accounts of the new 
religiosity found during the Victorian age: 
“The rules which ought to regulate the conduct of nations in their mutual intercourse 
are undoubtedly deduced, in part, from reason and justice, and from the nature of 
society existing between independent States or bodies politic; and, in part, from usage, 
and the agreements or compacts entered into between different nations. This 
difference in the nature and origin of these rules has led text-writers to divide 
international law into different branches. He most common of these general divisions 
is, into the natural law of nations, and the positive law of nations. The first of these 
branches has been subdivided into the Divine law, and the application of the law of 
God to States. The second branch has also been subdivided into the conventional law 
of nations and the customary law of nations.”42 
 
The divine law is understood as “the rules of conduct prescribed by God to his rational 
creatures, and revealed by the light of reason, or the sacred scriptures”, which are – 
following Grotius – conceived of as “natural law”.43 This natural law must however 
oftentimes be modified when applied to states; and it will therefore  – following Vattel 
– need to be complemented by a positive law of nations in the form of international 
treaties and international custom.44 The relationship between the two sources is 
thereby –  quoting Phillimore extensively – characterised as follows: 
“The necessity of mutual intercourse is laid in the nature of states, as it is of 
individuals, by God who willed the State and created the individual. The intercourse 
of nations therefore gives title to international rights and duties, and these require an 
international law for the regulation and enforcement. That law is not enacted by the 
will of any common superior upon earth, but it is enacted by the will of God; and it is 
expressed in the consent, tacit or declared, of independent nations. (…) custom and 
usage, moreover, outwardly express the consent of nations to things which are 
naturally, that is, by the law of God, binding upon them. But it is to be remembered 
that, in this latter case, usage is the effect and not the cause of the law.”45 
 
Let us finally look at the most “idiosyncratic” illustration of the re-Christianisation of 
international law in Victorian Britain. It can be found in the work of James Lorimer.46 
This closet Hegelian considered the law of nature to be “realised in the relations of 
 
41 The following editions were, respectively, published in 1878 (second edition), 1893 (third edition), 
1908 (fourth edition). I will be quoting from the second edition: S. Baker, Halleck’s International Law – 
Volume I (Paul, 1878). 
42 Ibid., 42. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 44. 
45 Ibid., 45. 
46 J. Lorimer, The Institutes of The Law of Nations – Volume I (Blackwood, 1883). 
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separate nations”, and his entire Law of Nations is centred on the (Hegelian) doctrine 
of recognition: “The law of nations is the realisation of the freedom of separate nations 
by the reciprocal assertions and recognition of their real powers”.47 Lorimer 
subsequently links the idea of the “reciprocating will” to religious creeds and here in 
particular: Christianity.48 This link is expressed in the following words:  
“It is Christianity alone which, in opening humanity a new avenue to knowledge of 
God’s will, and of those ultimate and absolute laws which lie behind and beyond all 
religions, does not close the avenue to this knowledge which nature has opened to 
mankind. In claiming to be a direct revelation to humanity, it does not repudiate the 
indirect revelation though humanity. On the contrary, it is on its coincidence with the 
latter, so far as the latter goes, that Christianity mainly bases its claim to our further 
acceptance. Its divinity is guaranteed to our nature by the divinity which addresses us 
thought our nature.”49   
 
These few illustrations from the first and second half of the nineteenth century should 
be enough to caution any attempt to characterise British international law during this 
period as significantly shaped by Austinian “positivism”. On the contrary, British 
thinking retained a strong natural law undercurrent during the whole nineteenth 
century;50 and, as we shall see in the next section, an even stronger rebuttal of the 
Austinian conception of international law came from a second intellectual revolution 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. This second anti-positivist impulse comes 
from the German Historical School and the rise of the “British” Historical School.  
 
 
47 Ibid, 1 and 3. For Lorimer’s Hegelian leanings, see: J. Lorimer, The Institutes of Law (Clark, 1872), where 
Hegel is discussed, inter alia, on pages 2, 19, 22, 36, 63, 74, 114, 240, 246, 267, 275, 281, and 443. 
48 J. Lorimer, The Institutes of The Law of Nations (supra n.46), 113. 
49 Ibid., 114. 
50 For a similar “naturalism”, see only: A. Polson, Principles of the Law of Nations (Griffin, 1848), 3: “The 
law of nations is … is of course based in the main on the principles of the law of nature”; as well as H. 
S. Maine, International Law: The Whewell Lectures (Murray, 1890), esp. 32: “There has been a 
difference of opinion among, writers concerning the foundation of the Law of Nations. It has been 
considered by some as a mere system of positive institutions, founded upon consent and usage; While 
others have insisted that it was essentially the same as the Law of Nature, applied to the conduct of 
nations, in the character of moral persons, susceptible of obligations and laws. We are not to adopt 
either of these theories as exclusively true. The most useful and practical part of the Law of Nations is, 
no doubt, instituted or positive law, founded on usage, consent, and agreement. But it would be 
improper to separate this law entirely from natural jurisprudence, and not to consider it as deriving 
much of its force and dignity from the same principles of right reason, the same views of the nature and 
constitution of man, and the same sanction of Divine revelation, as those from which the science of 
morality is deduced. There is a natural and a positive Law of Nations.”. Finally, see also T. Twiss, The 
Law of Nations (Clarendon Press, 1884), 146-157. For a remarkable Ph.D. thesis aiming to unearth the 
“vibrant natural law discourse in nineteenth century Britain”, see: G. Costello, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights in Nineteenth Century Britain (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sydney, 2014). 
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b. Historicist Thinking: The Rise of the British Historical School 
 
A seismic shift in the British conception of international law seems to have occurred 
after 1848. A harbinger of this development is a series of articles published in the “Law 
Review and Quarterly Journal of British and Foreign Jurisprudence”.51 Inspired by 
German writers on the subject – and particularly by Heffter – a new way of 
conceptualising “positive” international law is here suggested. This positive law is 
“real” law,52 whose normative basis is now described as follows: 
“[I]f, guided by observation and experience, we pass from the contemplation of 
individuals, living together in civil society, to the contemplation of such individuals, 
so associated and congregated, as constituting so many separate communities or 
states, we find, that among the latter also, as among the former, certain juridical or 
legal relations exist, or arise, in certain circumstances, anterior to, and independent of, 
any exercise of the national will; either internally in legislative enactment and executive 
administration, or externally in acts either unilateral, without any joint consent, or 
bilateral, involving the consent of others, such as conventions or treaties. And many, 
if not most, of these juridical or legal relations, and the concomitant or consequent 
rights and obligations, are simple and obvious, and are almost intuitively perceived or 
apprehended, and almost instinctively felt, by the ordinary population generally of 
whom states are composed. They come to exist in the consciousness or conviction of the people, 
just in the same manner, in which M. de Savigny shows the private rights and obligations of 
individuals living in civil society are unfolded, in the gradual progress of the internal jurisprudence of 
states.”53 
 
The common “consciousness” of a people or peoples is here seen as the foundation 
of positive international law; and with this spectacular introduction, customary law 
moves to the centre-stage in discussion of the normativity of international law in 
 
51 Five instalments are published between 1848 and 1850 in various issues of the “Law Review and 
Quarterly Journal of British and Foreign Jurisprudence”. The author remains anonymous yet indirectly 
reveals himself, in the fourth instalment, as James Reddie – the author of “An Historical View of the 
Law of Maritime Commerce” (Blackwood, 1841), who would later also publish “Inquiries in 
International Law: Public and Private” (Blackwood, 1851). 
52 [J. Reddie], International Law, (1848) 9 Law Review and Quarterly Journal of British and Foreign 
Jurisprudence 22 at 34: “The guarantees or sanctions of international law are more slender, more feeble, 
than those of public or constitutional law, and much more insecure than those of internal private law. 
But this difference does not affect or alter the essence or nature of the right, or law. It is, in a great 
measure, the consequence of the less advanced state of the cultivation of the juridical relations of 
nations, which might obviously be  greatly promoted by the establishment of proper and improved 
tribunals or courts of international law, judiciously constructed, and wisely and impartially directed or 
conducted, in a similar way to that, in which internally, in states, the common consuetudinary law is 
improved and matured. The want of such more powerful guarantees or sanctions, as belong to internal 
private civil law, or to the internal criminal law of states, does not at all take from the fundamental rules 
of international law their character of judicial or legal principles.” 
53 Ibid., 36 (emphasis added). 
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Britain.54 But importantly, and just as the German Historical School had argued, it is 
not custom as an “empirical” phenomenon that is the foundation of law (because an 
“is” cannot imply an “ought”); the true foundation of international law is the “ratio 
juris” underlying custom:  
“In short, to render the acts of individuals, however often repeated, fit to create a rule 
of common law, they must have inherent in them certain essential requisites. For 
ascertaining these requisites, we shall, as we have just said, appeal to the internal 
common law generally of the civilized nations of Europe. And this we are enabled to 
do with comparatively less difficulty, from the aid afforded by the very learned and 
scientific treatises recently published by two of the latest and most eminent writers on 
internal private law, M. Von Savigny of Berlin, and the late Prof. Puchta of Leip[z]i[g]. 
(…) Such appears to be the doctrine laid down by the latest and ablest continental 
lawyers, with regard to the juridical or legal effect of contracts between private 
individuals living in civil society, as affording or not affording evidence of a rule of 
the internal Common consuetudinary law of states, as administered to the individuals 
of whom they are composed. And no valid reason appears to have been assigned why 
the same doctrine should not be held applicable to the same individuals, when viewed 
in their collective capacity, as constituting a people or state.” 55 
 
With these words, British international law comes under the spell of Savigny and the 
German Historical School.56 For in an effort to oppose the utilitarian positivists, and 
 
54 Ibid., 43 (emphasis added): “It has indeed been argued, that there is an absurdity in propounding 
custom or usage, which is the mere repetition of the same or similar actions in succession, as the 
foundation of Law and Right. (…) But we do not here proceed on the supposition of the mere 
successive repetition of the same or similar acts, having of itself, or giving, much juridical value or legal 
validity. Along with M. Von Savigny and the late acute Professor Puchta, we view the long, successive, uninterrupted, 
and uniform repetition of the act, which constitutes the usage or custom, as clearly indicating and affording satisfactory 
evidence of the existence of the notion and feeling of right or legality in the consciousness and conviction of the great majority 
of the population, of whom the assemblage of nations is composed. In the uniformity of a long continued and permanent 
mode or course of action, we recognise its common root, as opposed to mere accident or chance - the firm belief of the people. 
And custom is thus the sign or mark, by which we recognise positive or established law, not its original 
foundation.” 
55 [J. Reddie], International Law, (1849) 11 Law Review and Quarterly Journal of British and Foreign 
Jurisprudence 26 at 37 and 40. 
56 On the general influence of Savigny on British law during this period, see: P. Stein, Legal Evolution: 
The Story of an Idea (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 72 et seq., who points especially to John Reddy, 
James Reddie’s son who had been a graduate of Göttingen and here become familiar with the ideas of 
the German historical school and whose writings popularized the ideas in England in addition to his 
father’s work. With the translation of Savigny’s “System des heutigen Römischen Rechts”, the Historical 
School would indeed exercise a profound effect on British international law. See only R. Phillimore, 
Commentaries upon International Law (Johnson, 1854; Butterworths, 1871); but most importantly: H.S. 
Maine whose “Ancient Law” (Murray, 1861) celebrated the historical method associated with Savigny. 
See also: A.C. Boyd (ed.), Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (Stevens, 1878), 19: “According to 
Savigny: “there may exist between different nations the same community of ideas which contributes to 
form the positive unwritten law (das positive Recht) of a particular nation. This community of ideas, 
founded upon a common origin and religious faith, constitutes international law as we see it existing 
among the Christian States of Europe…  The progress of civilization, founded in Christianity, has 
gradually conducted us to observe a law analogous to this in our intercourse with all the nations of the 
globe, whatever may be their religious faith, and without reciprocity on their part.”; and equally, T. 
Twiss, Law of Nations (Clarendon Press, 1884), 161: “Savigny has observed, that “there may exists 
 153 
especially the Austinian denial of international law,57 British international law takes a 
decisively “German” turn. For if international society – and not the State – is seen as 
origin and fountain of all law, then there can be an international law even without an 
international state: 
“It is sometimes said that there can be no law between nations because they 
acknowledge no common superior authority, no international executive capable of 
enforcing the precepts of International Law. This objection admits of various answers: 
First, it is a matter of fact that states and nations recognize the existence and 
independence of each other; and out of a recognized society of nations, as out of a 
society of individuals, Law must necessarily spring. The common rules of right 
approved by nations as regulating their intercourse are of themselves, as has been 
shown, such a law. Secondly, the contrary position confounds two distinct things; 
namely, the physical sanction which law derives from being enforced by superior 
power, and the moral sanction conferred on it by the fundamental principle of right; 
the error is similar in kind to that which has led jurists to divide moral obligations into 
perfect and imperfect.”58 
 
 
between different Nations a common consciousness of Right similar to that which engenders the 
Positive Law of a particular Nation…”. 
57 Almost all British textbooks published in the second half of the 19th century reject Austinian 
positivism. The principal criticism here is that Bentham’s and Austin’s definition of law is “universal” 
and “unhistorical”, see: J. Reddie, Inquiries Elementary and Historical in the Science of Law (Longman, 1840), 
90-91: “[T]he jurists of the analytical school, while they have, in reality, not done much towards the 
promotion of the science of law, by the mere enunciation of the proposition, that general utility, or the 
greatest happiness principle, is the foundation of law … appear rather to overrate the advantages of 
their prophesizing. They seem to despise the instruction to be derived by the legislator from the 
experience of past ages, as recorded in history. In their excessive generalization, as remarked by M. 
Savigny and M. Comte, they divest law of its actual, individual, or particular character, of its national 
originality[.]”.  This criticism is subsequently picked up by Maine’s “Ancient Law” (supra n.56), 7: 
“Before we quit this stage of jurisprudence, a caution may be usefully given to the English student. 
Bentham, in his “Fragment on Government,” and Austin, in his “Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined,”  resolve every law into a command of the lawgiver, an obligation imposed thereby on the 
citizen, and a sanction threatened in the event of disobedience; and it is further predicated of 
the command, which is the first element in a law, that it must prescribe, not a single act, but a series or 
number of acts of the same class or kind. The results of this separation of ingredients tally exactly with 
the facts of mature jurisprudence; and, by a little straining of language, they may be made to correspond 
in form with all law, of all kinds, at all epochs. It is not, however, asserted that the notion of law 
entertained by the generality is even now quite in conformity with this dissection; and it is curious that, 
the farther we penetrate into the primitive history of thought, the farther we find ourselves from a 
conception of law which at all resembles a compound of the elements which Bentham determined. It 
is certain that, in the infancy of mankind, no sort of legislature, not even a distinct author of law, is 
contemplated or conceived of.” Finally, and closer to the end of the nineteenth century, see also: W.E. 
Hall, Treatise On International Law (Clarendon Press, 1890), 15: “But it is now fully recognised that the 
proper scope of the term law transcends the limit of the more perfect examples of law. To what extent 
it transcends them is not equally certain. The various ideas of law formed in different societies and 
times, and the various groups of customs which have been obeyed as law, have probably not yet been 
sufficiently compared and analysed, and until an adequate comparison and analysis have been made, no 
definition or description of law can be regarded as final.”; as well as J. Westlake, International Law – Part 
I (Cambridge University Press, 1910), 8-11 (dealing with “Austin’s Limitation of the term “Law””). On 
the appeal of Savigny, as the champion of “conservatism”, to counter the reformist potential of the 
utilitarian positivism, see P. Stein, Legal Evolution (supra n.56), 72. 
58 R. Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (supra n.38), 91. 
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Stating the mainstream British conception of international law in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, Westlake – one of the most famous British international 
lawyers during that time – could confidently state: “[i]nternational Law, otherwise 
called the Law of Nations, is the law of the society of states or nations”; and “when 
international law is claimed as a branch of law proper, it is asserted that there is a 
society of states sufficiently like the society of men, and a law of the society of states 
sufficiently like state law”, or in other words: “ubi societas ibi just est”. 59  
This new emphasis on the “society of nations”, as the origin of international law, 
placed custom at its normative centre;60 and with this new centre, the Austinian 
challenge was met by emphasising that customary law did not need to rely on a political 
sovereign for its adoption or enforcement. It “naturally” and “unconsciously” 
developed and was equally naturally and unconsciously enforced within the 
international society of states. In a retrospective summary of the philosophical 
zeitgeist, we thus read: 
“Almost from the beginning of the science of the Law of Nations the question has 
been discussed whether the rules of International Law are legally binding… And during 
the nineteenth century Austin and his followers take up the same attitude. They define 
law as a body of rules for human conduct set and enforced by a sovereign political 
authority. If indeed this definition of law be correct, the Law of Nations cannot be 
called law. (…) However, this definition of law is not correct. It covers only the written 
or statute law within a State, that part of the Municipal Law which is expressly made 
by statutes of Parliament in a constitutional State or by some other sovereign authority 
in a non-constitutional State. It does not cover that part of Municipal Law which is 
termed unwritten or customary law. There is, in fact, no community and no State in 
the world which could exist with written law only. Everywhere there is customary law 
in existence besides the written law. This customary law was never expressly enacted 
by any law-giving body, or it would not be merely customary law. 61 
 
59 J. Westlake, International Law (supra n.57), 1, 6-7. 
60 For Westlake the only two “real” sources of international law are therefore custom and reason (ibid., 
14): “Custom and reason are the two sources of international law.” The idea that “reason” is a direct 
source is thereby not primarily a reference to classic natural law but mainly a reference to the “synthetic” 
method of the (German) historical school in which “reason” abstracts and perceives general principles 
from custom (ibid., 14-15): “Reason is a source of international law not only for the seekers after 
international right, who will appeal to reason as a check on custom, but for all, and for two causes. First, 
the rules already regarded as established, whatever their source, must be referred to their principles, and 
their principles extended to new cases, by the methods of reasoning proper to jurisprudence, 
enlightened by a sound view of the necessities of international life. Secondly, the rules as yet established, 
even when so applied and extended, do not cover the whole field of international life, which is constantly 
developing in new directions. Therefore from time to time new rules have to be proposed…”.  In the 
true tradition of the (German) Historical School, Roman law will here be the best guide in many cases 
(ibid. 15). Treaties, by contrast, are relegated to mere “evidence” of a consented practice or customary 
rule (ibid., 16). 
61 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise – Volume I (Longmans, 1912), § 2. When it comes to 
Austin’s objection that customary law only becomes „law“ when it is „recognized“ by a State court as 
such, Oppenheim objects (ibid): „Courts of justice having no law-giving power could not recognise 
unwritten rules as law if these rules were not law before that recognition…”.  
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Pace Austin, international law thus positively exists – as law –  in the form of 
international custom; and it is even seen as a system of positive norms that can be 
externally enforced.62 This general acceptance of the metaphysical premises of the 
Historical School in British international law writing should – in theory – have one 
important consequence: the idea of an international law among private individuals; yet, 
as we shall see in the next section, this conclusion is – unlike continental European 
scholarship – not drawn. Following an American constitutional law scholar, British 
“private international law” would remain embedded in a different conceptual world.   
 
 
c. Conceptions of Private “International” Law: An Enclave of State Positivism 
  
The rise of the Historical School had, as we saw in Chapter 3 for Germany, reignited 
the idea of a ius commune that also applied to private individuals. “Private” international 
law came to be seen as a natural complement to (classic) “public” international law – 
with both branches equally rooted in a common international society with its own legal 
consciousness. This “European” conception of private international law, while making 
some early inroads,63 would however never prevail within the Anglo-American world. 
 
62 Ibid., §9: “Is there a common consent of the community of States that the rules of international 
conduct shall be enforced by external power? There cannot be the slightest doubt that this question 
must be affirmatively answered, although there is no central authority to enforce those rules. The heads 
of the civilised States, their Governments, their Parliaments, and public opinion of the whole of civilised 
humanity, agree and consent that the body of rules of international conduct which is called the Law of 
Nations shall be enforced  by external power, in contradistinction to rules of international morality and 
courtesy, which are left to the consideration of the conscience of nations. And in the necessary absence 
of a central authority for the enforcement of the rules of the Law of Nations, the States have to take 
the law into their own hands. (…) But a weak law is nevertheless still law, and the Law of Nations is by 
no means so  weak a law as it sometimes seems to be.” 
63 See here, particularly: J. Reddie, Inquiries in International Law: Public and Private (Blackwood, 1851), 447-
458 and esp. 456: “So far, we apprehend, private international law does not rest upon the comitas or 
courtesy, or upon the mere consent of nations, but may be legitimately enforced by such physical means 
as such states have at their disposal. Not does it seem necessary for the true independence and welfare 
of nations, to push their exclusive right of sovereignty so far as seems to be done by the jurists of the 
present day, or to make private international law entirely dependent for its existence on the consent of 
each separate nation.” But more importantly still, see R. Phillimore, Commentaries upon International 
Law – Volume IV: Private International Law (Benning, 1861), x: “I cannot help expressing a hope that 
the Treatises of such jurists as those of Puchta and Savigny, which have the merits without the defects 
of German erudition, may one day become familiar to English lawyers.”; as well as ibid., 9: “The writer 
upon International Law is bound to draw the distinction which has been mentioned between Comity 
and Law. But having done so, and shown on what terms Comity is admitted to govern the legal relations 
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Here, a fundamentally different view gained prominence – mainly thanks to two 
towering constitutional law scholars who regarded private international law as nothing 
but external state law. 
The founding father of the “American” approach to private international law – or, as 
it would henceforth be called following his suggestion: “conflict of law” – is Joseph 
Story. This Supreme Court Justice and Harvard Law School Professor published his 
most significant work in 1834 under the Blackstone-Kent-inspired title 
“Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws”.64 Bemoaning the lack of a systematic treatise 
in English, and criticising “[t]he civilians of continental Europe” for their overly 
“theoretical distinctions” and “metaphysical subtleties”,65 the basic principle governing 
the new discipline was to be this:  
“[I]t is an essential attribute of every sovereignty, that it has no admitted superior, and 
that it gives the supreme law within its own dominions on all subjects appertaining to 
its sovereignty. What it yields, it is its own choice to yield; and it cannot be commanded 
by another to yield it as matter of right. And, accordingly, it is laid down by all 
publicists and jurists, as an incontestable rule of public law, that one may with 
impunity disregard the law pronounced by a magistrate beyond his own territory. (…) 
The jurisprudence, then, arising from the conflict of the laws of different nations, in 
their actual application to modern commerce and intercourse, is a most interesting 
and important branch of public law. (…) This branch of public law may, therefore, be 
fitly denominated private international law, since it is chiefly seen and felt in its 
application to the common business of private persons, and rarely rises to the dignity 
of national negotiations, or of national controversies.”66 
 
This view fundamentally challenged the idea of a private “international” law on two 
fronts; and this dual challenge also had two important corollaries. First, by not 
accepting any authority above the State, there simply could be no “international law” 
properly speaking; and the essential question was therefore not to what extent national 
law was in conflict with international law but, rather, to what extent domestic national 
law was in conflict with foreign national law. Secondly, the national law to decide 
whether foreign law was to apply was not private but public law because it determined 
to what extent public authorities had to apply foreign law instead of domestic law.  
 
of the subjects of different States, he may and ought to insist that the jus gentium,” like the jus inter 
gentes, is built upon the hypothesis of a common law for a Commonwealth of States[.]”  
64 Originally published by Hillard & Gray in 1834. In the following, I will use the second edition: J. 
Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Little and Brown, 1841). 
65 Ibid., 10.  
66 Ibid., 8-9. 
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Once this new perspective is accepted, the fundamental starting point for all “conflict 
of law” principles becomes the principle that “every nation possesses an exclusive 
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory”; and that “whatever  force and 
obligation the laws of one country have in another, depend solely upon the laws, and 
municipal regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence 
and polity, and upon its own express or tacit consent”.67 The decision to allow foreign 
law to apply within the domestic territory was thus a sovereign question for each state 
to decide.68 And yet: Story did not deny that there were moments, when a State ought 
to recognize and apply foreign law within its territory. However, this was not a legal 
obligation but derived from moral “comity”;69 and – quoting Vattel – this duty of “comity” 
was for each State to judge for itself.70  
This “sovereigntist” view quickly became dominant in the United States,71 and it 
profoundly influenced a British scholar of constitutional law: Albert Venn Dicey. The 
 
67 Ibid., 23-24. For Story, there is also no difference between “property” and “personal” laws (ibid.19 
and 23). 
68 Ibid., 7: “It is plain, that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic force, proprio vigore, except 
within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of that country. They can bind only its own subjects, and 
others, who are within its jurisdictional limits; and the latter only, while they remain therein. No other 
nation, or its subjects, are bound to yield the slightest obedience to those laws. Whatever extra-territorial 
force they are to have, is the result, not of any original power to extend them abroad, but of that respect, 
which from motives of public policy other nations are disposed to yield to them[.]” 
69 Ibid., esp. 29-38. Story here draws extensively on the seventeenth-century Dutch scholar Ulrich 
Huber, whose main work on “De Conflictu Legum” had also inspired Story’s title. On Story’s 
misreading of Huber, see however: A. Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors (University of Georgia 
Press, 1992). 
70 Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (supra n.64), 35: “It is, therefore, in the strictest sense, a 
matter of the comity of nations, and not of any absolute paramount obligation, superseding all discretion 
on the subject. Vattel has with great propriety said; "That it belongs exclusively to each nation to form 
its own judgment of what its conscience prescribes to it; of what it can, or cannot do ; of what is proper, 
or improper for it to do. And of course it rests solely with it to examine and determine, whether it can 
perform any office for another nation, without neglecting the duty, which it owes to itself."” 
71 H. Wheaton, Elements (1855 Lawrence Edition, supra n.25), 113-4: [A]ll the effect, which foreign laws 
can have in the territory of a State, depends absolutely on the express or tacit consent of that State. (…) 
There is no obligation, recognized by legislators, public authorities, and publicists, to regard foreign laws 
; but their application is admitted, only from considerations of utility and the mutual convenience of 
States — ex comitate, ob reciprocam utilitatem.”. See also F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 
(Kay, 1881), 1: “Private International Law is that branch of the law of a county which relates to cases 
more or less subject to the law of other countries. It is a law, and hence binding; but it is binding, so far 
as concerns England and the United States, not because it has been enacted as a code, nor because all 
its parts have been definitely settled by prior decisions, but because, like other parts of the common 
law, it is ascertained as a local interference from the conditions of each case.” For a counter-current 
here, see however: D. Dudley Field, Draft Outlines of an International Code (Baker & Voorhis, 1872) – 
almost half of which deals with “private international law” as international law and whose Article 8 
states: “The First Book has two Divisions. The first Division, entitled Public International Law, contains 
the rules respecting the relations of nations to each other and to the members of other nations. The 
second, entitled Private International Law, contains the rules respecting the relations of the members 
of a nation to the members of other nations.”  
 158 
very title of Dicey’s “The Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws” left no doubt 
as to his views on the normative character of this type of law.72 While subtly critical of 
the term “conflict of laws”,73 the concept of “private international law” was 
unacceptably wrong.74 Following Story’s lead, all private “international” law was but 
(external) “national” law! The national “conflict of laws” rules thus simply reflected 
each nation’s choice whether (and to what extent) to impose its domestic law on 
“foreigners”. For English courts, the central criterion for such a choice was thereby 
the idea of “acquired rights”.75 
Methodologically, Dicey also thought that the European scholars had gotten it all 
wrong. For the “theoretical method”, especially the one developed by Savigny and Bar, 
had blurred the line between “is” and “ought”. “What each author attempts to provide 
 
72 A. V. Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with reference to The Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons, 1908). 
For a wonderful discussion of the importance of this book, see: G. W. Bartholomew, Dicey and the 
Development of English Private International Law, (1959) 1 Tasmanian Law Review 240. 
73 Dicey, Conflict of Laws (supra n.72), 13: “The defect, however, of the name is that the supposed 
"conflict" is fictitious and never really takes place. If English tribunals decide the matter in hand, with 
reference to the law of Portugal, they take this course not because Portuguese law vanquishes English 
law, but because it is a principle of the law of England that, under certain circumstances, marriages 
between Portuguese subjects shall depend for their validity on conformity with the law of Portugal.” 
74 Ibid., 14: “The words ‘private international law’ should mean, in accordance with that use of the word 
'international' which, besides being well established in ordinary language, is both scientifically 
convenient and etymologically correct, a private species of the body of rules which prevails between 
one nation and another. Nothing of the sort is, however, intended; and the unfortunate employment of 
the phrase, as indicating the principles which govern the choice of the system of private law applicable 
to a given class of facts, has led to endless misconception of the true nature of this department of legal 
science. Nor does the inaccuracy of the term end here. It confounds two classes of rules which are 
generically different from each other. The principles of international law, properly so called, are truly 
"international" because they prevail between or among nations; but they are not in the proper sense of 
the term "laws", for they are not commands proceeding from any sovereign. On the other hand, the 
principles of private international law are "laws" in the strictest sense of that term, for they are 
commands proceeding from the sovereign of a given state, e.g., England or Italy, in which they prevail 
; but they are not "international," for they are laws which determine the private rights of one individual 
as against another, and these individuals may, or may not, belong to one and the same nation.” 
75 The famous shift from international comity to acquired (foreign) rights is made at ibid., 25: “English 
judges, and the same thing holds good of, for instance, French or German judges, never in strictness 
enforce the law of any country but their own.  Upon the occasions on which they are popularly said to 
enforce a foreign law, what they do, in reality, is, as already pointed out, to enforce not a foreign law, 
but a right acquired under the law of a foreign country. This distinction may appear at first sight a useless 
subtlety, but due attention to it removes difficulties which have perplexed both text-writers and Courts.  
At least half of the perplexities which have obscured the treatment by jurists of the law as to the 
enforcement of foreign judgments arise from the failure to appreciate this distinction. Thus it has been 
thought an anomaly that the Courts of one country, e.g., England, should enforce the judgments given 
by the Courts of another country, e.g., Italy, or, in other words, that tribunals acting under the authority 
of the King of England should enforce the commands of the King of Italy. What has not been noticed 
is that when A brings in England an action against X on an Italian judgment, our Courts are called upon 
to enforce not the judgment of the Italian Court, i.e., the command of the King of Italy, but the right 
acquired by A under an Italian judgment to the payment of a debt by X.”  The US American author J. 
H. Beale in his “A Treatise on The Conflict of Laws or Private International Law – Volume I” (Harvard 
University Press, 1916) would adopt and popularise Dicey’s doctrine of “vested rights”. 
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is a statement of the principles which ought, as a matter of consistency and expediency, 
to guide the judges of every country when called upon to deal with a conflict of laws”;76 
yet this was not what the law “is” and only the “positive method” could avoid this 
problem: 
“The positive method is followed by a whole body of authors, among whom Story is 
the most celebrated. (…) This school starts from the fact that the rules for determining 
the conflict of laws are themselves " laws " in the strict sense of that term, and that 
they derive their authority from the support of the sovereign in whose territory they 
are enforced. Story, therefore … [did] not practically concern [himself] with any 
common law of Europe, but make it the object of their labours to ascertain what is 
the law of a given country with regard to the extra-territorial operation of rights. (…) 
But whatever be the limits imposed on the scope of their inquiries by writers who 
follow the positive method, the object of their labours is always in character the same. 
Their aim is to ascertain what are the rules contained in the law of a given country 
with regard to a special topic, namely, the extraterritorial recognition of rights. Hence 
it follows that these authors ought not, in so far as they act consistently with their own 
method, to attempt the deduction of the rules of private international law from certain 
general and abstract principles, for their aim is to discover not what ought to be, but 
what is the law.”77 
 
The positive method here denies, just as Austin had done for public international law, 
the very existence of any private “international” law. There was no such law; all there 
was were “statutory enactments and the judicial decisions” that were adopted by each 
national legal order.78 The “only sound method for an English lawyer who attempts to 
write on private international law” was therefore “to follow judicial example and look 
exclusively to the sources of information recognized by the Courts”.79 Private 
international law was thus not only national law, it was positive law in the pure 
Austinian sense – a law that was neither natural nor customary but solely expressed in 
the authoritative decisions and commands of the British legislature and courts. 
 
 
3. The “Imperial” Dimension of British International Law 
 
With the exception of private international law, British conceptions of public 
international law had remained loyal to a historicist account that wholeheartedly 
 
76 Dicey, Conflict of Laws (supra n.72), 17. 
77 Ibid., 19. 
78 Ibid., 20. 
79 Ibid., 23. 
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rejected analytical positivism and which embraced the “idealist” premise that law will 
“naturally” grow within a “society” of states. The question however remained whether 
a “European” international law could recognize the normative existence and 
equivalence of other “particular” societies of states. A “regional” relativism had indeed, 
as we saw in Chapter 1, embryonically emerged by the end of the eighteenth century. 
It was, most poignantly, reflected in the work of Robert Ward (mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter). Yet by the middle of the nineteenth century, a fundamental 
change of perspective took hold of British philosophers; and soon, the legal 
justifications for a new “imperialist” reading of international law followed.80 This new 
“imperialist” perspective transforms the “relativist” particularism – still found in Ward 
– into a “universalist” particularism that is based on an absolute criterion of human 
progress.  
How did this happen? With the rise of evolutionary anthropology,81 “civilised” 
societies had come to assume that there was a hierarchical chain of being in which 
other societies reflected lower evolutionary stages when measured against the – 
absolute and universal – European standard of civilisation.82 And this point of view 
would have profound consequences on the beneficiaries of international law. For 
integrating J.S. Mill’s philosophical project, international law was now given an 
imperialist dimension that came to disenfranchises all “primitive” states outside the 
(European) society of civilised nations. The relationship between Mill’s liberal 
imperialism and doctrinal international law in the second half of the nineteenth century 
is not always easy to disentangle but this third section aims to show whatever 
conceptual logic there is in the development of this new – and very British – 
conception of international law.  
 
 
80 The conventional starting date for the new wave of “formal” imperialism is often set around the 
1870s, and is therefore identified as a “late Victorian” phenomenon. See: J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A 
Study (Nisbet, 1902); as well as H.L. Wesseling, The European Colonial Empires, 1815-1919 (Longman, 
2004). This view that modern imperialism starts around the 1870s has however been qualified by the 
“informal” imperialism thesis propounded by J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, The Imperialism of Free 
Trade (1953) 6 The Economic History Review 1.  
81 J. W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1968), 
Chapter 4: “The Laws of Nature and the Diversity of Mankind”.  
82 Ibid., esp. 98: “[Evolutionary theories] offered a way of reformulating the essential unity of mankind, 
while avoiding the current objections to the older theories of a human nature everywhere essentially the 
same. Mankind was one not because it was everywhere the same, but because the differences 
represented different stages in the same process.” 
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a. The European “Family of Nations” and its Standard of Civilisation 
 
The idea of evolutionary stages in the development of human societies had been part 
of British moral philosophy since the Scottish Enlightenment. Within the nineteenth 
century, two representatives of this kind of thinking had been James and John Stuart 
Mill. With the publication of Darwin’s “Origin of Species” in 1859 and Maine’s 
“Ancient Law” in 1861, this perspective suddenly gained prominence. British 
international law scholars thus came to reject the core idea of eighteen-century 
international law: the “sovereign equality” of all states. While, admittedly, all human 
societies were – once – equal, human progress had been confined to a small number 
of particular societies:  
“[A]fter the epoch of codes the distinction between stationary and progressive 
societies begins to make itself felt. It is only with the progressive that we are 
concerned, and nothing is more remarkable than their extreme fewness. In spite of 
overwhelming evidence, it is most difficult for a citizen of western Europe to bring 
thoroughly home to himself the truth that the civilisation which surrounds him is a 
rare exception in the history of the world. (…) One set of usages has occasionally 
been violently overthrown and superseded by another; here and there a primitive code, 
pretending to a supernatural origin, has been greatly extended, and distorted into the 
most surprising forms, by the perversity of sacerdotal commentators; but, except in a 
small section of the world, there has been nothing like the gradual amelioration of a 
legal system.”83  
 
With Maine’s famous distinction between “stationary” and “progressive” societies, the 
perception becomes increasingly accepted that evolution and “progress” has been 
confined to a small set of (Western) European states. The rest of the world – excluding 
those parts already “civilised” by European settlers – has, by contrast, remained within 
its “original” or “primitive” condition. Projected onto international law, there is 
consequently only one most “advanced” society of nations in which the most 
“ameliorated” international law has organically grown. This hierarchical view will soon 
come to mean the following: 
“Strictly speaking, there is not one International Law, but several. Wherever a group 
of peoples are compelled by local contiguity or other circumstances to enter into 
relations with each other, a set of rules and customs is sure to grow up among them, 
and their intercourse will be regulated thereby. The rules will differ at different times 
and among different groups. Their nature will be determined by the ideas current upon 
the subject of international intercourse and the practices permissible in warfare. (…) 
But though there are several systems of International Law, there is but one important 
 
83 Maine, Ancient Law (supra n.56), 22-23. 
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system, and to it the name has been by common consent appropriated. It grew up in 
Christian Europe, though some of its roots may be traced back to ancient Greece and 
ancient Rome. It has been adopted in modern times by all the civilized states of the 
earth.”84 
 
The “European” society of states and “its” international law is here portrayed as a 
universalistic standard in-becoming. For if the European standard is the most 
advanced standard, each society that wishes to interact with the Western world will 
have to eventually conform to this standard. This – ironically – means that by the end 
of the nineteenth century a dialectic form of “universalism” is reborn that abandons 
the “relativistic” idea of different-yet-equal “classes” of states in favour of re-
confirming the existence of a “universal international community”;85 yet unlike the 
universal community of mankind, posited by natural law theorists, this universal 
community is considered incomplete. For Oppenheim, to give just one example, it 
indeed cannot yet be said that “the dominion of the Law of Nations extends as far as 
humanity itself”.86 For the “universal” law of civilised nations is still confined to a few 
states; and while it grows organically, it will only eventually include all nations:  
“There is no doubt that the Law of Nations is a product of Christian civilization. It 
originally arose between the States of Christendom only, and for hundreds of years 
was confined to these States. (…) But from about the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, matters gradually changed. (…) Thus the membership of the Family of 
Nations has of late necessarily been increased, and the range of the dominion of the 
Law of Nations has extended beyond its original limits. This extension has taken place 
in conformity with the basis of the Law of Nations.  As this basis is the common 
consent of the civilised States, there are three conditions for the admission of new 
members into the circle of the Family of Nations. A State to be admitted must, first, 
be a civilised State which is in constant intercourse with members of the Family of 
Nations. Such State must, secondly, expressly or tacitly consent to be bound for its 
future international conduct by the rules of International Law. And, thirdly, those 
States which have hitherto formed the Family of Nations must expressly or tacitly 
consent to the reception of the new member.”87 
 
The older relativist conception of different “classes” of states having each developed 
their own (regional) international law order is here categorically rejected. There exists 
only one “universal” international law whose community membership is however 
dynamic. The family of nations – this organic community of values – was originally 
 
84 T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (Heath, 1898), 4.  
85 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (supra n.61), §7.  
86 Ibid., §26 (referring to Bluntschli as an illustration). 
87 Ibid., §§26-27. 
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confined to European states alone but since has expanded to include the “Christian 
states which grew up outside Europe”; and it even received the Turkish Empire in 
1856.88 Henceforth, international law has therefore “ceased to be a law between 
Christian States only”; and the question of civilisation has stopped to be a purely 
“religious” question.89 But what, then, determines the standard of civilisation? For 
Oppenheim, this appears to be predominantly a question of economic development.90 
(For others – following Mill – the standard of civilisation depends on the existence of 
a local government able to guarantee basic legal protections.91) Importantly, however, 
even where that “European” standard of civilisation has been reached, membership in 
the (European) family of nations is not – at least not for Oppenheim – automatic. On 
the contrary, employing the Hegelian idea of mutual recognition, “[a] State is and 
 
88 Ibid., §28. With regard to the Turkish Empire, Oppenheim refers to Article 7 of the 1856 Peace Treaty 
of Paris; with regard to Japan, he believes that it only obtained full membership at the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
89 For other non-Christian states, Oppenheim is more doubtful (ibid., § 103): “Doubtful is the position 
of all non-Christian States except Turkey and Japan, such as China, Morocco, Siam, Persia, and further 
Abyssinia, although the latter is a Christian State, and although China, Persia, and Siam took part in the 
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Their civilisation is essentially so different from that of 
the Christian States that international intercourse with them of the same kind as between Christian 
States has been hitherto impossible. And neither their governments nor their populations are at present 
able to fully understand the Law of Nations and to take up an attitude which is in conformity with all 
the rules of this law. There should be no doubt that these States are not International Persons of the 
same kind and the same position within the Family of Nations as Christian States.” 
90 Ibid., § 7: “As the civilised States are, with only a few exceptions, Christian States, there are already 
religious ideas which wind a band around them. There are, further, science and art, which are by their 
nature to a great extent international, and which create a constant exchange of ideas and opinions 
between the subjects of the several States. Of the greatest importance are, however, agriculture, industry, 
and trade.” 
91 J. Westlake, “Territorial Sovereignty, especially with Relation to Uncivilised Regions”, in “The 
Collected Papers of John Westlake (editor: L. Oppenheim; Cambridge University Press, 1914), 131; 
where we read (ibid., 143): “Civilisation is a term which has often occurred during the last few pages, 
and we must try to give ourselves an account of what for the present purpose we mean by it. We have 
nothing here to do with the mental or moral characters which distinguish the civilised from the 
uncivilised individual… When people of European race come into contact with American or African 
tribes, the prime necessity is a government under the protection of which the former may carry on the 
complex life to which they have been accustomed in their homes[.]” In this sense also: W.E. Hall, 
Treatise on International Law (supra n.57), 55: “[I]nternational law is a product of the special civilisation 
of modern Europe, and is intended to reflect the essential civil and facts of that civilisation so far as 
they are fit subjects for international rules. Among these facts is the existence in almost all states of a 
municipal law, consonant with modern European ideas, and so administered that foreigners are able to 
obtain criminal and civil justice with a tolerable approach to equality as between themselves and the 
subjects of the state. International law therefore contemplates the existence of such law and such 
administration; and a state, professing to be subject to international law, is bound to furnish itself with 
them. If it fails to do so, either through the imperfection of its civilisation, or because the ideas, upon 
which its law is founded, are alien to those of the European peoples, other states are at liberty to render 
its admission to the benefits of international law dependent on special provision being made to 
safeguard the person and property of their subjects.” 
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becomes an International Person through recognition only and exclusively”.92 And in 
the absence of such “international personality” (granted as a membership right by the 
family of nations), the equality principle will simply not apply.93  
 
 
b. Imperial International Law and the Question of Colonialism  
 
The (re-)introduction of a distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders” in the 
international legal system had important “practical” consequences. For by the end of 
the nineteenth century, this “British” vision of international law comes to deprive 
“uncivilised” societies of their status and rights under international law. In its most 
extreme case, it conveniently produced a legal justification for the subjection and 
colonization of non-civilised peoples. The philosophical theory behind this British 
“imperialist” international law had been offered by J.S. Mill.94 Mill’s “pedagogical” 
project had indeed actively argued in favour of placing uncivilised nations under the 
“nonage” of civilised states:  
“[T]here is such a thing as political nonage; for, though barbarians may be old children, 
those of them who belong to capable races are simply the children of the great human 
family. Their childishness cuts them off from international rights only for a time; but 
whilst it subsists it cuts them off as effectually as the childishness of a promising child 
cuts it off from municipal or political rights. The right of underdeveloped races, like 
the right of underdeveloped individuals, is a right not to recognition as what they are 
not, but to guardianship – that is, the guidance – in becoming that which they are 
capable, in realizing their special ideals.” 95 
 
A more complex legal justification of this form of liberal imperialism has came from 
the pen of Westlake – a fervent admirer of Mill’s work:  
“The form which has been given to the question, namely what facts are necessary and 
sufficient in order that an uncivilized region may be internationally appropriated in sovereignty to a 
particular state? implies that it is only the recognition of such sovereignty by the 
members of the international society which concerns us, that of uncivilized natives 
international law takes no account. This is true, and it does not means that all rights 
 
92 Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (supra n.61), §71. Oppenheim expressly rejects the idea of a 
de facto – automatic – recognition: “It is generally agreed that a new State before its recognition cannot 
claim any right which a member of the Family of Nations has towards other members.” 
93 Ibid., §115. “The equality before International Law of all member-States of the Family of Nations is 
an invariable quality derived from their International Personality.” 
94 On J. S. Mill’s liberal imperialism, see Chapter 4 above.  
95 J. Lorimer, Institutes of the Law of Nations (supra n.46), 157. 
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are denied to such natives, but that the appreciation of their rights is left to the 
conscience of the state within whose recognized territorial sovereignty thy are 
comprised, the rules of the international society existing only for the purpose of 
regulating the mutual conduct of its members.”96     
 
But the most radical “colonial” conclusion is drawn by Lawrence: 
“[E]ven the attainment by the original inhabitants of some degree of civilization and 
political coherence has not sufficed to bar the acquisition of their territory by 
occupancy. All territory not in the possession of states who are members of the family 
of nations and subjects of International Law must be considered as technically res 
nullius and therefore open to occupation. The rights of the natives are moral, not legal. 
International Law knows nothing of them, though International Morality demands 
that they be treated with consideration.”97 
  
More moderate British (German) voices, on the other hand, considered that 
“backward” states could not simply be “occupied” as if they were terra nullius.98 Their 
“weakness” should turn them into “protectorates”; and the institute of the 
“protectorate” becomes indeed the central “institution” during this “neo-colonial” 
phase of European international law.99 Long established and originally applied among 
“civilised” states,  protectorates were developed to account for a situation wherein a 
small state requested permission to come under the protection of a more powerful 
one. The protectorate state here retained its “internal” sovereignty, while its “external” 
sovereignty was transferred to a more powerful foreign state. This “feudal” 
arrangement now experienced a renaissance, when it came to apply “by analogy” to 
uncivilised regions of the world. Westlake explains: 
“[I]n recent times a practice has arisen by which in such regions civilized powers 
assume and exercise certain rights in more or less well defined districts, to which rights 
and districts, for the term is used to express both the one and the other, the name of 
a protectorate is given by analogy. The distinctive characters of those rights are, first, 
that they are contrasted  with territorial sovereignty, for, as far as such sovereignty 
extends, there is the state itself which has acquired it and not a protectorate exercised 
by that state; secondly, that the protectorate first established excludes all other states  
 
96 Westlake, Territorial Sovereignty, Especially with Relation to Uncivilised Regions (supra n.91), 138. 
97 Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (supra n.84), 146. 
98 Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (supra n.61), §221: “even although such State is entirely 
outside the Family of Nations, is not a possible object of occupation, and it can only be acquired through 
cession or subjugation.“ This was true for (tribal) societies that had not yet formed a state; wherever 
there existed some form of government, a state had come into existence and could not simply be 
absorbed. In light of these – much more moderate – “German” views, when compared to British 
contemporaries, it is surprising that M. García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 104 claims that Oppenheim’s doctrine was “a far more radical 
promoter of neo-colonialization” than his contemporaries. This evaluation is, in my view, untenable.  
99 On the idea of the “protectorate”, see M.F. Lindley, The acquisition and government of backward 
territory in international law (Negro University Press, 1969), Chapter XXIII: “Protectorates”. 
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from exercising any authority within the district either by way of territorial sovereignty 
or of a protectorate—that is to say, while it lasts, for the question  remains whether a 
protectorate, like an inchoate title to territorial sovereignty, is not subject to conditions 
and liable to forfeiture  on their non-fulfilment ; thirdly, that the state enjoying the 
protectorate represents and protects the district and its population, native or civilised, 
in everything  which relates to other powers.”100 
 
The novel idea of the “colonial” protectorate represents a synthesis of two previously 
irreconcilable ideas. For while formally acknowledging the statehood of an uncivilised 
community, the essential aim behind this new type of protectorate is the future 
annexation of a state-turned-colony.101 The legal institution thus acknowledges the 
“inchoate title of territorial sovereignty” to the protector; and in a semantic perversion 
of its original meaning, the name “protectorate” no longer serves to signal the 
protection of an indigenous community from others; it is rather the protector itself 
that wishes to see itself protected against outside interference into “its” – future – 
colony. It is thus “[a]n essential feature of the colonial protectorate is that it is 
recognized by the other members of the International Family as giving to the 
protecting Power the right, as against themselves, to take steps in the direction of 
annexing the protected territory to its dominions.”102 The “colonial protectorate”, 
chiefly a British invention, soon becomes the standard model for the formal colonial 
expansion in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.103 Its status is famously 
“codified” in the 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference in West Africa.104  
 
 
100 J. Westlake, Territorial Sovereignty, Especially with Relation to Uncivilised Regions (supra n.91), 
182-3. 
101 This is, in my view, picked up by Oppenheim who is critical of extending the idea of the protectorate 
to states outside Europe; and who clearly and critically sees the institution, when applied to non-
Christian states as a preliminary form of colonisation (Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (supra 
n.61), §94). 
102 Lindley, The acquisition and government of backward territory in international law (supra n.99), 183: 
“No one has better expressed this new “colonial” meaning in English than Hall: “States may acquire 
rights by way of protectorate over barbarous or imperfectly civilised countries, which do not amount to 
full rights of property or sovereignty, but which are good as against other civilised states, so as to prevent 
occupation or conquest by them, and so as to debar them from maintaining relations with the protected 
states or peoples.”  
103 C.H. Alexandrowicz, The Afro-Asian world and the law of nations, (1968) 123 Collected Courses of 
the Hague Academy of International Law 117 at 191. For a historical analysis, see: A. Porter, European 
Imperialism, 1860-1914 (Macmillan, 1994). 
104 Especially: Articles 34 and 35. For an extensive discussion of the meaning of these provisions, see: 
Westlake, Territorial Sovereignty, Especially with Relation to Uncivilised Regions (supra n.91), 163-193; 
and see also: J. Fisch, Africa as terra nullius: The Berlin Conference and International Law, in: S. Forster 
et al (eds.), Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Conference 1884-1885 (Oxford University Press, 





Leaving the American debate aside, three major strands emerge in British discourses 
on the nature of international law in the nineteenth century. First, there – surprisingly 
– remains a lively natural law conception that has however shed its secular-rationalist 
character in favour of a Christian-moralist one. A second discourse begins around the 
middle of the nineteenth century. This second conception of international law roots 
its normativity in the “society of states”; and – inspired by the (German) Historical 
School – all law is seen to emerge from the collective consciousness and common 
culture of nations. Law is an organic phenomenon that naturally springs to life within 
every society: ubi societas, ibi ius; and because there exists a “society” of nations, there 
equally exists international law. Thirdly, and finally, there exists a strand of utilitarian 
positivism; yet neither Bentham nor Austin succeed in marshalling much support 
among British international jurists during the nineteenth century. For even if 
Bentham’s utilitarianism occasionally informs legal scholarship here, his ideas – 
including his call for international codification – do not become mainstream; and the 
same holds even more true for the Austinian philosophy of international “law”.  
It is therefore profoundly misleading to claim that British international jurists, even if 
only in latter part of the nineteenth century, “were most influenced by John Austin, 
the foremost spokesman for positivism”.105 In no part of that century was Austin taken 
too seriously – at least not by international law scholars; on the contrary, by the end 
of that century, Austinian positivism had become a pseudo-theory that British 
international lawyers instinctively rejected.106 The still often-claimed proposition that 
British international law debates during the nineteenth century are predominantly a 
 
105 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 44). 
106 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 51: “In the last years of the century, international lawyers routinely 
responded to the Austinian criticism by noting that law does not only come down by sovereign 
enactments but equally from the spontaneous functioning of society." This view is equally shared by D. 
Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, (1996) 65 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 385 at 401: “Broadly comparing the Austin/Bentham cite in theoretical 
chapters from, say 1840 through 1890, we find nineteenth century scholars relatively untroubled by 
Austin's assertion that international law is not law "properly so called."… In a sense, Austin had not yet 
become a challenge, let alone the central challenge, and international legal philosophy had not become 
a tradition of polemical response.” 
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discourse on “positivism” is thus fundamentally mistaken. For “positivism” and 
“historicism” are – as the overall “Conclusion” will show in greater detail below – very 
distinct normative philosophies, whose sole overlapping consensus lies in the rejection 
of abstract and utopian natural law thinking.107 And once we consider the historical 
school as a distinct philosophy of international law, the “British” nineteenth century 
turns out to be a German one!108  
There is however one particularly British element that needs to be added to the 
German historicist paradigm. For British international law comes to cement a 
distinction between “civilised” and “uncivilised” states that would have a profound 
effect on the scope of international law in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
The primary losers of this “contraction” in the personal scope of international law 
were thereby not China, the Ottoman Empire and Japan (which all are re-included, 
relatively quickly, once they have embraced the “Western” standard of civilisation);109 
the principal losers of the new “imperialist” character of international law are the 
“barbarous” societies of Africa. And following the – dramatic – expansion of the 
British Empire, whose size doubles in the second half of the nineteenth century, other 
European states feel the need to also expand their spheres of economic and political 
influence. (For Lenin, the new “European” imperialism indeed stemmed directly from 
the “capitalist” competition over the world market.110) This “European” colonialism 
encountered, at first, some spirited US American opposition; yet at the turn of the 
twentieth-century, the “New Imperialism” had equally captured the United States.111  
 
107 Contra, J. Pitts, Boundaries of the International (supra n.8), who argues that despite their fundamentally 
different outlook, the positivists and the historical school shared a fundamental similarity (ibid., 153) “I 
trace Maine’s historicist critique of Austinian positivism and revisit the debate between analytic and 
historical jurisprudence to argue that behind that apparently deep divide was a shared historical narrative 
that united aspirational scientific and universal claims about humanity as such, encapsulated in the 
paradoxical assertion that Europeans uniquely exemplified certain universal human tendencies or 
qualities, including social progress[.]” 
108 On this point, see the general conclusion of the thesis below.   
109 For an excellent discussion of China generally, see G. W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in 
International Society (Clarendon Press, 1984), Chapter 5: “The Standard of ‘Civilization’ and the Entry of 
China into International Society”.  
110 On the relationship between capitalism and imperialism, see V. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism (Penguin Classics, 2010). 
111 An academic precursor to this development is D. Dudley Field, Draft Outlines of an International Code 
(Baker, 1872), Article 77: “A nation has for itself and each of its members the right to explore and 
colonize any territory not within the territorial limits of a civilized nation.” 
 169 
Neither Benthamite utilitarianism nor Austinian positivism could have arrived – at 
least not directly – at this new formal “imperialist” conception of international law. 
For they simply lack the normative resources to envisage the distinction between 
“civilised” and “barbarous” states. These earlier utilitarianisms were “individualist” and 
“non-essentialist” philosophies that were also – in principle – not committed to a 
specific set of “civilised” values. The principle of utility and the principle of habitual 
obedience are, normatively, agnostic as to the degree of “civilisation” of the sovereign. 
The relationship between “positivism” and “imperialism” is therefore not as 
straightforward as some would have us believe.112 Nevertheless, there are elements of 
philosophical complicity. For not only could the principle of utility be (ab)used to 
explain why “civilised” nations might make better use of the territory and resources 
than an indigenous and “barbarous” people; even the imposition of a “higher” culture 
could, theoretically, be characterised as serving the general “civilisational” interest of 
humanity as a whole. And analytical positivism helped here too: for in drawing a 
categorical distinction between morality and law, it ultimately arrived at the very same 
conclusion as liberal imperialism: there cannot be a “natural right” to sovereign 
independence, as questions of sovereignty, are political and not legal questions.  
Be that as it may, the best way to explain the rise of formal imperialism in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century is to see it as a combination of two – independent – 
elements. The (German) Historical School’s emphasis on a “regional” international 
law combined with (British) liberal imperialism and thereby created a particularistic 
universalism that came to explain and justify why “underdeveloped” societies in the 
rest of the world could and should be excluded from the legal rights granted by 






112 Viewed from this perspective, it is therefore mistaken to argue along the lines of A. Anghie, 
















The Story Thus Far: International Law until 1914 
 
In the transition from the eighteenth to the twentieth century something peculiar 
seems to happen to the normative foundation and personal scope of international law. 
Starting from a natural law conception that is “rationalist” and “universal”, and which 
originally denies the very existence of positive international law, one hundred-fifty 
years later the exact opposite view prevails. Now, the existence of a natural law is 
generally denied: all international law must be “positive” law; and far from its 
“universal” scope and “utopian” ambitions, international law has become “European” 
and “apologetic”. How did this transformation happen? If nature and history abhor 
radical changes, what conceptual process was here at play? This thesis has tried to 
answer this question; and in its methodological approach, it has attempted to steer a 
synthetic middle course between (German) idealism and (British) empiricism. For all 
philosophical thought without history is empty; all history without philosophical concepts is blind. In 
light of that “Kantian” programme, this Conclusion will first evaluate the results 
encountered in the previous five chapters; and, in a second step, it will then test the 
three conventional beliefs that it set out to challenge in the Introduction. 
We started in Chapter 1 with a retrospective analysis of the eighteenth century as a 
“Sattelzeit”.1 It is a time of semantic restructuring in which three normative conceptions 
of international law co-exist and compete: a “theological” conception, a 
“metaphysical” conception, and a “positivist” conception. Surprisingly, each of the 
three conceptions can still be found, in one way or another, within the long nineteenth 
century;2 yet according to the academic “standard” account, it is the third conception 
– positivism – that comes to dominate.3 Our close analysis of the philosophical theory 
and jurisprudential practice within Germany and Britain must qualify this conventional 
wisdom.  
 
1 On the importance of the eighteenth century as a “Sattelzeit”, see: R. Kosselleck, Einleitung, in: O. 
Brunner et al. (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Klett, 2004) – Volume 1, XV.  
2 A “theocratic” understanding of international law can still, to some extent, be found in the “Holy 
Alliance”; as well as in some of the British jurists discussed in Chapter 5. 
3 For this traditional classification, see: A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Macmillan, 
1954), esp. 175-250; and more recently: S. Neff, Justice among Nations: A History of International Law 
(Harvard University Press, 2014), Part III: “A Positive Century (1815-1914)”.  
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German philosophy indeed remains firmly embedded in an idealist project that – after 
Kant – manifests itself however in two main variants (Chapter 2). On one side stands 
Hegel’s absolute idealism, which develops a “natural law” conception based on the 
state as the ultimate (and divine) unit of social organisation; and having posited the 
state at the apex of all normativity, Hegel unsurprisingly comes to deny the “objective” 
normativity of international law. The Historical School, on the other hand, is able to 
envisage a normative order above that state; yet it insists on its being rooted in a moral 
community that is socially constituted. All law here derives from a metaphysical source: 
the “spirit” of people(s); and while this spirit will primarily speak to one people, the 
Historical School can envisage a moral community above the nation. A “family” of 
culturally similar and socially connected nations will form an international society that, 
in turn, will be the moral cradle for its own customs and laws.  
We saw in Chapter 3 that this – historicist – legal philosophy becomes dominant in 
the juristic imagination in Germany for the better part of the nineteenth century; and, 
as Chapter 5 has – perhaps surprisingly – shown, the same holds true for much of the 
British nineteenth century. Instead of Bentham and Austin – these British princes of 
utilitarian positivism – it is Savigny and the German Historical School that come to 
decisively shape British conceptions of international law in the nineteenth century.4 
This however is not the complete picture. For by the end of the nineteenth century, a 
renaissance of Hegelianism triggers a methodological revolution in German public law 
that – via Jellinek and Triepel – would also significantly change the German conception 
of international law in the twentieth century. International law here assumed a 
“positivist” streak, because according to these Neo-Hegelians, all law must find its 
normative origin in a state will. Not only is there no universal – natural – law of nations; 
there also cannot be any regional – historical – customary law above states. All 
international law is “particular” law based on the state will(s); and the primary 
instrument of this – positive – international law is the international treaty.  
Yet this – extreme – form of state positivism, emerging at the very end of the 
nineteenth century, has little influence in Great Britain. For Westlake (and originally 
Oppenheim) stay embedded within the older (German) conception of the community 
or family of nations and which continues to see custom as the principal source of 
 
4 The exception to this rule, discussed in Chapter 5, is the British conception of private international 
law, where Austin did, arguably, play a significant role.  
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international law. The “speciality” of British international law in the nineteenth century 
is therefore decidedly not its “positivist” conception; rather, and as we saw in Chapter 
5, it comes to develop a “colonialist” vision of the European family of nations. 
Inspired by the liberal imperialism of John Stuart Mill, this “British” conception 
assumes a “hierarchical” dimension that is eventually (ab)used to “disenfranchise” 
non-European peoples from their membership in the society of nations. And sadly, 
after 1880, this British colonial conception goes mainstream in Europe, including 
Germany.5 
But let us take a step back: what does it all mean; and, what about the three 
conventional beliefs the thesis wished to challenge? The three received ideas listed in 
the Introduction were: first, the belief that the nineteenth century should be characterised 
as a “positivist” century; secondly, the belief that there was a radical break in the 
conception of international law around 1870; and, thirdly, the belief that the nineteenth 
century should be characterised as the “British” century shaped by a Benthamite 
conception of international law. 
Let us start with the first view. If the Historical School dominates nineteenth century 
discussions on the normativity of international law, should it be characterised as part 
of a “naturalist” or a “positivist” project; or, is it a – third and different – way of 
thinking about law that deserves its own classification? In line with Kantian 
“naturalism”, the Historical School starts out from a conception of “private law”; yet 
unlike Kant, it does not derive its private law system from a “rationalist” and 
“individualist” but an “organicist” and “collectivist” base. This conception looks at the 
past, but it is also dynamic and evolving – a contrast that clearly distinguishes it from 
all “naturalist” philosophies that imagine an “eternal” and “static” law. And whereas 
“rationalist” accounts locate the ultimate source of all law in human reason and 
consciousness – with each individual human being representing the universal 
community of mankind, for the Historical School all law derives from the collective 
consciousness of particular moral communities of people(s).  
 
5 There is no (formal) “colonial” international law in Germany (or Italy and France) until late in the 
nineteenth century. The continental European rejection of the colonial idea is well summed up by H. 
Bonfis, Manuel de Droit International Public (Rousseau, 1905), 312: “Le respect des droits d’indépendance 
et de souveraineté intérieure des tribus barbares est inseigné par Heffter, Klüber, G.F. de Martens, 
Pradier-Fodéré, Gérard de Rayneval, Ortolan, Salomon, etc.” On Bismarck’s late conversion to the 
colonial idea, see H.L. Wesseling, The European Colonial Empires: 1815-1919 (Pearson, 2004), 135. 
On Mancini’s late colonialism, see: T Scovazzi, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini e la teoria italiana del 
colonialismo, (1995) 78(3) Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 677.   
 174 
This position however clearly distinguishes the Historical School from legal positivism 
too. For unlike the latter, it is “consciousness” not “being” – pace Marx – that is seen 
as the source of all law; and it is for that reason that (philosophical) “jurists” and not 
(empirical) legislators come to be seen as the principal organs of law-making. Indeed: 
one of the main differences between the Historical School and legal positivism lies in 
their fundamentally different conception of the relation between a “people” and its 
“state”. For whilst the state remains alien and external to the historicist account of law, 
it constitutes the normative centre of all positivist philosophies. Instead of a customary 
law created outside and without state institutions, all law is here reduced to “institutional” 
or formal state law; and, in the utilitarian logic, the legislator simply aggregates the 
individual preferences of (hedonistic) individuals that happen to have formed a “state 
people”.6  
 
 Idealism Realism 
 Rationalists Historicists Positivists 
    
Principal Law Natural Law Customary Law Institutional Law 








Future Past Present 
Ontological 
Character 
Rationalist Organicist Voluntarist 







Table 1. Overview 
 
The philosophical premises of the Historical School are thus very different from both 
the “rationalist” and the “positivist” schools (Table 1). The Historical School here 
stands between “idealism” and “realism”; and distinct from rationalism and positivism, 
it should consequently not be seen as a “Grotian” mixture that combines elements of 
both; but, rather, as a third and distinct conception of normativity whose special 
characteristics are ontologically different from either of the two other philosophical 
 
6 Once again: the fundamental difference between the “Historical School” and “State Positivism” is that 
for the fomer, the “people” is a “natural” unit, whereas for the latter it is a “constructed” unit. 
Technically, the “Staatsvolk” only comes into existence positively, that is with the creation of a state 
and the “people” in this sense do not exist outside a state.  
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schools. Once this is recognised, the conceptual changes that take place in the 
foundations of international law in the long nineteenth century can be described as a 
two-stage process in which “rationalism” gives way to “historicism” and “historicism” 
is, in a much later second step, substituted by “positivism” at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  
The best surface indicator of this two-step transformation is the changing hierarchy of 
sources through which international law is produced. For in line with the 
transformation of the overall philosophical project, these normative sources change in 
order and importance. The “rationalist” project clearly prioritises human reason, as 
deciphered by philosophical jurists, such as Wolff; while custom and treaties are not 
“real” international law. The emergence of “customary law”, as an independent and 
formal source of international law, is then a nineteenth century achievement of the 
Historical School.7 Yet while becoming its central source, the Juristenrecht retains – while 
not unchallenged – its status as a formal source of law. The importance of custom is 
however eclipsed with the rise of state positivism, which – at the beginning of the 
twentieth century – places the international treaty at the very centre of all international 
law.8 Seen from the philosophical perspective of state voluntarism, international 
treaties are the best expressions of sovereign state wills, with “custom” being relegated 
 
7 P. Guggenheim, Contribution à l’histoire des sources du droit des gens, (1958) 94 Collected Courses 
of the Hague Academy of International Law 1 at 52; as well as A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in 
International Law (Cornell University Press, 1971), 47: “Prior to the nineteenth century, no writer had 
addressed himself to the details of custom-formation. But then, in that century, Puchta and Savigny 
took the first step[.]”. For both Guggenheim and D’Amato, the modern “twentieth century” version is 
born with François Gény’s “Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif” (1899). 
8 For Triepel’s criticism of the Historical School’s emphasis on “legal consciousness” as the origin of 
international normativity, see: H. Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Hirschfeld, 1899), 30: “Wenn das 
Recht das Produkt eines Willens ist, so ist ... es unzulässig, eine „Rechtsüberzeugung“ oder ein 
„Rechtsbewusstsein“ als Quelle des Rechts, in Sonderheit des Völkerrechts hinzustellen. Dem 
Ideenkreise der sogenannten historischen Rechtsschule entstammend und für die Rechtsquellentheorie 
zunächst des Landesrechts in einschneidender Weise verwertet, haben diese Begriffe auch in der Lehre 
des Völkerrechts als internationales oder gemeinsames Rechtsbewusstsein, internationale, 
gemeinschaftliche Rechtsüberzeugung der Staaten oder gar der Menschheit gastlich Aufnahme 
gefunden - , eine Adoption, die weder glücklich noch notwendig gewesen ist. Wie nahe diese und 
ähnliche Anschauungen mit der angeblich schon längst überwundenen naturrechtlichen Theorie 
zusammenhängen, ist erst neuerdings, wie mir erscheint überzeugend, nachgewiesen worden.” For the 
classic statement that custom, like international law generally, is merely positive morality that is only 
transmuted into a legal rule when adopted by a sovereign legislature or a judge, see: J. Austin, The Province 
of Jurisprudence Determined (editor: W. Rumble; Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35.  
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into to a secondary – less “conscious” – “treaty”.9  The respective hierarchy of sources, 
within each of our three philosophical projects, can be found in Table 2. 
 
Rationalism Historicism Positivism 
Jurists (natural law) Custom Treaties 
Treaties Jurists (general principles) Custom 
Custom Treaties Jurists (teachings) 
 
Table 2. Legal sources (auxiliary sources in italics) 
 
 
These shifts in the sources of international law also tell us something about the 
“contraction thesis” by Charles Alexandrowicz – briefly discussed in the Introduction to 
the thesis. For whatever is seen as the primary and foundational source of international 
law determines whether international law is considered to be “universal” or “regional” 
in scope (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Universal and Regional Conceptions  
 
The transition from a (universal) natural law to custom thus leads to a “regionalisation” 
and “contraction” of international law, since custom is, by nature, a regional rather 
than a universal phenomenon. By contrast, the emphasis on international treaties 
 
9 A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (supra n.7), 50: “Custom is a tacit treaty, binding 
only those states which have tacitly consented. Custom, in the respective writings of Anzilotti, Corbett, 
and Strupp, amounts only to a uniting of wills of independent states.” 
 177 
reintroduces – pace Alexandrowicz – a universal element, wherever treaties between 
two or more “classes” or “families” of nations can be found. One could even take this 
a step further and argue that positivism simply lacks the intrinsic normative resources 
to arrive at a (regional) conception of international law. It cannot, for example, itself 
distinguish between “civilised” and “barbarous” societies. The “exclusionary” 
normative element must here always come from somewhere else – an external 
“metaphysical” premise – be it Hegel’s dominant national spirit(s) or Mill’s 
civilisational philosophy.   
What about the second conventional view: the belief that there was a “radical” break 
in the way international law is conceptualised around 1870? One of today’s brilliant 
academic voices here justified his major work on the short nineteenth century with the 
“sense that earlier accounts of the profession’s pedigree failed to give an adequate 
sense of the radical character of the break that took place in the field between the first 
half of the nineteenth century and the emergence of a new professional self-awareness 
and enthusiasm between 1869 and 1885”.10 For Koskenniemi, the creation of the 
“Institute of International Law” in 1873 constitutes a foundational moment 
symbolising the true beginning of the modern discipline of international law.11 To 
recall, the core provision within the Institute’s Statute here states as follows:  
“The Institute of International Law is an exclusively scientific association, and with 
no official character. Its objects are - 
(1) To favour the progress of International Law by seeking to become the organ of 
the legal conscience [consciousness] of the civilised world. 
(2) To formulate the general principles of the science, as well as the rules that result 
from it, and to spread the knowledge of it.  
(3) To give its aid to any serious attempt at gradual and progressive codification. 
(4) To endeavour to procure the official recognition of such principles as shall have 
been recognised as being in harmony with the requirements of modern society.”12 
 
 
10 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3-4. 
11 Ibid., esp. 39-47. On the origins of the Institute, see: R. Yakentchouk, Les origines de l’Institut du 
Droit international, (1973) 77 Revue general de droit international 373. 
12 For a reprint of the original statute, see: J. Lorimer, The Institute of International Law Founded at Ghent, 
in: Studies National and International – Being Occasional Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh, 1864-
1889 (Green, 1890), 77 at 82. The translation of the French “conscience” into “conscience” in paragraph 
1 was a choice, perhaps a mistake by Lorimer, as the French equally stands for “consciousness” – a term 
devoid of the moralist connotations within “conscience”. According to Kokenniemi, far from being a 
mistake, the ambivalence of the French “conscience” as both a rationalist and a moralist concept, stands 
behind the Institute and the “Victorian” moralistic flavour of the period of international law from 1870-
1960.   
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The establishment of the Institute undoubtedly marked a crucial and critical moment 
in the gradual realisation of professional self-consciousness within the growing 
community of international jurists; yet a closer textual reading of its objectives also 
demonstrates their embeddedness in an earlier nineteenth-century tradition. For 
example: the idea that “jurists” were to act as the “organ” of the legal “consciousness” 
clearly reflected a “historicist” philosophy. In fact, it combined two central ideas of 
the Historical School, namely, that the “legal consciousness” constitutes the – idealistic 
– foundation of all “positive law” and, secondly, the particular idea – to quote Savigny 
– that “the estate of jurists” represents the best organ to record the “living customary 
law and thus for true progress”.13 With Mancini, as one of the founding members of 
the Institute, it is indeed not surprising that this philosophical programme entered into 
the mission statement of the newly established “organ” of international law; and this 
intimacy with the Historical School also best explains the importance of private(!) 
international law within the early life of the Institute. 
However, something important had changed around 1870. For the Savignian 
pessimism with regard to codification had given way to a feeling of professional 
optimism – best represented by Mancini’s rejoinder to Savigny in “Of the Vocation of 
our Century for the Reform and Codification of International Law”.14 This belief in 
the ability to formulate general principles from custom and to codify international law 
though “law-making” conventions set a new trend in the codification of international 
law. (Some have traced the trend all the way back to Bentham,15 but a more convincing 
starting point is the Lieber Code that was to inspire two founding members of the 
Institute: Johann Kaspar Bluntschli and David Dudley Field.16) It is this optimistic 
hope in the “constructivist” power of codification and the – in retrospect – naïve 
optimism to “procure the official recognition of such principles” that marks, with 
Koskenniemi, a new beginning. And yet: it marks, in a dialectical sense, not necessarily 
the beginning of something new but the beginning of an end. For the codification of 
 
13 F. C. von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Mohr, 1828), 133. 
14 P.S. Mancini, Della Vocazione del Nostro Secolo per la Riforma e la Codificazione del Diritto delle Genti (Civelli, 
1874), esp. 48. 
15 E. Nys, The Codification of International Law, (1911) 5 American Journal of International Law 871. 
16 For a wonderful overview of the various codification efforts, see: R.P. Dhokalia, The Codification of 
Public International Law (Manchester University Press, 1970). And for the nineteenth century specifically, 
see E. Augusti, Paece by Code: Milestones in the Codification of International Law, in: T. Hippler & 
M. Vec, Paradoxes of Peace in Nineteenth Century Europe (Oxford University Press, 2015), 37. 
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international law is, ultimately, a “positivistic” and “apologetic” project that starts to 
shift the normative foundations of international law from the “common 
consciousness” of mankind to the express “consent” of sovereign States. The Institute 
of International Law here became – counterintuitively – a collaborative force in a 
movement that will eventually undermine its founding principle: the moral 
“consciousness” or “conscience” as the principal normative force behind international 
law. 
What about the third – and final – conventional view? Is the nineteenth century really 
best characterised as a “British” century dominated by the Benthamite conception of 
“international law”? Chapter 5 has already answered to this question negatively, but let 
me here try to give a more positive answer. In the course of the nineteenth century, 
the older denomination “law of nations” becomes indeed gradually replaced – albeit 
not in Germany – by the newer term “international law”. And while Wheaton had 
dutifully cited Bentham for the English translation of the Latin ius inter gentes,17 the 
conceptual genealogy and path towards success has a very different trajectory. The 
causes for this success are thereby fundamentally opposed to the Benthamite project 
of international law (who, it may be recalled, introduces the term to stand for public 
international law, as a law between sovereign states).18  
For the new concept’s triumph is mainly due to the spectacular rise of the idea of private 
international law in the second half of the nineteenth century.19 And the reason for 
this success is simple: unlike the older “law of nations” denomination, the term 
“international law” offered a semantic umbrella to cover both “public” and “private” 
law as two equal branches of the same international tree. This “continental” 
conception has already been discussed in Chapter 3 with regard to Germany, but let 
me also quote (despite the missing discussion of the “French” nineteenth century in 
the present thesis) one of the most influential French texts here:  
“International law (jus gentium) is the set of principles accepted by civilized and 
independent nations to regulate the relations that exist or may arise between them and 
to decide on conflicts between the laws and various practices that govern them. 
International law is divided into public and private law. International public law (jus 
 
17 H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Caray, Lea & Blanchard, 1836), 36 – footnote 2. 
18 See Chapter 4 – Section 1 above. 
19 Joseph Story has been said to be the first to use the term (“Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws” 
(Little and Brown, 1841), 9); yet within Germany, it is Wilhelm Schäffner’s “Entwicklung des 
internationalen Privatrechts” (Sauerländer, 1841); and in France it will be Jean-Jacques Gaspard Foelix’s 
“Traité du Droit International privé” (Joubert, 1843) that popularise the term. 
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gentium publicum) regulates nation-to-nation relations; in other words, it has as its object 
conflicts of public law. Private international law (jus gentium privatum) is the set of rules 
by which conflicts between the private law of different nations are judged; in other 
words, private international law consists of the rules relating to the application of a 
State's civil or criminal laws in the territories of a foreign State.” 20 
 
The rise and success of the term “international law” is consequently not due to 
Bentham or the “British” conception of international law (which rejects the idea of a 
private “international” law altogether). It is rather the “continental” conception of 
international law, and especially the German Historical School, that allows private 
international law to become a legitimate sister of public international law.21 In essence: 
the success of the notion of “international law” is thanks to its widening to include 
private – international – law and not to the Benthamite narrowing to public relations 
between states! 22  
Yet it is, perhaps, also this link between “private” and “public” international law that 
may partly explain why the historicist conception of international law was ultimately 
so vulnerable to the exclusionary and colonial philosophy offered by British 
imperialism. For the fusion of private and public international law means that both 
should, in principle, be subject to the same normative principles; and that, in particular, 
means that moral dissimilarities within States may have external effects with regard to 
 
20 Ibid., 1-2. Nussbaum goes even so far as to claim that “the Law-of-Nations doctrine constituted a 
virtually unified conception“ and that “[n]early all of the leading continental writers of the period 
espoused the Law-of-Nations conception: in France, Weiss, Pillet and Bartin; in Germany, von Bar and 
Zitelmann; in Italy, Fiore and Diena; in Holland, Jitta; in Belgium, Laurent; in Switzerland, Brocher and 
Meili” (A. Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 
42 Columbia Law Review 189 at 194). 
21 On the importance and influence of the German Historical School on (French) Private international 
law, see: A. Pillet, Principes de Droit International Privé (Pedone, 1903), 12: « Les travaux de l’école allemande 
ont surtout été remarquables à cet égard et les noms de Schaeffner, de Waechter, de Savigny, de Brocher, 
de de Bar, pour ne citer que les plus connus, ont le droit d’être honorés comme ceux des fondateurs et 
des plus illustres représentants de cette école aux progrès de laquelle il semble bien que l’avenir de notre 
science soit dorénavant lié. »   
22 In terms of the dominant “ideas” of the age, Grewe’s identification of the nineteenth century as the 
“British” century is thus wrong (W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (De Gruyter, 2000), 429: “In 
respect of the development of international law in the nineteenth century this constellation had the 
effect that, on the one hand and primarily under British influence, international law increased in scope 
to become universal.”) For not only is the Benthamite idea of “international law” not at all prevalent on 
the continent, where the broader conception of public and private international law prevails; more 
importantly, on a substantive level, Grewe is mistaken to identify Britain as the intellectual centre behind 
the international law thinking within this historical epoch. Britain remains an “imperial” thinker and as 
such is not at all behind a “universalist” conception of international law that enfranchise the rest of the 
globe. In the words of Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (supra n.10), 34: "An Empire is 
never an advocate of an international law that can seem only an obstacle to its ambitions. The persistent 
British refusal to underwrite a legal system of collective intervention in the legitimist cause may have 
been justified by a genuine aversion against absolutism -- but the absence of common rules or agreed 
procedures also automatically played into its hands.” 
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their membership in the “society of nations”.23 The existence of a “capitulation” 
system, or extraterritorial consular jurisdiction generally, here suddenly comes to signal 
the absence of a common “civilisational” base that, in turn, becomes evidence of why 
a foreign state cannot be part of the (European) family of nations.24 The link between 
private and public international law, then, subtly undermines the sovereign equality of 
states because the existence of a different private law – say a different family law – 
comes to be a reason why – say Islamic states – cannot be members of the European 
family of nations.  
 
 
The Story Beyond 1914: Outlook and Trend(s)  
 
What would the twentieth century bring? The long nineteenth century ends in a 
cataclysmic catastrophe: the First World War. This war – unlike any other within the 
nineteenth century – fatally damages the belief that a common legal “consciousness” 
could itself guarantee the binding nature of international norms. International treaties 
had been violated;25 and the idea of a “family of nations” in which a common standard 
of civilisation would “civilise” the Great War had been shattered. The shock that states 
“really” acted like Hobbesian wolves triggered several reactions three of which shall 
briefly be mentioned. These three intellectual responses will remain – in the first third 
of the twentieth century – unsuccessful “utopian” projects that flounder when the 
post-1918 settlement itself collapses under the weight of its political contradictions 
 
23 This point is well made by Westlake, A Treaties on Private International Law (Maxwell, 1858), 144: “In 
other words, the extraterritorial acceptance of rights founded on territorial laws can only exist as 
between countries which resemble each other in the leading characters of their civilization, and none of 
which departs in any considerable degree from the average standard of those characters. We could not, 
for instance, recognize polygamy in Christian Europe or America, on the ground that the plural 
marriages were contracted in Turkey and by Turks. In this manner, the principle of the law of the parties 
marks as it were the limits of this department of legal science. It is when the conditions fail for applying 
its ordinary rules, from a contact with places where no law has yet been enacted, or with populations 
not within the jural community it supposes, that this principle, suppressed in general, emerges to supply 
the defect with all the force which it possessed in the infancy of law. The following cases however still 
mark its occasional employment even in Christendom.” 
24 One of the best expressions of this link between private and public international law is here offered 
by E. Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, (1910) 4 American Journal of 
International Law 517 at 521.  
25 I. Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (Cornell University 
Press, 2014). 
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and rising economic pressures.26 The three inter-war phenomena I am thinking of here 
are: (1) the rise of “universal” international institutions; (2) the brief revival of “natural 
law” theories to counter state positivism; and (3) the emergence of the neo-Kantian 
idea of the unity of all law.  
Let me only look briefly at the first – and most significant – phenomenon: the creation 
of the “League of Nations”. The latter initiates the “move to institutions” that would 
become the hallmark of the twentieth century.27 Predominantly an Anglo-Saxon 
project,28 the League was principally open to all sovereign States and territories.29 Its 
main aim was to “promote international cooperation and to achieve international 
peace and security” by imposing international obligations that were to be monitored 
by the League.30 The birth of permanent institutions to “represent” the international 
community was a major step in the formal “organisation” of the world. (This also 
famously included the creation of a judicial world organ: the “Permanent Court of 
International Justice”.31) The League was quickly seen as of a “sui generis” nature;32 
and from a substantive point of view, it offered a panoply of path-breaking 
innovations. Vaguely reminiscent of the European Concert in the early nineteenth 
century, the League Covenant had declared “[a]ny war or threat of war” to be “a matter 
 
26 On the various internal contradictions specifically, see C. S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: 
Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton University Press, 2015). 
27 D. Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, (1987) 8 Cardozo Law Review 841. For early discussions of 
the League, see P.E. Corbett, What is the League of Nations, (1924) 5 British Yearbook of International 
Law 119; as well as: F. Bleiber, Der Völkerbund (Kohlhammer, 1939). 
28 D. Kennedy, The Move to Institutions (supra n.27) 909 and 922. 
29 According to Article 1(2) of the League Covenant, the League was open to “[a]ny fully self-governing 
State, Dominion or Colony” and thus constituted a potentially (!) “universal” institutional project. The 
major absentees among the original members were (defeated) Germany and (communist) Russia which 
joined only later on; but more importantly still was the rejection of the League by the United States.  
30 Ibid., Preamble and Article 2.  
31 Ibid., Articles 13 and 14.  
32 L. Oppenheim, The League of Nations and Its Problems: Three Lectures (Longmans, 1919), 18 and 22: “Many 
people think that it would be possible to do away with war for ever, and they therefore demand a World 
State, a Federal State comprising all the single States of the world on the pattern of the United States of 
America. (…) I believe that these demands go much too far and are impossible of realisation. A Federal 
State comprising all the single States of the whole civilised world is a Utopia… Yet while a Federal 
World State is impossible, a League of Nations is not, provided such league gives itself a constitution, 
not of a state-like character, but one sui generis. What can be done is this: the hitherto unorganised 
Family of Nations can organise itself on simple lines so as to secure, on the one hand, the absolute 
independence of every State, and, on the other hand, the peaceful co-existence of all the States.”  
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of concern to the whole League” and asked its members to submit a dispute that could 
not be settled by diplomacy to arbitration or judicial settlement.33  
Normatively, the League was nevertheless firmly part of a new “positivist” project. 
While it was meant to be a “universal” treaty unlike any other;34 the “sources” of 
international law had not been radically reformed or rearranged. For even if 
Oppenheim was to speak of “international legislation” as a new source instigated by 
the League,35 there were no real “legislative” matters for which the League was 
responsible – except, ironically, for “those colonies and territories which as a 
consequence of the late war ha[d] ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States 
which formerly governed them and which [were] inhabited by peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”.36 The 
League here assumed the performance of “a sacred trust of civilisation” under which 
the colonies of the defeated parties were under its “mandate” and taken under its 
“tutelage”.37  
But apart from this “colonial” legislation, the general sources of “classic” international 
law were confirmed and codified. They were and are: 
“1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
4. … the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law...”38 
 
 
33 League of Nations Covenant, Articles 11 and 13. 
34 For the “primacy“ of the League Covenant over all inter-se agreements of its Members, see ibid., 
Article 20: “The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all 
obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly 
undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.” 
However, Article 21 expressly recognized the co-existence of “regional understandings like the Monroe 
doctrine” that would not be affected by the League.”  
35 Oppenheim, The League of Nations (supra n.32), 41. He however admits to using the term “in a 
figurative sense only” (ibid); and equally grants that “International Statutes cannot be created by a vote 
of the majority of States but only by a unanimous vote of all the members of the Community of civilised 
states” (ibid, 44). 
36 League of Nations Covenant, Article 22 (1). 
37 Ibid., Article 22 (2). Importantly, the mandate system was confined to some – not all – colonies; and 
while the principle of (national) self-determination was to become a cornerstone of the post-1918 world; 
the international effort to decolonise the world would have to wait until after the World War II. 
38 Article 38 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
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The priority of international treaties over international custom here formally 
announced the “positivist” victory over the custom-oriented Historical School; while 
the reference to “general principles of law recognized by civilised nations” consolidated, 
albeit indirectly, the nineteenth-century division into civilised and uncivilised counties 
and indeed confirmed the formal “imperialist” character of international law that had 
informally emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.39 Leaving the 
ambiguous third source aside,40 a fourth – subsidiary – source was still seen in the 
“teachings” of international legal scholars; yet there seems no shying away from the 
conclusion that the League wholeheartedly subscribed to a “positivist” project in 
which the States themselves took control over the sources of “their” law and in which 
the individual consent requirement triumphed over all non-voluntary forms of 
international law.41  
With the League, three phenomena become – it will be argued in the future – “the” 
defining characteristics of the twentieth century. These three characteristics are: the 
rise of “nationalism”, the consolidation of “colonialism”, and the triumph of 
“positivism”. The principle of “nationality”, born in the nineteenth century but still 
predominantly rejected in public international law,42 was to rise to general prominence 
in the first half of the twentieth century. (Ironically, at the same time, the “shift from 
idealism to realism” led private international law scholars to increasingly embrace the 
Anglo-American “conflict of law” conception.43) And it is also the twentieth century 
 
39 G. Schwarzenberger, The Standard of Civilisation in International Law, (1955) Current Legal 
Problems 220. 
40 On the origins of this third “ambiguous” source as a compromise between “naturalists” and 
“positivists”, see: P. Guggenheim, Contribution à l’histoire des sources du droit des gens (supra n.7), 
76-79. 
41 For anecdotal evidence, see only the Jellinek-like conception of international law by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in the Case of the “S.S. Wimbledon”: Britain et al. v. Germany, 
(1923) PCIJ Series A01, para.35: “The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a 
State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its 
sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the 
exercise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain 
way. But the right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.” 
42 See only: A. Bulmerincq, Praxis, Theorie und Codification des Völkerrechts (Duncker & Humblot, 1874), 
66. Even Mancini would later relativize his views, see: H. Raschhofer, Volk und Staat in der italienischen 
Rechtstheorie des 19. Jahrhunderts, (1936) 6 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht 538; as well already P. Fiore, Aggregazioni Legittime Secondo Il Diritto Internazionale: Esame Critico 
Del Princiipio Di Nazionalità (Paravia, 1879).  
43 T.M. Boer, Living Apart Together: The Relationship between Public and Private International Law, 
(2010) 57 Netherlands International Law Review 183. 
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in which colonialism assumes its “international” and “scientific” character.44 The most 
important normative development within the following century however is the move 
to “institutions”, briefly mentioned above, and the spectacular triumph of international 
law positivism.  
This “positivistic” triumph is often traced back – at least in the British literature –  to 
Oppenheim, whose textbook has a most impressive afterlife in the twentieth century.45 
We however saw in Chapter 5 that Oppenheim had originally remained within the 
older nineteenth-century German historicist tradition; yet his subsequent vocal 
positivism came to stand for “the absolute renunciation of a natural law foundation”.46 
With it came the belief that “the method to be applied by the science of international 
law can be no other than the positive method”;47 and that international law was but a 
collection of treaties and customs in which even the most foundational principles – 
like pacta sunt servanda – are nothing but custom to be codified in the future.48 This 
“positivist” project was, at first, not shared by many continental scholars;49 yet with 
the predominance of Anglo-American “realist” thinking in the twentieth century, the 
triumph of positivism was sealed. The twentieth century becomes “the” positivist 
 
44 M. Koskenniemi, The legacy of the nineteenth century, in: D. Armstrong, Routledge Handbook of 
International Law (Routledge, 2011), 141 at 144: “Colonialism began as a “science” only within the 
mandates system of the League of Nations in the 1920s and then in theories of “development” in the 
1950s and thereafter.” 
45 On the afterlife of Oppenheim’s international law treatise, see: W. M. Reisman, Lassa Oppenheim’s 
Nine Lives, (1994) 19 Yale Journal of International law 255. 
46 M. García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
80. The famous passage within Oppenheim’s “The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method” 
((1908) 2 American Journal of International Law 313 at 329) reads: “We know now-a-days that it is 
impossible to find a law which has its roots in human reason only and is above legislation and customary 
law.” 
47 Ibid., 333. 
48 Ibid., 349. For his idea that the answer to the question why treaties are binding lies in custom, see: M. 
Schmoeckel, The Internationalist as a Scientist and Herald: Lassa Oppenheim, (2000) 11 European 
Journal of International Law 699 at 701. According to Kingsbury, Oppenheim here breaks with 
Westlake and adopts a course that will make him the “real” founding father of British international law 
positivism in the twentieth century, see: B. Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: 
International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law, (2002) 13 
European Journal of International Law 401, esp. at 409. 
49 This reaction is, perhaps, best exemplified by the post-1914 international law conceptions of Louis 
Le Fur, who revives a “natural law” theory of international law (« La théorie du droit naturel depuis le 
XVII siècle et la doctrine moderne », (1927) 18 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 259.   
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century in which British empiricism and American “realism” provide the dominant 
“world spirit”.50 
It is through the prism of the “short” twentieth century (1918-1989) that we tend to 
look back. This “retrospective” however often leads to anachronistic fallacies in which 
we project the “present” into the “past” and in which the rich traditions of the 
nineteenth century are unceremoniously buried. Yet the nineteenth century is not the 
twentieth century! It was a century filled with naturalist and idealist thinking and, as 
such, a “metaphysical” – not a positivist – century. It starts early with a utopian 
“practical” project – the French Revolution – and two (semi-)utopian philosophers: 
Kant in Germany and Bentham in Britain.51 Yet a century and a half later, this 
theoretical and practical utopianism has been almost entirely replaced, at least at the 
international level, by a positivistic professionalism that even in its codification 
ambitions is “apologetic” in nature. For to codify the past or present is not to construct 
a better future.  
 
 
50 … at least within the “First World”! For the “Soviet” approach to international law in the “second 
world”, see: G.I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Harvard University Press, 2014). 
51 Bentham is, after all, a radical reformer whose “positivism” is not to codify the past; and in his 
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